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The Interrelationship between Human Rights and Climate Change: An Appraisal 
M.A. Payva Almonte 
 
The increasing impacts of climate change upon a number of human rights of individuals and 
communities worldwide evidence the need of urgent and radical responses to the crisis. Climate 
change gives rise to an unprecedented scenario that challenges otherwise unquestioned intrinsic 
notions within human rights in relation to the environment. This thesis argues that climate change 
acts as a catalyst of human rights rethinking and potential reforms in the long term. Indeed, the 
context of climate change exposes conceptual misunderstandings in the human rights’ relational 
approach to the environment. As part of its Western origins, international human rights law has 
traditionally represented the natural world as an object of instrumental value insofar it satisfies 
human needs. This (mis)representation of the natural world reflected in international human rights 
law legitimises rapacious environmental exploitation - or, at least, allows human rights’ complicity 
therein - in a way to meet neoliberal aims of unlimited (and unequal) economic growth, which 
mostly benefits multinational corporations. Corporations are considered responsible for about two-
thirds of global emissions and, hence, the main contributors to climate change.1 Yet, corporate 
actors traditionally operate within a favourable regulatory framework that allows them to 
disproportionally contribute to global climate change through the carbon footprint of their 
activities.  
 
Global warming must be kept to a maximum of 1.5°C in order to limit catastrophic effects of 
climate change, for which it is vital to radically drop global carbon emissions.2 Yet, governments’ 
responses have failed to meet the level of urgency and ambition required to limit climate impacts. 
As a consequence, civil society is mobilising, inter alia, through climate litigation. Using rights-
based climate litigation as a case study, this thesis seeks to determine whether or not climate 
change has the potential to catalyse rethinking and even reforms in international human rights law, 
 
1 See, for example, Matthew Taylor and Jonathan Watts, ‘The Polluters revealed: The 20 firms behind all carbon 
emissions’ (The Guardian, 9 October 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/oct/09/revealed-20-
firms-third-carbon-emissions> accessed 1 July 2020. 




in a way to gradually nuance its anthropocentric relational approach to the natural world. This does 
not imply suggesting that human rights should become non-anthropocentric in essence, but rather, 
I argue, that human rights may trigger a gradual change in their relational approach vis-à-vis the 
environment such that the natural world would be valued intrinsically. In doing so, this thesis also 
examines how human rights law operates in the context of climate litigation, whereby complex 
legal challenges of causation, attribution, extratemporality and extraterritoriality are presented. 
This thesis argues that, although still at an embryonic state rights-based climate litigation, human 
rights can, to some extent, assist in overcoming those technical challenges when applied in the 
context of climate change. Overall, this thesis argues that the cross-cutting and multifaceted global 
problem of climate change demands ‘business unusual’ responses from different fields, including 
international human rights law.  The context of climate change has the potential to prompt such 
responses, including structural rethinking and correction of human rights’ (mis)understandings on 
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The Earth, as we know it, is facing a life-or-death situation due to human-triggered climate change. 
Doomsday climate events, loss of biodiversity, harvest breakdown, vital resources scarcity, 
climate-related conflicts and ecosystems collapse are a present reality severely affecting peoples 
and ecosystems worldwide. Yet, governments, at international and national levels, are failing to 
react with measures quick and radical enough to limit the effects of the climate crisis. One of the 
human responses generated as a reaction to crises were human rights, a body of laws built on the 
basis of inherent and inalienable ‘rights’ that all humans enjoy, solely because of their human 
condition. However, from their origins to the present day, the idea and law of human rights have 
largely ignored a crucial factor in their anthropocentric rationale: nature.  
Human rights have grown and flourished decoupled from nature, despite being an integral part of 
human life and crucial for the realisation of human rights. Human rights law echoes a 
(mis)understanding on the relationship between humans and nature enrooted in mainstream law, 
whereby nature is represented as an object with the instrumental function of satisfying human 
needs.1 Humans, on the other hand, are not represented as a unique part of nature from which, just 
as other components of the natural world, depend for survival. Instead, human rights present 
humans as external and hierarchically superior to nature and, as such, entitled through law to 
exploit it.2 Although it falls beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse the roots and manifestations 
of this (mis)understanding in the relationship between humans, human rights, and nature,3 it is 
important to indicate this as a point of departure of this analysis. The implicit misrepresentation of 
the natural world in human rights - as a legal field focused on the protection of human beings and 
their entitlements characterised as ‘rights’ - has contributed to reinforce a wrong understanding of 
 
1 For Graham, for example, the ‘separation and hierarchical ordering of the human and non-human worlds constitutes 
the primary assumption from which most Western legal theory begins’. Nicole Graham, Lawscape: Property, 
Environment, Law (1st edn, Routledge 2010) 15. 
2 See, for example, Klaus Bosselman, ‘A vulnerable environment: contextualising law with sustainability’ (2011) 2(1) 
Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 43. 
3 For a philosophical analysis of legal anthropocentrism in human rights, see Anna Grear, ‘The vulnerable living 
order: human rights and the environment in a critical and philosophical perspective’ (2011) 2(1) Journal of Human 




nature that facilitates and legitimises environmental exploitation, which is at the core of the climate 
crisis. Certainly, the consequences of the long-lasting (mis)understanding of the relationship 
between humans and nature, reflected in laws and extended to other areas of living in society are 
increasingly being evidenced by the effects of climate change across the planet. That is why this 
thesis focuses on the interrelationship between human rights and climate change. Climate change 
– understood as ‘one of the greatest challenges of our time – an age where our impacts as human 
societies, have extended beyond our immediate environment and are now affecting entire planetary 
equilibria’,4 exposes the danger of implicit (mis)conceptions in our relationship with nature as 
human society, which are reflected in laws, and the need to correct them. This correction implies 
the evolution of law, in such a way as to recognise nature as a subject of inherent entitlements in 
the legal system – regardless whether these take the shape of ‘rights’ or otherwise – just like human 
beings, as part of the same whole.5 Maintaining traditional assumptions on nature within laws 
(including human rights law) where it is objectified as an utilitarian means to human ends, supports 
and legitimises the believes and actions that have led the world, as a global society to climate 
change, a threat to all forms of life on Earth, including human life which the law of human rights 
intends to protect.  
In that context, this thesis focuses on international human rights law as the ‘most putatively 
anthropocentric of all legal orders of rights’,6 dedicated to the protection of human beings through 
entitlements defined as ‘rights’, in contradictory disconnection to their natural environment. This 
thesis, therefore, argues that the relational approach of human rights to nature prevailing in 
Western law should be corrected in order to coherently -and likely more effectively- protect human 
rights, in harmony with nature. 7  As Burdon notes, ‘the dominant paradigm of Western law, which 
 
4 Benoit Mayer, The International Law on Climate Change (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2018) 1. 
5 For Bookchin, ‘what makes unity within diversity in nature more than an ecological metaphor for unity in diversity 
in society is the underlying philosophical concept of wholeness. By wholeness, I mean varying levels of actualization, 
an unfolding of the wealth of particularities that are latent in as-yet-underdeveloped potentiality.’ Murray Bookchin, 
The Ecology of Freedom – The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy (Cheshire Book, 2018) 27. 
6 Grear (n 3) 34. 
7 For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘Western’ refers, on the one hand, to the ‘vast heritage of humanist philosophy 
and theology [reflected in] western legal concepts [which] reflect anthropocentric values. Peter Burdon, ‘The Earth 
Community and Ecological Jurisprudence’ (2013) 3(5) Oñati Social-Legal Series 815, 815. And, on the other hand, 
in connection with the TWAIL context of this thesis, the term Western also refers to ‘the principles recognized in 
current international law [which] reflect relations of power and the historical dominance of specific Western states 
and their interests [excluding thus non-Western realities and interests]. As such the current norms of international law 
are internal to informal (neo)liberal imperialism’. Tony Evans and Alison J. Ayers, ‘In the Service of Power: The 




places humans at the centre of the legal system must be replaced with a conception of humans as 
part of an Earth community in which all natural beings, systems and the like are considered to be 
‘subjects, not objects’.8 Indeed, the Western inception of human rights present a one-sided view of 
living in society, in which humans are represented as a sort of ‘super specie’, disconnected from 
and with inherent ‘rights’ over nature, which is reduced to an ‘object’ deprived of ‘rights’,9 a 
‘storage bin of “natural resources” or “raw materials”10 at humans’ service. This 
(mis)understanding of the natural world reflected in international (human rights) law promotes an 
imaginary split between the human and natural world, which comes at an enormous cost to life 
(both human and non-human) and ecosystems across the planet. As Gearty puts it,  
‘the lack of interest in the nonhuman world is …built into the philosophy of human 
rights, …[which] is also evident in much of international human rights law’, thereby 
equipping governments unconcerned about environmental protection with a human 
rights-based reason for engaging in damaging activity’.11  
Under this logic, legal systems have empowered ‘humans’ to carry out environmentally harmful 
activities oriented to endless economic growth and, in this sense, have extended humans’ authority 
over nature to a ‘personified’ legal fiction, the corporation. Corporations personify in legal systems 
a sort of ‘superhuman species’ granted by law with owner-like faculties to exploit nature in the 
name of economic growth necessary for the realisation of human rights. It could thus be said that 
human rights embed ‘the underlying idea that their protection of the human being has generally 
been accompanied by disregard for the well-being of the non-human animal and by an exploitative 
attitude towards the environment.12 This conceptual (mis)understanding of nature and hence not 
the relational approach of humans to nature,  reflected in legal systems, including international 
humans rights law – as the ‘most putatively anthropocentric of all legal orders of rights’13 – are at 
the core of the climate crisis. 
 
8 Burdon, ibid, 818. 
9 For Burdon, for example, ‘[theories of law and legal concepts promote human beings as separate to the 
environment and define frameworks for the exploitation of nature’, ibid, 815. See also, for example, Grear (n 3). 
10 Bookchin (n 5) 20. 
11 Conor Gearty, ‘Do human rights help or hinder environmental protection?’ (2010) 1(1) Journal of Human Rights 
and the Environment 7, 9. 
12 Grear (n 3) 25. 




That is why this thesis focuses on international human rights law as subject of potential reforms, 
and climate change as external stressor capable of catalysing the rethinking needed to trigger such 
reforms, particularly on the human rights’ relational approach to nature. This is because climate 
change - at difference of comparable global challenges with environmental implications (e.g. the 
ozone layer depletion resulting on the adoption of a complex international legal framework14) - is 
a complex, cross-cutting and multi-faceted global challenge requiring multilateral far-reaching and 
radical policy responses from a multidisciplinary perspective (whereby human rights is one of 
them) and, as such, constitutes a unique15 epochal threat to humanity and the planet as a whole. As 
Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani put it:  
‘Climate change poses a complex, polycentric, and seemingly intractable policy 
challenge … Several factors combine to make climate change an ‘issue from hell’.16 It 
is planetary in scope and – due to its long-term and potentially irreversible 
consequences – intergenerational in its impacts. It is caused by a wide range of 
production and consumption processes. Its causes and effects are global and require 
complex collective action. It can be managed only if all states, or at least the major 
GHG emitters, cooperate in undertaking potentially costly, large-scale shifts in their 
economic and energy systems’.17 
Certainly, climate change cannot be temporarily or geographically demarcated. Therefore, 
departing from the recognition of the intrinsic contradictions underpinning human rights in relation 
to the natural environment, and the uniqueness of climate change as an epochal threat, this thesis 
seeks to find out whether the context of climate change can provoke developments in international 
human rights law as to propel rethinking and eventual reform of the human rights’ relational 
approach to the environment or natural world. In exploring the terrain of climate litigation in the 
 
14 See the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, adopted on 22 March 1985 and entered into 
force on 22 September 1988; and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted on 16 
September 1987; and its subsequent amendments adopted in London on 29 June 1990; in Copenhagen on 25 
November 1992; in Montreal on 17 September 1997; and in Beijing on 3 December 1999. 
15 See Section 1.2 of this introduction for a detailed discussion of the ‘uniqueness’ of climate change and its potential 
ability to prompt rethinking and potential development in international human rights law. 
16 Al Gore, The Future: Six Drivers of Climate Change (New York: Random House, 2013) 314 cited in Bodansky et 
al, infra note 17. 
17 Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (1st ed, Oxford 




last chapter, this thesis attempts to identify early signs that the traditional (mis)understandings of 
human rights in relation to the environment are being or could be challenged; and, in this process, 
it also examines the challenges and performance of international human rights law when applied 
in a context of climate change. 
This thesis argues that the context of climate change has the potential to act as catalyst for the 
rethinking and gradual expansion of human rights law, in a way to correct its relational approach 
to nature in the long term. In doing so, this thesis attempts to move discussions on human rights 
and climate change beyond the current focus on the inclusion of human rights considerations in 
climate action, by incorporating a critical approach to human rights that recognises the serious 
pitfalls in the international legal and human rights approach to nature, which are at the root of the 
climate crisis. As such, this thesis intends to contribute with an alternative way of framing the 
evolving field of human rights and climate change. By exploring avenues potentially triggering 
urgent rethinking and ultimate expansion of human rights, particularly with respect to their 
relational approach to nature, this thesis makes what, somewhat may seem to be a counter-intuitive 
contribution. It proposes that climate change will alter foundational ideas in human rights law. 
 
1. The Climate Emergency  
The increase in the frequency and intensity of climate events has become common news in the last 
decade. Heatwaves, hurricanes, floods, droughts, wildfires, glaciers melting, mass species 
extinction, ocean acidification, among other climate-related events, have severely impacted 
communities and their surrounding environment across the globe in recent years causing enormous 
and irreparable loss. The 21st century is being characterised by increasing record temperatures. The 
last decade, from 2010 to 2019, which is considered ‘the warmest decade on record’,18 registered 
a nearly consistent increase of global temperature records. 2016 was ‘the third year in a row that a 
new global temperature record [was] set’.19 In fact, according to the World Meteorological 
 
18 Katherine Brown (ed), ‘NASA, NOAA Analyses Reveal 2019 Second Warmest Year on Record’ (NASA Press 
Release 20-003, 15 January 2020).  She also notes that in 2019 ‘temperatures were second only to those of 2016 and 
continued the planet's long-term warming trend: the past five years have been the warmest of the last 140 years.’ 
<https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-noaa-analyses-reveal-2019-second-warmest-year-on-record> accessed 11 
May 2020. 
19 NASA Earth Observatory, ‘Global Temperature Record Broken for Third Consecutive Year’ (NASA Earth 




Organization, ‘2015-2019 … [was] set to be the warmest five-year period on record.20 Similarly, 
sea level rise has increased throughout the last decade. According to scientific findings worldwide, 
‘2019 marks the eighth consecutive year that global mean sea level increased relative to the 
previous year, reaching a new record: 87.6 mm above the 1993 average’.21 One thus no longer 
needs to be a climate expert to realise that the global climate is changing, and that it bears 
catastrophic consequences for humanity and the environment as a whole.22  
It is also increasingly recognised that greenhouse gas emissions (‘emissions’) released with the 
burning of fossil fuels such as oil, gas, and coal are the main cause of climate change: ‘When burnt, 
fossil fuels release carbon dioxide into the air, causing the planet to heat up’.23 This is, to a great 
extent, the result of human activity, which, despite repeated alarming scientific projections, is still 
leading the world towards climate catastrophe. According to the Fifth Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ‘[it] is extremely likely that more than half 
of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by 
the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings 
together’.24 In the same vein, the United Kingdom Meteorological Office found that:  
Humans cause climate change by releasing carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 
into the air. Today, there is more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere than there ever has 
been in at least the past 800,000 years. During the 20th and 21st century, the level of 
carbon dioxide rose by 40%.25  
 
for-third-consecutive-year> accessed 11 May 2020. See also, Japan Meteorological Agency, ‘Global temperature for 
2016 to be the highest since 1891 (Preliminary)’ (Tokyo Climate Center, 21 December 2016) 
<http://ds.data.jma.go.jp/tcc/tcc/news/press_20161221.pdf> accessed 11 May 2020. 
20 World Meteorological Organization, ‘Global Climate in 2015-2019: Climate change accelerates’ (World 
Meteorological Organization, 22 September 2019) <https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/global-climate-
2015-2019-climate-change-accelerates> accessed 11 May 2020. 
21 American Meteorological Society, ‘Global Oceans’ (2020) 101(8) Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 
S129, S135.   
22 Putting the humanity and the environment as two different concepts in the same sentence might be contradictory to 
the bottom-line argument of this thesis, as it points out to the differentiation between these two concepts enrooted in 
human rights law – and, in general, in Western neoliberal culture- while its main argument implies that they both are 
and should be regarded as a part of a unity. But, for clarity, both concepts are mentioned. 
23 United Kingdom Met Office, ‘Causes of Climate Change’ (UK Met Office, undated) 
<https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/weather/climate-change/causes-of-climate-change> accessed 11 May 2020. 
24 IPCC, Fifth Assessment Report - Summary for Policymakers ‘Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis’ 
(IPCC, 2013) at 17.  




While humans in general contribute to climate change through their carbon footprint, bearing in 
mind the continued interlinked factors of coloniality and neoliberalism, it is important to know 
that not all humans have (historically) contributed equally to the problem. In fact, there are huge 
differences in terms of human contributions to / impacts of, climate change. That is the paradox of 
climate change: it disproportionally impacts first, and the most, those who contributed the least to 
the problem, who, at the same time, are already in disadvantaged positions amongst and within 
societies / states, such as, for example, small islands states, indigenous peoples, children, future 
generations, and non-human components of the environment. At the same time, on the other side 
of the reality of climate change are the multinational corporations (‘corporations’), which are by 
far the largest contributors to climate change.26 Scientific studies indicate that only 100 private and 
state-owned corporations are responsible for 71% of global emissions, from which only 25 are 
responsible for 51% of global emissions.27 Therefore, taking into account the differentiated and 
disproportionate emissions contributions from corporations, any ambitious (international or 
national) effort to tackle climate change must principally and urgently target corporate sources as 
the main contributors to global emissions.28  
The IPCC has warned that there is a very short time left to dramatically drop global emissions and 
reduce the effects of climate catastrophe. The IPCC, ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C Report’, warns 
that the world has only about a decade to reduce global emissions in such a way to hold global 
temperature rises below 1.5˚C, in order to avoid dangerous climate change effects. It states that: 
The lower the emissions in 2030, the lower the challenge in limiting global warming 
to 1.5°C after 2030 with no or limited overshoot (high confidence). The challenges 
from delayed actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions include the risk of cost 
 
26 See Richard Heede ‘Tracing anthropogenic carbon dioxide and methane emissions to fossil fuel and cement 
producers, 1854-2010’ (2014) 122 Climatic Change 229. 
27 Paul Griffin, ‘The Carbon Majors Database – CDP Carbon Majors Report 2017’ (CDP Report 2017) 8. See also, 
Tess Rilley, ‘Just 100 companies responsible for 71% of global emissions, study says’ (The Guardian, 10 July 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2017/jul/10/100-fossil-fuel-companies-investors-responsible-
71-global-emissions-cdp-study-climate-change> accessed 11May 2020.  
28 See, for example, Climate Accountability Institute, ‘Carbon Majors - Update 8 October 2019: Accounting for 
carbon and methane emissions, Top Twenty investor-owned and state-owned oil, gas, and coal companies 1965-
2017’ (Climate Accountability Institute, 8 October 2019) 




escalation, lock-in in carbon-emitting infrastructure, stranded assets, and reduced 
flexibility in future response options in the medium to long term (high confidence).29 
This implies that holding temperature increase below 1.5˚C would require radical efforts and 
changes at all levels of society. The 1.5°C Report highlights the need to undertake ‘rapid and far-
reaching transitions’ in order to limit global warming to 1.5°C.30 Therefore, states have a central 
and essential role in leading climate action.31 However, contrary to this, states have not responded 
with the level of ambition and promptness needed. The 1.5°C Report  warns that the ‘current 
nationally stated mitigation ambitions as submitted under the 2015 Paris Agreement … would not 
limit global warming to 1.5°C, even if supplemented by very challenging increases in the scale 
and ambition of emissions reductions after 2030’.32 In particular, responses from governments – 
particularly from those contributing the most to climate change with carbon emissions - have 
generally been weak.33 These responses have failed to meet the level of urgency and ambition 
needed to face the climate emergency.34 Considering the level of urgency, special attention should 
be given to the failure of governments to target emissions from large corporate emitters, through 
more stringent laws and policies. As Humphreys points out, ‘[the] weak legal response to climate 
change means that big polluters are getting off lightly’.35 This failure to target the largest emitters 
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as a response to the urgent need to dramatically reduce global emissions, is thus pushing the planet 
closer to the edge of climate collapse.  
1.1 Climate change: Ignoring the Alarm Bells? 
It appears that the emergency ‘alarm’ calling for radical steps to be taken by governments to give 
the world, at least, a better chance to face the imminent and existing impacts from climate change, 
remains unheard. According to the World Meteorological Organization report, ‘The Global 
Climate in 2015-2019’, which includes the immediate years following the adoption and entering 
into force of the Paris Agreement, global emissions have only increased reaching historic records. 
It says that: 
2015–2019 has seen a continued increase in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and an 
accelerated increase in the atmospheric concentration of major greenhouse gases 
(GHGs), with growth rates nearly 20% higher. The increase in the oceanic CO2 
concentration has increased the ocean’s acidity. The five-year period 2015–2019 is 
likely to be the warmest of any equivalent period on record globally, with a 1.1 °C 
global temperature increase since the pre-industrial period…Continuing and 
accelerated trends have also predominated among other key climate indicators, 
including an acceleration of rising sea levels, a continued decline in the Arctic sea-ice 
extent, an abrupt decrease in Antarctic sea ice, continued ice mass loss in the glaciers 
and the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, and the clear downward trend in the 
northern hemisphere spring snow cover. More heat is being trapped in the ocean; 2018 
had the largest ocean heat content values on record…Heatwaves were the deadliest 
meteorological hazard in the 2015–2019 period, affecting all continents and resulting 
in new temperature records in many countries accompanied by unprecedented 
wildfires…The 2019 northern summer saw record-breaking wildfires that expanded to 
the Arctic regions, setting new records, and wide-spread fires in the Amazon 
rainforest.36 
Should these alarming accounts inform climate responses from governments, one would expect 
the implementation of immediate emergency-like measures, such as shutting coal mines; passing 
 




(more) stringent legislation to regulate and gradually reduce extractive activities; criminalising 
fracking and offenses against the environment; taxing proportional to certain activities’ emission 
levels; among others. However, climate breakdown has continued unabated in the past five years; 
CO2 has accelerated; the oceans have continued to acidify; and the world has warmed to 
unprecedented levels. We have all witnessed the impact on our television screens – devastating 
fires in the Amazon and Australia, and, the Arctic, melting ice caps and shocking weather events. 
Still, despite these flagrant impacts on the planet affecting humans and the environment 
worldwide, today and in the future, the emergency alarm seems, yet, not to have been heard. This 
thesis contends that, at least one significant part of the problem and the reasons underpinning this 
dangerously indolent attitude to the climate crisis is rooted in our human understanding of and 
relational approach to nature, which is reflected in dominant neoliberal laws and consumption 
patterns, including in international human rights law. Before exploring the existing human and 
human rights approach to nature, it is first necessary to explain why climate change can be 
considered a ‘unique’ global situation capable of triggering otherwise ‘impossible’ changes in 
human rights. 
1.2 The Uniqueness of Climate Change: a ‘Unique’ Opportunity to ‘Fix’ Human 
Rights?    
Climate change entails unprecedented challenges and circumstances for humans and the 
environment in many respects, including in relation to human rights. It is an urgent problem, 
unequal in its impacts and uncertain in magnitude. These features make the climate crisis a unique 
global landscape.  
First, climate change is an urgent problem. Scientists have repeatedly warned of the urgency of 
limiting human emissions to mitigate climate impacts. Indeed, scientific studies warn that ‘we are 
deeply within a climate emergency state, but people are not aware of it.’37 Professor Schellnhuber 
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illustrates the extent of the problem: ‘…when it comes to the urgency of decarbonising society and 
keeping the forests alive, we need at least 20 years. We have only 30 years left to do this. It simply 
means that we are in a deep state of climate emergency. If you trust the numbers from science’.38 
Recognising climate change as a global emergency is therefore crucial in order that governments 
and society in general implement ambitious climate action consistent with the level of the 
emergency.  
Second, whilst climate change is indiscriminate as a global problem, its impacts are unequal. 
Climate impacts hit some states, populations, and ecosystems far more than others. That is 
precisely the big paradox of climate change: it affects most those who have contributed the least 
to the problem. For instance, small islands and low-lying states are clearly some of the most 
disproportionally affected by climate change to the extent that it poses an imminent threat to their 
very existence. Also, one of the most vulnerable states to climate impacts, Bangladesh, may even 
lose part of its territory: ‘three-foot rise in sea level would submerge almost 20 percent of the 
country and displace more than 30 million people—and the actual rise by 2100 could be 
significantly more’.39 Similarly, for small island states the threat is imminent: ‘[while] 
contributing less than 1 per cent to the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, these countries are 
among the first to experience the worst and most devastating impacts of climate change with 
greater risks to economies, livelihoods, and food security’ .40 The indiscriminate but still unequal 
character of climate impacts is shown in these countries’ present realities, which prove the uneven 
impacts of climate change. These realities certainly raise climate justice issues, especially if their 
emission contributions to the problem are compared with those of highest emitting states, such as 
the United States or China. Yet, climate change is indiscriminate and therefore, albeit to varying 
degrees, also affects those who contributed the most to the problem. For instance, ‘[heavy] rainfall 
is increasing in intensity and frequency across the United States and globally and … [heatwaves] 
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have become more frequent … since the 1960s, while extreme cold temperatures and cold waves 
are less frequent.’41 This is added to extreme weather events that have impacted the United States 
in the last decades.42 Likewise, China, the state with the highest emissions, is also seriously 
affected by climate impacts. It is estimated that ‘water scarcity in northern China has been 
exacerbated by decreasing precipitation, doubling population, and expanding water withdrawal’.43 
Certainly, there is no doubt that some states are by far most vulnerable to and at the forefront of 
climate impacts, however, climate change  still poses a serious threat to all states and the Earth as 
a whole. 
These examples, show that climate impacts are received by all, including the two largest emitters 
states, however, the poorest and most vulnerable are those who experience first and worst the 
impacts of climate change, both amongst states (e.g. small islands states),  and within states, 
including wealthy states too. 
Thirdly, climate change impacts are uncertain. Whilst there exist accurate projections on the 
potential impacts of climate change across the world, uncertainty remains about the timing and 
extent of its actual impacts given that these can develop over several years or even decades. The 
aforementioned example of small islands states or Bangladesh challenge the temporality with 
which climate change is commonly presented. They show that climate change is no longer a threat 
with future consequences, but a reality that gets worse (for some states more than others), with 
continuous sea level rise: ‘[for] the nearly one-third of all citizens in small island developing states 
… living in areas no higher than a few meters above sea level, the existential threat of climate 
change is already here.’44 Yet, based on climate projections, climate change is often represented as 
a future problem, providing imaginary room for delayed climate action.  
 
41 Donald Wuebbles, David Fahey and Kathy Hibbard [coordinating lead authors) et al, ‘Executive Summary - 
Highlights of the Findings of the U.S. Global Change Research Program Climate Science Special Report’ in Linda 
Mearns, Ross Salawitch and Christopher Weaver (review eds) Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National 
Climate Assessment, Volume I (U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2017) at 1-2.  
42  For detailed records of extreme climate events in the United Sates, see NOAA Climate.gov., (Climate Watch 
Magazine) <https://www.climate.gov/news-features/category/extreme-events> accessed 13 June 2020. 
43 IPCC, Fifth Assessment Report (n 24) Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability – Part B: 
Regional Aspects, (IPCC, 2007) at 1337.  
44 Hussain Rasheed Hassan and Valerie Cliff, ‘For small island nations, climate change is not a threat. It's already here’ 
(World Economic Forum website, 24 September 2019) <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/island-nations-




Overall, the urgent, indiscriminate, and uncertain character of climate change makes it a unique 
problem, unprecedented and with multifaceted impacts. Contrary to more specific events that 
result in crises-provoked international legal developments,45 the climate crisis demands and – 
though time will tell – may even force rethinking of conceptual understandings incept in neoliberal 
laws, including international human rights law, such as the foundational conceptual flaw in the 
characterisation of the relational approach of humans to nature. However, as Charlesworth warns 
with respect to crises-triggered legal developments in international law, international human rights 
law may risk developing in response to the climate crisis whilst failing to see ‘issues of structural 
justice’46 and global inequality, which have contributed to a great extent to the climate crisis in the 
first place. A crisis induced response risks also seeing and dealing with parts of the problem only. 
Crisis poses, therefore, both risks and opportunities for the evolution of international human rights 
law. This thesis focuses on the potential catalyst effect of climate change to propel changes in the 
relational approach of human rights to nature. This will be discussed in the next section. 
 
2. Human Rights, Humans and Nature: The Relational Approach 
In a climate changing world, stepping into the Anthropocene is crucial to interrogate our 
relationship with the natural world and how this is portrayed in the laws that govern us. As a matter 
of course, the human relationship with nature has been decoupled, whereby the former is a separate 
entity, which naturally exercises dominance over the latter. Grear recognises that ‘[such] 
separation between Anthropos and its feminised ‘other/s-nature’ is fundamental to understanding 
the foundations of the Anthropocene crisis’.47 She however notes that:  
… largely absent from the (thus far dominant) standard natural science accounts of the 
Anthropocene’s genesis – is the important idea that the Anthropocene (and its climate 
crisis) represents a crisis of human hierarchy … [Such] hierarchies implicate a 
systemically privileged juridical ‘human’ subject whose persistence subtends – to a 
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significant and continuing extent – the neoliberal global juridical order as a whole, and 
that these hierarchical commitments also significantly undermine the ability of the 
international legal order to respond to climate crisis…’.48 
This legal exaltation of the human’s (subject) over nature (object) reflected in the anthropocentrism 
incepted ‘by default’ in neoliberal laws49 – and, consequently, in our mindset and behaviour – has 
proven to have potential catastrophic effects on both the natural world and humanity as a whole. 
As Stone said already in the seventies (in the middle of the full blooming of human rights law) in 
his thought-provoking article Should Trees Have Standing, ‘[natural] objects have traditionally 
been regarded by the common law, and even by all but the most recent legislation, as objects for 
man to conquer and master and use’.50 As a result, the exploitation of the natural world  is 
embedded in and legitimised by existing (human rights) law. 
Therefore, one point that should be recognised upfront is the limitedness of neoliberal international 
law and, specifically, of international human rights law to respond to the climate crisis given their 
inherent anthropocentrism, which is at the core of the climate crisis. The context of climate crisis 
exposes the need to expand traditional parameters within which human rights are thought and 
applied. Climate change exposes the need to reimagine our understanding of the natural world and 
resulting relationship with it, as reflected in human rights law with its lack of ecological 
considerations. Therefore, the faith in the human rights’ incursion in the climate change arena, as 
the quintessential anthropocentric legal field,51 should be accompanied, inter alia, by the 
awareness of its limitations and the need to rethink its structural assumptions in order to be ‘fit ‘for 
purpose, notably with respect to their relational approach of humans – and human rights – to the 
natural world. In this sense, as Bookchin, from the perspective of social ecology theory, reflects: 
In this confluence of social and ecological crises, we can no longer afford to be 
unimaginative; we can no longer afford to do without utopian thinking. The crises are 
too serious and the possibilities too sweeping to be resolved by customary modes of 
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thought - the very sensibilities that produced these crises in the first place… Humanity 
has passed through a long history of one-sidedness and of a social condition that has 
always contained the potential of destruction, despite its creative achievements in 
technology. The great project of our time must be to open the other eye: to see all 
sidedly and wholly, to heal and transcend the cleavage between humanity and nature 
that came with early wisdom.52 
Certainly, reimagining international human rights law, the flagship anthropocentric legal regime,53 
disassociated from its adhesion to the dominant 'restrictive anthropocentric approach to nature, 
which sees it mainly as a ‘resource’ for humans’,54 might be difficult to conceive from an 
anthropocentric legal perspective. However, the unviability of the existing relational approach to 
nature prevailing in laws, including in international human rights law, is being exposed by climate 
change, triggering as a result -I argue- the need to rethink international human rights law. With 
this in mind it is thus, worth identifying some of the aspects of human rights that would need to be 
rethought in order to make its contribution more substantial and coherent in the context of climate 
change. 
First, human rights lack an ecological dimension, understood in Bookchin’s terms as a concern 
with ‘the dynamic balance of nature, with the interdependence of living and non-living things’.55 
Human rights produce a certain view of living in society that reflects a neoliberal notion of the 
environment whereby its value lies in its capacity to serve human needs. As Morrow puts it, when 
reflecting on Plumwood’s ‘paradigm of mastery’ it essentially casts the environment/nature as 
inherently inferior and a means to privilege humanity’s ends, rendering it ripe for what is assumed 
to be self-evidently justified and thus largely unquestioned exploitation’.56 In a context of climate 
change, that increasingly evidences the consequences of this understanding, this view of the natural 
world is no longer viable. Second, human rights condemn certain forms of violence (such as 
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torture) and facilitate others (such as the violence of the market),57 which means that human rights 
struggle to get at the root causes of ecological crises in capitalist social relations.58 In failing to 
forge the crucial link between capitalism and human rights violations, human rights can install a 
set of blinders on social movements, concealing from sight the structural violence of global 
capitalism. As Marks puts it, human rights can, thereby, ‘domesticate potentially radical demands 
on the social structure and bring with it the demobilization of oppositional activity’.59 In the context 
of climate change, in a similar vein, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty 
and human rights sharply upbraids international human rights organisations for their failure to 
recognise the need for ‘deep social and economic transformation’ and their subsequent ‘deep 
denial of the real gravity of the situation’.60 Human rights can thus be a two-sided sword in battles 
of social justice in the context of climate change. 
It falls beyond the scope of this thesis to undertake a critical examination of human rights. Rather, 
by pointing out these pitfalls in human rights law, which undermine what Knox describes as ‘a key 
promise of human rights law’, namely ‘that it is possible – without fundamental change – to reach 
a situation in which human rights are respected’,61 this thesis seeks to identify the conditions that 
the context of climate crisis generate in propelling the re-examination of human rights law and its 
inherent notions on the environment. While acknowledging Charlesworth’s contention that 
‘[crises] are not of course the only catalyst for the development of international law’, due to the 
risks of taking the elements of crises as ‘uncontroversial’ and ‘[diverting] attention from structural 
issues of global justice’,62 which are certainly a crucial factor of the climate crisis, this thesis relies 
on the uniqueness of climate change as a crucial distinguishing factor that provides the context for 
structural changes in international human rights law.  
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3. The Climate Crisis and International Human Rights Law: a TWAIL Perspective 
This thesis interrogates the relational approach of human rights and nature reflected in international 
law and international human rights law, which legitimises the idea of nature as a set of ‘assets or 
raw materials that can be used for economic production or consumption.’63 This notion that reduces 
nature to a mere ‘object’, apt for environmental exploitation oriented to economic growth, is at the 
core of the climate crisis.  
While the Third World64 approach to international law does not critique international law and 
international human rights law from an ecological standpoint, it facilitates such a critique. This is 
because ‘[a] TWAIL perspective … helps ...  to appreciate how international human rights law can 
be manipulated to promote and legitimise neo-liberal aspirations’.65 Certainly, neoliberalism – 
understood ‘in the first instance [as] a theory of political economic practices that proposes that 
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade’66 – is enrooted in international law. Allegedly, this thesis acknowledges 
human rights’ neoliberal ethos, thereby supporting subjacent (mis)conceptions in the relationship 
between humans and nature that enable environmental exploitation, particularly in the Third 
World.  Indeed, Mutua, for instance, describes international law as ‘a predatory system that 
legitimizes, reproduces and sustains the plunder and subordination of the Third World by the 
West’.67  In this sense, apart from the use of human rights to justify international armed political 
or economic interventions,68  human rights are central in the context of climate crisis as they are 
presented as a due path to be followed by (neo-colonised) states in the Third World in order to 
achieve the realisation of human rights. In this vein, Chimni points out that ‘the omnipresence of 
the discourse of human rights in international law has coincided with increasing pressure on third 
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world states to implement neoliberal policies is no accident; the right to private property, and all 
that goes along with it, is central to the discourse of human rights’.69 And so are their 
environmental implications vividly evidenced today by the impacts of climate change, precisely, 
with the most serious effects, upon the human rights of individuals and communities worldwide. 
This thesis does not intend to explore whether or how human rights law have been developed to 
reflect neo-colonial aims in a way to perpetuate dominance by ‘Western cultures’70 cover the 
formerly colonised ‘Third World’. Rather, it takes this claim from TWAIL as a premise in order 
to contextualise the legal frameworks in which this thesis is anchored, namely the human rights 
and climate change regimes.  
Accordingly, this thesis relies, first, on the premise that international human rights law endorses a 
postcolonial neoliberal agenda that, inter alia,71 promotes exploitation of nature. More specifically, 
TWAIL assists this thesis in understanding the dynamics of economic dominance and exploitation 
on the basis of which international law – including human rights law and the climate change regime 
– is developed; and that in turn explain, to some extent, the roots of the climate crisis. In this 
respect, in writing about law and colonial economies, Anghie notes that:  
…the rule of law, as promoted by the colonial power, became largely a means by which this 
system of economic development was maintained and furthered … There is nothing 
objectionable about economic progress as such; but, in this situation, economic progress was 
equated with the furtherance of a system of economic inequalities specific to colonialism.72 
In this context, international law played a key role as a normative foundation of the colonial and 
postcolonial economic order that facilitates the perpetuation of hegemony over the Third World,73 
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that legitimised the top-down imposition of capitalist relations oriented to at-all-cost economic 
growth, including environmental costs. As a consequence, under this scheme of wealth 
accumulation supported by international law, its most emblematic neoliberal agent, the 
(multinational) corporation, is priviliged. As Grear notes, ‘[the] first result of the corporate 
colonisation of international human rights discourse is that the most cherished goals of the 
international human rights movement are being recast in ways that serve a capitalist agenda – this 
time, a globalized capitalist agenda.’74 This receptiveness of international human rights law to 
promote capitalist interests contradicts, however, its rhetorical noble aims of human dignity as 
these can result in human rights violations, including as a result of environmental exploitation. In 
other words, as Rajagopal puts it, ‘human rights-discourse can ignore/condone  certain forms of 
violence,… [such as, for example], the violence of the market’.75  With this in mind, one might 
wonder how international human rights law could meaningfully help to address the challenges 
presented by climate change, if corporations – the quintessential capitalist person -  
disproportionately contribute  to it through their highly emitting activities, which are the core of 
the problem76 Hence, independently of the noble aspirations that inspired the human rights 
movement since its outset, this ‘suggests … that international human rights discourse is 
ideologically porous, to say the least, to the very same globalized neo-liberal ideology so 
profoundly implicated in the production of not only intense human suffering, particularly in the 
Third World, but also of environmental destruction caused by irresponsible corporate exploitation 
of the living order’.77  
Indeed, the privileged position of the corporate person in international law illustrates how the 
dynamics of power are exercised in a way to replicate neocolonial forms of dominance led by 
wealthy (states or corporations) over the Third World. Such position of privilege in the 
international legal system also involves a differentiated treatment. For instance, at difference of 
the legal restraints that ‘granting’ rights to nature generates,78 the corporate person enjoys human-
like property rights, supported by international laws, including human rights law.79 As Grear notes, 
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‘where corporations have been granted ‘victim status’ in human rights contexts the ‘basis of that 
protection appears to have been the status of the company as a legal person’.80 Therefore, the 
acquisition of this status by corporations seems to operate as  ‘a conduit for the receptivity of law 
to the ‘human rights’ of personified capital’.81 While the legal fiction of corporate personality is 
not per se the reason for its (neo)colonial dominance, and not all corporations are necessarily 
engaged with emitting activities disproportionally contributing to climate change, the risks of this 
legal construction legitimised by neoliberal laws and institutions enabling capital accumulation are 
sharply illustrated by climate change. The disproportional impacts of climate change put under 
risk the human rights of individuals and communities that international human rights law aims to 
protect, as well as the environment. Indeed, ‘since human rights remain available to ‘persons’, 
legal persons such as corporations and other business associations stand coequally possessed of a 
certain regime of protection and promotion of human rights’.82 The ‘personification’ of the 
corporation present in international human rights law, thus, reflects a privileged relational 
approach of human rights vis-à-vis corporations, which clearly contrasts with their relational 
approach vis-à-vis the environment, whereby the ‘objectification’ and subjugation of nature to 
human and corporate capitalist ‘needs’ is justified and promoted.83  
Secondly, this thesis also relies on the premise that international human rights law, by reflecting 
Western anthropocentric views, which often focus on the immediate individualised human 
experience rather than the wider environment, contribute to the (mis)representation of nature 
reflected in laws. By doing so, neoliberal laws reinforce the harmful relationship between humans 
(including ‘quasi-human’ corporations) and the natural world. In this regard, Grear describes the 
‘liberal legal person’ represented in ‘legal anthropocentrism’ as having ‘characteristics implicating 
some exclusions or negative moments with profound implications for the problems currently 
haunting the relationship between humanity, human rights and the environment.’84 Accordingly, 
bearing in mind TWAIL’s claim regarding the ‘role that law plays in creating relations of 
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domination’,85 this thesis takes the view   that nature, on the other hand, is represented in 
anthropocentric laws as fulfilling a mere utilitarian function, whereby  its value is determined by 
its capacity to meet human needs. The ‘human’ is, therefore, not perceived or represented as part 
of the natural world, in which both human and non-human life coexist as part of a whole.86   
Today, in a climate changing world, law is compelled to reimagine itself in a way to question its 
traditional assumptions and push conventional boundaries, even if ideas seem at first, in Stone’s 
words, ‘unthinkable’.87 For the purposes of this thesis, this means that the relationship of humans 
vis-à-vis nature should be rethought in law in such a way to incorporate a dimension that takes 
into consideration the environment and its components. In this process – this thesis argues, the 
context of climate change, given its unique character, has the potential to act as catalyst of changes 
in international human rights law, leading to the rethinking of its structural (mis) understandings 
on the environment and, in the longer term, its reform.  
 
4. The Anthropocene and the Capitalocene 
The dominant liberal legal rationality has ‘historically [operated] … to privilege the interests 
of identifiable propertied capitalistic elites and their interests.’88 The dynamics of power and 
wealth in which corporations operate are facilitated by a favourable legal framework,89 
which has serious implications for human and non-human species, and ecosystems 
worldwide.  In particular, ‘the current global dominance of corporations-driven priorities and 
practices is having a deleterious impact upon the environment’90 and the rights of individuals 
and communities worldwide, particularly in the Third World. No doubt, scientifically 
identifiable corporate sources play a key role in the current climate crisis due to their 
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significant emissions levels contributing to climate change.91 Corporations are thus central 
actors, in what is a new human-induced geological age, the so-called Anthropocene.  
On assessing the term Anthropocene, Mauser notes that:  
The term Anthropocene has been suggested to mark an era in which the human impact 
on the Earth System has become a recognisable force. Presently there are no signs for 
a deceleration or reversal of this development. Coping with the consequences of Global 
Change therefore becomes a challenge of prior unknown dimension for human 
societies.92 
In considering this human centrality as a driver of the Anthropocene, Kotzé identifies ‘[of] all the 
many drivers that have contributed, and continue to contribute, to the Anthropocene’s signatures, 
two stand out as being particularly troubling: coloniality and neoliberalism’.93 The historic and 
interlinked dynamics of power and domination engraved in these two drivers of the Anthropocene 
should be considered to understand the still prevailing domination (between subjects and objects) 
and how these have been constructed in law, for example, in such a way as to configure the 
prototype scheme of relationships of dominance, both between humans themselves and with 
nature. As Grear puts it, ‘[the] “subject” at the centre of the Anthropocene trope thus ineluctably 
reflects hierarchies foundational to European rationalism. Anthropos is in a very real sense, the 
quintessential European (and then ‘Western’) rational subject — and, accordingly, also law’s 
archetypical subject’.94 In light of the Anthropocene, it is at the very least necessary to question 
the sacrosanct supremacy granted in Western neoliberal laws to the ‘Anthropos’, including the 
privileged position of the ‘quasi-Anthropos’ legal person, the corporation - as the dominant 
‘master’ over the ‘unintelligent’ object of nature.  
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In fact, since ‘[international] law, capitalism and colonialism are all interwoven with Eurocentric 
(and now Global North) impulses and logics of action fully discernible in the Anthropocene 
crisis… [it is considered that] the Anthropocene is better understood as the Capitalocene’.95 In this 
sense, the notable differences between the common ‘Anthropos’ would thus be differentiable from 
the powerful and wealthy forms of (‘quasi’) Anthropos, the corporation. Given the overriding 
position (prioritisation) of the market and of the corporation, the Anthropocene is better understood 
as Capitolocene. Grear defines the ‘Anthropocene-Capitalocene [as] an epoch…of eco-violation 
reflecting well-practised, patterned and predictable global and globalising distributions of intra-
species and inter-species injustice.’96 Therefore, climate change can be considered as the resulting 
symptom from multiple persisting intertwined factors, notably, coloniality and neoliberalism that 
are leading the world into the Anthropocene/Capitalocene. 
In this sense, the role of corporations as active agents of eco-violation worldwide should be 
pursued as ‘[they] are, in terms of their ability to impact on lives and local environments, the 
dominant institution in global society and yet have the ability to be a transient presence across 
geographical locations’.97 As a result, Falk’s proposal from the 1970s on ‘ecocide’98 has been 
revived to ‘demand … [making] individuals and corporations accountable for knowingly causing 
damage to the planet.’99 Although the crime of ecocide has not yet crystallised in law, the figure 
of ecocide constitutes a strong case to punish corporate behaviour contributing to climate change. 
In the meantime, the relatively recent acceptance of human rights in the climate debate has been 
reflected in the increased use of rights arguments in the field of climate litigation.  
Yet, despite this incursion, human rights will have to overcome several challenges in order to be 
technically fit to operate within the context of climate change. Issues of causation, attribution, 
extratemporality and extraterritoriality represent serious technical obstacles for the application of 
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human rights in a climate change context. However, the emerging human rights trend in climate 
litigation100 provides an opportunity not only to address the technical challenges that human rights 
face in the context of climate change but, more substantially, to prompt initial human rights 
rethinking and even, in the long term, reform of conceptual (mis)understandings in relation to the 
environment. 
 
5. The Interrelationship between Human Rights and Climate Change 
The relationship between human rights and climate change has been given significant recognition 
in recent years and, today, it could be considered as widely accepted. However, human rights 
considerations were not always welcome as part of the climate change debate, led by the United 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Climate change was until recently widely 
regarded as scientific and technical. It was not until the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 
that human rights were expressly invoked in a climate treaty and considered part of the climate 
debate. This reference in the Paris Agreement consolidated therefore the recognition of human 
rights in the climate change arena. The Preamble of the Paris Agreement establishes: 
Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties 
should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider 
their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of 
indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities 
and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender 
equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.101 
The ‘acknowledgement’ of the need to consider human rights considerations in climate action 
enshrined in the Paris Agreements implies the recognition that climate change adversely impacts 
the ability to enjoy a wide array of human rights. Indeed, the increase in the frequency and intensity 
of climate-related events puts at risk, inter alia, the right to life, health, water, food, an adequate 
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standard of living, and ‘collective’ rights such as the rights of indigenous peoples and even the 
right of self-determination of individuals and communities worldwide.102  
Today, despite the fact that human rights are still making their way in the field of climate change 
governance,103 the relationship between human rights and climate change can be considered well 
established and, across the human rights machinery, there has been a proliferation of rights 
references in respect of climate change. There have been several UN documents making reference 
to the states’ human rights obligations in relation to climate change.104  In addition, there is a 
notable emergence of cases invoking human rights considerations in climate litigation, 105 and the 
scholarship dedicated to human rights and climate change has proliferated in the last years.106  
Either applied as a central legal basis or collaterally in climate claims, the human rights presence 
in climate litigation cases before regional and national courts worldwide is growing. Although the 
trend is still in an early stage and it is too early to assess its impacts, the proliferation of rights-
based climate litigation is auspicious considering governments’ failure (at multilateral and national 
level) to advance emergency-like measures to address the climate crisis. Yet, there already exists 
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some ‘successful’ stories, whereby human rights have been invoked as part of the litigation 
‘strategy’ used by litigants to ground their claims. One of those ‘success stories’ is the acclaimed 
Urgenda case,107 whereby a national civil court ordered the Dutch government to ‘limit the joint 
volume of Dutch annual greenhouse gas emissions, or have them limited, such that this volume 
will have been reduced by at least 25% at the end of 2020 compared to the level of the year 1990′.108 
The judgement was appealed by the Dutch government to the Superior Court109 and, subsequently, 
to the Supreme Court110 and was confirmed in both legal instances. Although the Urgenda case 
was not principally grounded upon human rights arguments, but rather in civil law and other legal 
principles – articles 2 and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights were initially 
marginal to the case – it ‘gave a significant boost to the argument that climate change is a human 
rights issue’.111 Notably, the case paved the way (and raised hopes) for subsequent rights-based 
climate claims in which the deployment of human rights arguments is being put to the test. 
However, the human rights’ incursion into climate change issues is not without obstacles and will 
have to surmount complex legal barriers pertaining to their extra-temporal and extraterritorial 
application as well as causation and attribution challenges.   
Beyond examining human rights performance in the arena of climate litigation, this thesis attempts 
to identify therein potential or early signals that the context of climate change provides the 
circumstances apt to trigger human rights (grassroots-led) rethinking and evolution, particularly 
with respect to their so far decoupled relationship with the environment. I depart from the position 
that, despite the human rights recognition in the Paris Agreement, human rights law is not climate 
change ready. This is because human rights have inherent shortcomings resulting from their 
neoliberal Western inception, resulting in these concepts being equipped for exploitation. 
Accordingly, human rights have historically been wielded by the powerful (states, corporations) 
to exploit natural resources and the environment, which is at the root of the climate crisis. This 
thesis, nevertheless, also recognises the potential of human rights as an international lingua franca 
and as a noble aspiration for international action, judicial or otherwise. As McNay notes, '[rights] 
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discourse has a transient strategic utility, which might assist in the mitigation of the climate 
injustice in a piecemeal way but is certainly far from being an effective or comprehensive approach 
to overcoming systemic oppression'.112 In this context, the uniqueness of the climate crisis presents 
an ‘opportunity’ for human rights re-examination and potential evolution in the long run, 
particularly with respect to their relational approach with the environment. In this sense, this thesis 
explores whether the current conditions of impending climate collapse can produce what Anghie 
describes as a ‘Grotian moment’. 
 
6. Climate Crisis and International Human Rights Law: a ‘Grotian Moment’? 
Unlike more ‘specific’ crises, the climate crisis has potentially catastrophic impacts for humanity 
and ecosystems. As such it is worth asking whether the ongoing climate crisis can be considered a 
‘Grotian moment’ from a legal point of view.  Discussing the events of 11 September 2001, which 
led to drastic changes in United States foreign policy, Anghie explains the ‘"Grotian moment" [as] 
one in which the entire character of the international system changed irrevocably. Consequently, 
the old system of international law and relations appeared inadequate, to many, to deal with these 
unprecedented challenges.’113 
The impacts of the ongoing climate crisis, touching all aspects of living in society, including the 
laws that govern it, make a strong case for the climate crisis to qualify as a ‘Grotian moment’, a 
‘phenomenon of profound change’.114 In this sense, changes brought by climate change would 
only be comparable, for instance, to those brought by the Industrial Revolution – which, ironically, 
could be considered the starting point of the causes leading to climate change – or by World War 
II, in the aftermath of which the human rights movement arose.    
Climate change, in an analogous way, has the potential to trigger profound changes, to open up 
new ‘visions’ of the (human and non-human) world in international law. Climate change brings to 
light in a dramatic way the inadequacy of certain concepts, understandings and (neoliberal) 
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objectives on which the international legal system is based. At the very least, it provides a context 
in which to question this inadequacy. Accordingly, climate change - I argue - will increasingly 
evidence the need to rethink and expand human rights’ conceptual (mis)understandings in relation 
to the environment –the relationship of humans vis-à-vis nature- triggering ultimately its gradual 
correction. Since this is a mere prediction of a likely future, obviously, it cannot categorically be 
demonstrated beyond identifying the existing initial steps in that direction; yet, I argue, that we are 
at an embryonic stage in the process of human rights expansion.  
This thesis attempts to identify how the reality of climate change impacts individuals, communities 
and ecosystems worldwide in such a way to provoke civil society-driven initial steps towards 
rethinking and expansion of human rights and their conceptual foundations, particularly in relation 
to the environment. In this process, it examines the challenges that international human rights law 
encounters when applied in a climate change context, (namely, causation, attribution, 
extratemporal and extraterritorial challenges) and how human rights are used as strategic tool to 
overcome those challenges within climate legislation Yet, despite the recent proliferation of right-
based climate litigation cases and its potential to prompt climate action that governments otherwise 
would not take, it is important to bear in mind the previously discussed shortcomings that human 
rights congenitally bear and the crucial need to correct them. In this sense, this thesis argues that 
the human rights relational approach to the environment needs to be rethought and, ultimately, 
corrected if human rights are deemed to provide a substantial and long-lasting contribution to 
address climate change. The climate crisis thus constitutes an externality with the potential of 
propelling these changes in international law, particularly on the relationship between humans and 
human laws and the environment, which, as we are vividly witnessing now, is no longer viable in 
light of the climate crisis. 
As Fisher, Scotford and Barritt point out, ‘climate change gives rise to situations that are at odds 
with legal stability, coherence and knowability.’115 Consequently, given the unprecedented 
magnitude and scope of climate impacts, legal systems will likely not only need to create and adapt 
legislation but will be urged to do so, creating thereby ‘legal disruption’.116 Human rights law is 
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not exempt from climate-provoked disruption. This thesis argues that climate change can act as 
catalyst of (gradual) rethinking and, in the long run, correction of international human rights law, 
in such a way to change deep-rooted conceptual (mis)understandings, such as those on the 
environment. This means, therefore, that the reality of climate change entails ‘a "Grotian moment" 
in international law, [which] occurs when novel events compel a new conceptualization of these 
issues’, although,117 expectedly, this may generate (initial) resistance from law and its operators. 
Accordingly, this thesis argues that the context of climate change will increasingly show the 
inadequacy of human rights’ intrinsic concepts in relation to the environment and, as a result, 
human rights operators will be compelled to rethink and even correct international human rights 
law in the long term. In this (likely) scenario, human rights would have, at least partly, achieved 
emancipation from their inherited Western roots compatible with neoliberal endeavours and be 
opened to incorporate new ones, where the environment is intrinsically respected in laws, 
independently from its value to humans.118 Certainly, as Dehm notes, the history of human rights 
reflects ‘struggles over competing visions of human rights’.119 However, it should be recognised 
that, despite the limitations of human rights, particularly, in its relational approach to the 
environment, its application in the context of climate change, and, for example, in climate 
litigation, can, to some extent, contribute to climate action both as a rhetorical language and as a 
legal regime. Yet, the capacity of human rights to adapt to structural changes remains to be seen. 
 
7. Thesis Overview 
This thesis seeks to determine whether the context of climate change can act as a catalyst for the 
rethinking and correction of foundational notions in human rights law in relation to the 
environment, in such a way as to expand its inherited limitations because of its Western inception. 
It attempts thus to identify what is the potential impact of the climate change context upon human 
rights law concerning its relational approach to the environment. In this process, it examines to 
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what extent human rights law is equipped to be applied in the context of climate change.  With the 
use of primary and secondary literature, and the assistance of TWAIL theory as an overarching 
premise to contextualise the existing international legal frameworks of human rights and climate 
change, I attempt to demonstrate that the uniqueness of the context of climate change provides an 
opportunity for the evolution of human rights law – and human rights, in general. I argue that 
climate change may gradually force rethinking of the conceptual foundations of human rights, on 
which the structural notions of rights in relation to the environment are underpinned. Using climate 
litigation as a case study, I argue that the existing human rights notions in relation to the 
environment will potentially be rethought and even corrected in the long term because of a climate 
changing world.  
I argue that the uniqueness of the context of climate change has the potential to generate rethinking 
of human rights’ basic (mis)understandings in their relational approach to the environment. To the 
extent that human rights gradually reconsider and make initial steps towards the correction of their 
notions on and relational approach to the environment. For example, through the ‘work-in-
progress’ within the climate litigation arena, human rights can potentially make a more substantive 
and long-lasting contribution to their own evolution and, time provided, to climate action. 
Chapter one discusses he international climate change legal framework in order to explain the path 
that human rights have taken in traditional multilateral mechanisms of climate governance led by 
the UNFCCC, until the adoption of the Paris Agreement, when they were ‘officially’ entered into 
the international legal climate change debate. In doing so, it intends to identify the relational 
approach of international law to the environment, as reflected in the climate change regime, which 
in turn portrays the anthropocentric relational approach to the environment also present in human 
rights. 
Chapter two seeks to identify the linkages between human rights and climate change. It contends 
that climate change adversely impacts a wide array of human rights. In doing so, it presents some 
of the human rights adversely affected by climate change, including the human right to a healthy 
environment, as an important step to approach human rights to the protection of the environment 
in international human rights law. In addition, having recognised the linkages between human 
rights and climate change, chapter two intends to identify the benefits of adopting a human rights 




that a human rights approach to climate change, despite its limitations, offers benefits when applied 
in the context of climate change, both as a transnational language and as an international legal 
framework. However, it recognises that human rights should first reconsider, and correct, some of 
their basic notions with respect to their relational approach to the environment in order to be able 
to make a more substantive and long-lasting contribution to the problem. 
Chapter three examines the role of (multilateral) corporations in the current climate crisis from a 
human rights perspective. It intends to demonstrate that corporations, despite being sources of the 
largest emissions contributions to climate change, are central beneficiaries of market-oriented laws 
that prioritise economic growth over environmental protection and, consequentially, operate in a 
legal vacuum. Accordingly, chapter three contends that corporations enjoy a ‘light’ regulatory 
framework, which allows them to maximise their economic profit at the cost of environmental and 
human rights harms, especially in the so-called Third World. By analysing several attempts made 
at international level to regulate corporate activity from a human rights perspective, chapter three 
seeks to identify to what extent human rights have supported the privileged legal status of 
corporations. It argues that the dominant neoliberal international legal framework favours a 
scenario of corporate impunity in which corporations can operate under light regulation, and even 
engage in environmentally harmful (emitting) activity without serious legal consequences, which 
is significantly contributing to lead the world to imminent climate catastrophe. It contends that, 
unless governments introduce strict regulatory frameworks and radical sanctions oriented to 
regulate corporations and emissions levels, global efforts to address climate change will remain 
weak. 
Chapter four uses climate litigation as a testing ground to assess the role of human rights in the 
context of climate change. It focuses on identifying how the deployment of human rights 
considerations can potentially assist in overcoming technical challenges presented by the context 
of climate change, such as: causation, attribution, extratemporality and extraterritoriality. In doing 
so, chapter four seeks to determine whether the context of climate change under which the case 
law presented is framed, is capable of triggering initial steps towards human rights rethinking and 
expansion in the context of climate litigation, particularly in their conceptual (mis)understandings 
on the environment. It is argued that the context of climate change will trigger(if not force), 




constitutes a limited but significant avenue whereby the initial steps towards human rights 
rethinking can arise. 
This thesis concludes that the uniqueness of climate change has the potential to act as catalyst of 
human rights rethinking and even, correction in the long term. It contends that, despite the 
limitations of human rights in their understanding of nature resulting from its Western 
anthropocentric inception - in which the environment is reduced to an object whose value is 
determined by its utilitarian capacity to fulfil human (capitalist) needs - the climate crisis amounts 
to a ‘Grotian moment’, capable of propelling deep changes in law. Yet, if in light of imminent 
climate catastrophe swift, radical and ambitious climate action is not undertaken, these potential 





CHAPTER 1:  
The International Legal Framework on Climate Change and Human Rights 
 
1. Introduction 
The disparity among states’ approaches to climate change has characterised international climate 
negotiations. Long debates over the need to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions (‘emissions’) 
and states’ contributions to that end have dominated climate negotiations for more than a decade. 
The positions of states with respect to climate negotiations and their level of ambition to contribute 
to global mitigation efforts vary according to their development level, vulnerability to climate 
change impacts, relevance of fossil fuels industry to their economies and adaptation needs. These 
differences play a crucial role in the outcome of multilateral climate negotiations led by the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). For example, for small island 
developing states in the Pacific Ocean, climate change is a priority; therefore, they have played an 
active role in climate policy-making processes and negotiations, leading to the adoption of the 
Paris Agreement. Accordingly, the governments of small island development states issued the 
Male’ Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change,1 expressing their concern 
for the ‘clear and immediate implications for the full enjoyment of human rights’ of climate 
change’.2 The Male’ Declaration led to the conduct of a study by the Office of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights on the effects of climate change on the full enjoyment of human 
rights, which concluded that climate change ‘have a range of implications for the effective 
enjoyment of human rights’.3 Subsequently, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights has issued several resolutions further exploring the relationship between human 
 
1 Male’ Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change [Malé Declaration], 14 November 2007. 
Note that, before the Male Declaration, the Inuit, a community in the Arctic region, filed a petition to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. The petition detailed how the effects of climate change in the Arctic 
environment were adversely impacting a range of human rights of the Inuit as a result – it argued - of United States 
emissions contributions to climate change. Although it was rejected, the impact of the petition, considered the first 
human rights-based climate ‘case’, was significant as an early call of attention to the international community on the 
human rights dimension of climate change. See Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking 
Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States, 7 
December 2005. For a detailed discussion of the Inuit Petition, see Chapter 4. 
2 Malé Declaration, ibid. 
3 Human Rights Council, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 




rights and climate change, and the state obligations in that regard,4 which have usefully informed 
climate negotiations and helped to raise awareness and understanding on the effects of climate 
change upon human rights, particularly in the most vulnerable communities.5 These contributions 
have, thus, played a crucial role in the initial understanding of the linkages between human rights 
and climate change; and paved the way for the subsequent recognition of human rights 
considerations in the Paris Agreement.6 The adoption of the Paris Agreement, irrespective of its 
shortcomings, constitutes a breakthrough step in the development of the international legal 
framework on climate change and, indeed, in the recognition of human rights in the climate change 
debate. Yet, the international climate change regime has extensively been criticised for not being 
able to effectively tackle the (root causes of the) problem of climate change and, rather, promoting 
neo-colonial forms of domination by wealthy Western states over the Third World, through 
policies favouring wealthy states that, far from alleviating the problem, perpetuate human suffering 
and environmental degradation.7  
This chapter, in section 1, presents the foundations of international law on climate change regime 
and the negotiation process within international climate governance leading to the adoption of the 
Paris Agreement, in order to contextualise the human rights progress into the field of climate 
change. Section 2 of this chapter looks beyond the incorporation of a human rights provision in 
the Paris Agreement and, jointly with the human rights approach to climate change recognised in 
its preamble, recognises the importance of also considering ecosystems and biodiversity (Mother 
Earth) therein as an opportunity to rethink the human rights’ relational approach to the 
environment.  
 
4 See for example, Human Rights Council, Resolution 19/10, A/HRC/RES/19/10, 19 April 2012, appointing an  
independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and 
sustainable environment; Human Rights Council, Resolution A/HRC/25/53, Mapping report of the Independent 
Expert on the issue of  Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable 
Environment: Focus Report on Human Rights and Climate Change, 30 December 2013. 
5For a more detailed analysis of the OHCHR report, see John Knox, ‘Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at 
the United Nations’ (2009)33 Harvard Environmental Law Review 477. 
6 Paris Agreement, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/19, 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016 [Paris 
Agreement]. UNFCCC Decision, 1/CP. 21’Adoption of the Paris Agreement’, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, 29 January 
2016. 
7 See, for example, Julia Dehm, ‘Carbon Colonialism or Climate Justice? Interrogating the International Climate 
Regime from a TWAIL Perspective’ 33 Windsor Y. B. Access Just (2016) 129; and Heidi Bachram, ‘Climate Freud 




There is today a set of international norms and policies aimed at tackling climate change. With the 
endorsement of the UN General Assembly, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) established the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 ‘to provide internationally co-ordinated scientific assessments of 
the magnitude, timing and potential environmental and socio-economic impact of climate change 
and realistic response strategies’.8 It is composed of 195 member governments, which meet at least 
once a year in Plenary Sessions of the Panel.9 It provides governments with ‘the most authoritative 
scientific assessments on climate change’, its impacts and future risks, and options for adaptation 
and mitigation.10 Since its creation, the IPCC has informed the climate policy-making process and 
negotiations with assessment reports that cover scientific, technical and socio-economic aspects of 
climate change. Given that climate science is essential to inform the developments in the climate 
regime, the IPCC fulfils a fundamental role in this regime. 
The basis of the international legal framework on climate change law is the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change,11 adopted in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. 
Since the entry into force of the UNFCCC, the international community has adopted further 
implementing treaties that specify states’ commitments on climate change, namely the Kyoto 
Protocol,12 adopted in 1997, and entered into force in 2005; and the Paris Agreement, adopted in 
2015 and entered into force in 2016.13 In addition to the international treaties on climate change, 
norms of customary international law also apply in the international climate change regime.14 The 
international law on climate change also intersects with other international legal frameworks, 
particularly with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,15 aimed both 
at protecting the Earth’s ozone layer from depletion caused by emissions from certain substances 
and phasing out their production; and the International Convention for the Prevention of the 
 
8 UN General Assembly, ‘Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind’ (43rd session), 
UN Doc. A/RES/43/53, 6 December 1988, para. 5. 
9 IPCC website <https://www.ipcc.ch> accessed 1 June 2020. 
10 ibid. 
11 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
12 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997 [hereinafter 
Kyoto Protocol].  
13 Paris Agreement (n 6). 
14 See, Daniel Bodansky, ‘Customary (And Not so Customary) International Environmental Law’ 3(1) Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies (Symposium; International Environmental Laws and Agencies: The Next Generation) (1995) 
105; and Benoit Mayer, ‘Climate Assessment as an Emerging Obligation under International Customary Law’(2019) 
68(2) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 271. 




Pollution from Ships,16 and its subsequent amendments;17 international trade and investment law, 
international maritime and civil aviation law, and norms of international human rights law and 
international environmental law.18  
The international climate regime has been characterised by intricate negotiation processes, 
reflecting the disparity amongst states’ positions with respect to the global efforts needed to tackle 
climate change, and the underlying issues of climate injustice. The multilateral regime of climate 
governance initiated by the UNFCCC is, thus, one of the regimes of international law where the 
division between developing (Third World) and developed (Western) states, and their dynamics 
of power and domination are most tangible, and as such, is highly contested. As Dehm notes: 
… grassroots movements for climate justice have been questioning not simply the 
adequacy of action taken under the umbrella of the UNFCCC but also the kind of 
action being taken: its rationality, its underlying neoliberal market-driven ethos, and 
the ensuing distributional consequences. From a climate justice standpoint, pertinent 
critiques have been made of the role played by the UNFCCC in promoting “false 
solutions” such as carbon trading and carbon offset schemes that more deeply 
perpetuate the inequalities at the heart of the climate crisis.19 
Certainly, international climate governance has been questioned, inter alia, for the blatant ways in 
which it has reproduced neo-colonial forms of dominance; and for the alleged political interference 
from non-state actors, whereby multinational corporations [‘corporations’] are able to influence 
the climate change policy-making processes by putting ‘pressure on decision-makers.’20  
 
16 International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution from Ships, 17 February 1973, modified by the Protocol 
of 1978. 
17 1997 Protocol to Amend the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution from Ships (as 
modified by the Protocol of 1978), 26 September 1997; and the Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1997 to 
Amend the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (1973/78), 15 July 2011. 
18 Since human rights, climate change and the environment are central to this thesis, more detail on different aspects 
of their interrelationship can be found throughout it.  For a detailed analysis on the intersections between the climate 
change and international trade, and investment regimes see, for example, Rafael Leal-Arcas Climate Change and 
International Trade (Edgar Elgar Pub. 2013); and Shalanda Baker ‘Climate Change and International Economic Law’ 
(2016) 43(1) Ecology Law Quarterly 53.  
19 Dehm (n 7) 131. 
20 Irja Vormedal, ‘The Influence of Business and Industry NGOs in the Negotiation of the Kyoto Mechanisms: The 




2. The International Legal Framework on Climate Change and Human Rights 
2.1 The UNFCCC 
The first talks envisaging the adoption of an international legal framework governing climate 
change started in the seventies. The WMO held the first World Climate Conference in 1979, but 
the actual works to develop a legal framework on climate change started in 1990, after the second 
World Climate Conference in Geneva co-hosted by the WMO and the UNEP, with the aim of 
reviewing the WMO-UNEP World Climate Programme.21 The Conference mainly consisted of 
scientific and technical sessions resulting in recommendations, which included, for example, the 
significance of greenhouse gases (GHG) for climate change.22 Subsequently, the UN General 
Assembly created the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention, 
which, in 1992, adopted the UNFCCC at the Rio Conference on Environment and Development 
(also known as the ‘Earth Summit’). According to its article 2, the ‘ultimate’ objective of the 
UNFCCC is ‘to achieve … stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’23 Also, 
article 4 recognises climate change as a response to anthropocentric activity, in light of article 1(2) 
and defines climate change: ‘Climate change means a change of climate which is attributed directly 
or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is 
in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.’24 
This treaty was developed with the aim of addressing the increasing concerns about global climate 
change. One of its most salient provisions is Article 4, providing for national commitments. It 
states that, ‘taking into account the principle of common but differentiated responsibility’,25 States 
 
21 For a summary of the outcomes of the conference, see UNEP, ‘The Second World Climate Conference (Information 
Unity on Climate Change, 1 May 1993) 
 <https://unfccc.int/resource/ccsites/senegal/fact/fs221.htm> accessed 1 June 2020. 
22 See, UNFCCC, ‘The Second World Climate Conference,’ 29 October-7 November 1990 
https://unfccc.int/resource/ccsites/senegal/fact/fs221.htm> accessed 13 June 2020. 
23 UNFCCC (n 11) Article 2. 
24 ibid, article 1(2). 
25 The principle of common but differentiated responsibility, enshrined within the UNFCCC, was explicitly formulated 
in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: It establishes that, i view of the different contributions 
to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the 
pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they 
command. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 3-14 June 1992. Rio Declaration on 




Parties, inter alia, shall communicate to the Conference of States Parties their ‘national inventories 
of emissions (Article 4.1); regional programmes of mitigation measures (Article 4.2); and 
cooperate and promote ‘adaptation to the impacts of climate change’ (Article 4.5). As such, Article 
4 attempts to specify states’ obligations on climate mitigation and adaptation. However, as Mayer 
observes, ‘these provisions are formulated in a vague, almost incantatory language… [and] do not 
define any obligation to achieve a particular result, such as quantified targets of emission 
reduction’.26 Indeed, the UNFCCC, recognised the need for states to undertake climate 
commitments to mitigate global emissions and adaptation measures, but it left their content 
unclear. Instead, the intention during negotiations was to build up the content of the States’ 
obligations in a framework convention with the aim of subsequently having an agreement, such as 
was the case of the Montreal Protocol (1978), which specified the States’ obligations previously 
delineated in the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985) in a more general 
way.27 
In line with the development of earlier environmental treaties,28 the international legal framework 
on climate change has followed a protocol-framed approach which, on the one hand, allows 
flexibility in bringing scientific developments on climate change to bear on the progress of the 
climate change regime; on the other hand, it does not provide concrete and clear state obligations 
under this regime.  
2.2 The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted in 1997 with the main objective of ‘setting 
quantified limitation and reduction objectives with specified time-frames’.29 The Kyoto Protocol 
became the first international treaty governing climate change with a fixed expiry date.30 The 
Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005, seven years after its adoption. It was adopted for an 
 
26 Benoit Mayer, The International Law on Climate Change. (Cambridge University Express 2018) 38. 
27 ibid, 35. 
28 For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Helsinki Protocol on the 
Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, and, within the climate regime, the Kyoto Protocol. 
29 UNFCCC, 1st Conference of States Parties (COP1), Decision 1/CP.1, “The Berlin Mandate”, 7 April 1995, para. 2 




initial period from 2008 to 2012, which subsequently was extended for another period from 2013-
2020.31  
In the Kyoto Protocol, States Parties agree to reduce their emissions by at least 5% below their 
1990 levels, which can be fulfilled either individually or jointly.32 The Protocol has a flexible 
approach whereby States Parties can fulfil their obligations through ‘flexibility mechanisms’. First, 
the joint implementation mechanism (JIM) allows an Annex I party with an emission reduction or 
limitation commitment to earn Emission Reduction Units from an emission-reduction or emission 
removal project in another Annex B (developed) state party, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2, 
which can be counted towards meeting its target under the Kyoto Protocol.33 Second, the clean 
development mechanism (CDM) allows an Annex I (developed) state to receive emission 
reduction units from emission reductions in other (non-Annex I) countries, which generally are 
developing states. 34 Third, there is the emissions trading mechanism,35 which allows countries that 
have emission units to spare (emissions permitted but not ‘used’) to sell this excess capacity to 
countries that are over their targets. This mechanism has been considered the ‘ultimate neo-liberal 
market concession to the climate process’.36 It has been criticised for its counterproductive results, 
whereby, according to Shah, ‘it will be easier to buy credits than to reduce emissions hence it 
won’t really work and will just be a license to pollute’.37 Certainly, the ‘carbon markets’ enabled 
by the Kyoto Protocol have been extensively critiqued.38 For instance, Dehm argues: 
… some have described the UNFCCC framework as promoting a form of “carbon 
colonialism” or “CO2lonialism”… [These mechanisms] ‘perpetuate inequalities at the 
heart of the climate crisis…[These] schemes are an ineffectual response that abrogates 
 
31 UNFCCC (COP8), Annex of Decision 1/CP.CMP.8, ‘Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to its Article 3, 
paragraph 9’ (“Doha Amendment”), 8 December 2012. 
32 Kyoto Protocol (n 14) article 3, para. 1. 
33 ibid, article 6. Note that the ‘joint implementation mechanisms’ is not explicated used in the text of the Article 6, 
however, it is widely recognised as such. 
34 ibid, article 12.  
35 ibid, article 17. 
36 Raymond Clémençon, ‘The Two Sides of the Paris Climate Agreement: Dismal Failure or Historic Breakthrough’ 
25(1) Journal of Environment & Development (2016) 3, 4. 
37 Arup Shah, ‘Climate Change Flexibility Mechanisms’ (Global Issues, 2 April 2012) 
<https://www.globalissues.org/article/232/flexibility-mechanisms> accessed 1 June 2020. 
38 See, for example, Steffen Böhm and Siddhartha Dabhi (eds), Upsetting the Offset; The Political Economy of Carbon 
Markets (MaryFly Books 2009); and Kevin Smith, ‘The Carbon Neutral Myth: Offset Indulgences for your Climate 




responsibility of key polluters while threatening the livelihoods of those communities 
with limited responsibility for and high vulnerability to climate change.39  
The Kyoto Protocol mechanisms constitute indeed a leeway for developed states to continue 
emitting at the cost of developing states. Specifically, the CDM has been criticised because, like 
the JIM, it allows countries in the North to ‘avoid responsibilities at home … [which] will actually 
increase emissions because the credits earned will allow rich countries to emit more’.40 The CDM 
thus undermines the criteria that ‘emissions reductions … are real, additional, verifiable, and 
permanent’41 for CDM projects in the South. Thus, the CDM, ‘in essence, … is criticised for 
allowing the rich countries to continue using the burning fossil fuel while paying the third world 
not to’.42 As a result, the efficiency of the ‘flexibility mechanisms’ under the Kyoto Protocol 
remains at least controversial, having not achieved its aim under articles 3 on quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments. Furthermore, these offset mechanisms are not criticised 
only because of their inability to contribute to global emissions reduction but, also, because they 
can be purchased and used to legitimate further greenhouse emissions in the North. As a result, 
environmental groups allege that carbon trading mechanisms are a ‘dangerous distraction’ that 
prevents urgently necessary changes in energy production and distribution.43 Indeed, the role of 
flexibility mechanisms in legitimising dominance and intensifying North-South inequalities 
should be understood in the context of climate negotiations as ‘they were mainly included on 
strong United States insistence and to keep [it] in the treaty.’44 Yet, ‘despite getting its way in 
terms of emissions trading in the Kyoto Protocol’, the United States, having signed the Protocol, 
did not ratify, rather it repudiated the process in 2001;45 Canada, for its part, officially withdrew 
in 2011.46 Unlike Canada, Australia, Japan and Russia remained in Kyoto, but the latter two 
 
39 Dehm (n 7) 131. 
40 Shah (n 37). 
41 Carbon Market Watch, ‘The Clean Development Mechanism: Local Impacts of a Global System’ (Carbon Market 
Watch, October 2018) <https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/CMW-THE-CLEAN-
DEVELOPMENT-MECHANISM-LOCAL-IMPACTS-OF-A-GLOBAL-SYSTEM-FINAL-SPREAD-WEB.pdf> 
accessed 1 June 2020. 
42 Shah (n 37). 
43 Dehm (n 7) 134. 
44 Shah (n 37). 
45 Although the United States was a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, the Senate did not ratify it, with the result that 
the ‘United States did not become bound by any emission limitation and reduction commitment’ … [despite being the 
largest emitter country back then] …’ (now surpassed by China) ‘and its … emissions represented a large share of the 
emissions of developed States that the Kyoto Protocol sought to regulate.’ Mayer (n 19) 41. 




refused to commit to targets for the second commitment period. China, classified as a developing 
country or non-annex B country in the Kyoto protocol, was not committed to anything. 
There is no doubt that the aggressive neoliberal market orientation of the Kyoto Protocol served 
the interests of developed States. Along with serving the interest of the mentioned states, it also 
greatly served the interest of these developed states’ corporations, leading to ‘new’ forms of legal 
‘CO2lonialism’.
47 The European Corporations Observatory points out that states’ corporate 
ventures: 
…that might become eligible for emissions credits - nuclear power plants, so-called 
'clean coal' plants as well as industrial agriculture and large-scale tree plantations 
(including genetically engineered varieties) - have extremely serious negative social 
and environmental impacts. Investments in carbon’ sinks (such as large-scale tree 
plantations) in the South would result in land being used at the expense of local people, 
accelerate deforestation, deplete water resources and increase poverty. Entitling the 
North to buy cheap emission credits from the South, through projects of an often-
exploitative nature, constitutes ‘carbon colonialism’.48  
As such, international climate governance approves ‘new’ forms of ‘CO2lonialism’, which only 
benefit wealthy States and their empowered corporations at the cost of the most disadvantaged 
countries, triggering thereby human suffering and environmental depletion in the Third World.49  
2.3 The Human Rights’ Path from Kyoto to Paris  
Since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in the nineties until the adoption of the Paris Agreement 
in 2015 only slight progress was made in the context of the Conference of State Parties to the 
UNFCCC (COP) to include human rights considerations in climate change negotiations prior to 
the adoption of the Paris Agreement. The climate negotiations towards its adoption have been 
characterised by tensions between different states or states groups’ positions such as, the European 
Union states; the United States and its partners; the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and 
 
47 Dehm (n 7) 129. 
48 Corporate Europe Observatory, ‘Saving the Kyoto Protocol Means Ending the Market Mania’ (July 2001) 
<http://archive.corporateeurope.org/climate/bonnstatement.html> accessed 1 June 2020. 
49 In part, this has been a factor that triggered bottom-up responses from civil society who is increasingly resorting to 




China); small island developing states (joined by least-developed states); and the oil-producing 
states (led by Saudi Arabia).50  Typically, largest emitters states have  shown a lack of political 
will to undertake significant steps oriented to reducing global emissions so as to hold the Earth’s 
temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.51 Likewise, highly vulnerable states to climate 
change impacts (notably, small islands states) have consistently pushed for ambitious mitigation 
efforts during climate negotiations. It could be considered that human rights have been a peripheral 
subject which often faced reluctance by states in the negotiation processes prior Paris. This is 
reflected in the outcome documents of COPs negotiating the post-Kyoto regime whereby explicit 
references to human rights references appear only sporadically, including in the reduced (but still 
significant) reference in the final text of the Paris Agreement.52  
As the end of the first commitment period (2008-2012) of the Kyoto Protocol was coming to an 
end,53 it was essential to gain traction towards the adoption of a successor, legally binding 
document tackling the global problem of climate change. In 2007, the COP13 adopted the Bali 
Action Plan,54 which was essentially a point of departure of climate negotiations oriented to build 
consensus on the adoption of a climate agreement in Copenhagen in 2009. Importantly, based on 
the findings of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report,55 the Bali Action Plan emphasises ‘the 
urgency to address climate change’.56 To that end, the Plan ‘[launched] a comprehensive process 
to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term 
cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012 [end year of first period of the Kyoto Protocol], 
in order to reach an agreed outcome and adopt a decision at its fifteenth session [at Copenhagen]’.57 
Accordingly, the Plan established an Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action 
 
50 Daniel Bodansky,] Jutta Brunnée and Lavanya Rajamani, ‘International Climate Change Law’ (Oxford University 
Press 2017) at 116. 
51 See, for example, Raymond Clémençon (n 36); and Aslak Brun, ‘Conference Diplomacy: The Making of the Paris 
Agreement’ 4(3) Politics and Governance (2016) 115.  
52 Discussing the diverse aspects of and positions within climate negotiations leading to the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement falls beyond the scope of this section. Rather it seeks to provide an overview of the gradual understanding 
and incorporation of human rights’ considerations in the climate regime amidst, at times, diametrically opposed 
positions around states’ mitigation commitments, which reflect the dynamics of power that dominate the climate 
regime and explain somewhat their outcomes. 
53 The Kyoto Protocol did not count with the ratification from United States, which back then was the largest emitter 
state. 
54 UNFCCC (COP13), Decision 1/CP. 13 ‘Bali Action Plan’, 14-15 December 2007. 
55 IPCC, ‘Fourth Assessment Report: Technical Summary’ (IPCC Working Group III contribution to AR4, 2007). 
56 UNFCCC, Bali Action Plan (n 54). 




to carry out that process.58  The Bali Action Plan was considered an achievement as ‘political 
compromise between developed and developing countries at the end of tortuous political 
negotiations’,59 over five main categories of  its ‘shared vision for long-term cooperative action’, 
including mitigation, adaptation, shared vision, technology and financing,60  whereby mitigation 
was a central issue. Indeed, as Bodansky notes, ‘[although] the Bali Action Plan addressed 
mitigation by both developed and developing countries … it continued to distinguish between the 
two’.61 For instance, while the Plan required both developing and developed states to take 
‘measurable, reportable and verifiable mitigation actions’;62 it provides developed states with the 
option of including or not quantified emission reduction targets. For Rajamani, ‘[this] is 
disappointing given the effort sharing arrangement, their historical and current GHG contributions, 
and their inability in large part to meet even the modest ambition of the existing climate regime’.63 
This kind of climate policy resulting from multilateral climate negotiations show that the climate 
regime is porous given that, far from contributing to urgent climate mitigation, it can provide the 
means to largest emitting states (and their corporations) to continue their emissions business-as-
usual, without really contributing to climate mitigation, despite recognising its urgency. In 
addition, the Bali Action Plan does not make any explicit reference to human rights. It only refers 
to the participation of relevant stakeholders including civil society in the process of 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.64 Climate mitigation commitments and their nature as well 
as the incorporation of human rights considerations in global climate action remained thus matters 
to be pushed for in subsequent climate negotiations. 
Subsequently, the COP15 held in Copenhagen in 2009 sought to implement what was agreed in 
Bali, consisting in the adoption of an instrument on climate action. The COP15 in Copenhagen 
was considered ‘a very public failure for international negotiations on climate change’.65 This is 
 
58 ibid, para. 2. 
59 Mayer (n 26) 43. 
60 See Bali Action Plan (n 54) para. 1(a). 
61 Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani, (n 50) 110. 
62 Bali Action Plan (n 54) para. 1(b)(i). 
63 Lavanya Rajamani, ‘From Berlin to Bali and Beyond: Killing Kyoto Softly’ (2008) 57(4) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 909, 939. 
64 Bali Action Plan (n 54) para. 11. 
65 Mayer (n 26) 43. See also, for example, Shamus Cooke, ‘Why Copenhagen Failed?’ (Global Research, 19 December 
2009) <http://www.globalresearch.ca/why-copenhagen-failed/16612> accessed 1 June2020; and Ben Lieberman, 
‘The Copenhagen Conference: A Setback for Bad Climate Policy in 2010’ (The Heritage Foundation, 19 January 
2010) <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/01/the-copenhagen-conference-a-setback-for-bad-climate-




because, after long and tedious negotiations, no decision was made until the very last minute with 
agreement only from ‘twenty-eight countries, including all of the major economies and emitters, 
representative of all of the UN regional groups, and representatives of the most vulnerable and 
least developed states’.66 As a result, some countries, led by the United States, adopted the 
‘Copenhagen Accord’,67 which led to complaints from other delegations that did not participate in 
the drafting process.68 In consequence, the Copenhagen Accord, which was basically an agreement 
based upon voluntary commitments ‘to limit global temperature to below 2°C before pre-industrial 
levels’,69 did not reach consensus during the COP15 and was only agreed upon by more states after 
its closing.70 It acknowledged the particularly vulnerable situation of the least developed countries  
and small island developing states and Africa to climate change impacts.71 In addition, amongst 
other aspects, the Copenhagen Accord established the Green Climate Fund for adaptation and 
mitigation purposes;72 and  recognised the ‘crucial role of reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation’.73 Yet, the Copenhagen Accord did not have legal force as it was 
considered a political agreement ‘rather than a full-fledged legal instrument’.74 It lacked powers 
of enforcement and clarity on its procedural mechanisms for implementation.75 The Copenhagen 
Accord also obviated implicit or explicit references to human rights. In sum, beyond the decisions 
made, the negotiation process and outcome of the COP15 in Copenhagen posed serious concerns 
and increased scepticism on the feasibility of achieving a climate agreement to follow the Kyoto 
regime after 2012; and put the spotlight on the North-South division, particularly evidenced in 
international regime of climate governance.  
The mitigation targets submitted in the Copenhagen Accord were subsequently acknowledged the 
following year at the COP16 held in Cancun. States developed the approach set by the Copenhagen  
 
66 Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 50) 110. 
67 UNFCCC, COP15, Annex of decision 2/CP.15 ‘Copenhagen Accord’, 18-19 December 2009. 
68 Mayer (n 26) 43. 
69 Copenhagen Accord (n 67) para. 1. 
70 141 out of the 197 Parties to the UNFCCC agreed upon the text of the Copenhagen Accord during the COP15 and 
afterwards, through notification to the UNFCCC Secretariat.  Mayer (n 26) 44. 
71 Copenhagen Accord (n 67) para. 3. 
72 ibid, para. 10.  
73 ibid, para. 6. 
74 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Post-Mortem’, (2010) 104 American Journal 
of International Law 1, 4. 





Accord and built upon them in the Cancun Agreements.76 These Agreements confirmed the 
bottom-up approach of the Copenhagen Accord based on voluntary mitigation pledges submitted 
by states with the aim of holding the temperature rise below 2°C, and even 1.5°C.77 The Cancun 
Agreements also established the Climate Green Fund,78 and the Cancun Adaptation Framework, 
which incorporated the principles set in Bali, whereby adaptation measures should ‘follow a 
country-driven, gender-sensitive, participatory and fully transparent approach’.79 Yet, one of the 
crucial issues that remained unclear in Cancun was the nature of state emission reduction pledges 
which, ‘[depending] on the particular circumstances of each communication … could constitute 
unilateral declarations from which arise international obligations’.80 Similarly to the Copenhagen 
Accord, the Cancun Agreements  maintained the process towards  a second commitment period 
under the Kyoto Protocol,81 later achieved at Doha. In relation to human rights, the Cancun 
Agreements constitutes a symbolic breakthrough in the climate regime. For the first time, explicit 
reference to human rights was made in the international regime of climate change. In a decision 
adopted by the COP16 held in Cancun, it was recognised that:  
…the adverse effects of climate change have a range of direct and indirect implications 
for the effective enjoyment of human rights and that the effects of climate change will 
be felt most acutely by those segments of the population that are already vulnerable 
owing to geography, gender, age, indigenous or minority status and disability. 82 
In addition, the Cancun Agreements ‘[emphasize] that Parties should, in all climate change 
related actions, fully respect human rights’.83 Although minimal, this explicit reference to 
human rights in the report of the COP16 in Cancun represents an important step towards the 
recognition of human rights in multilateral climate negotiations. Nevertheless, the vagueness 
of the emissions’ reduction targets built in the Copenhagen Accord, enshrined by the Cancun 
Agreements fell short of constituting a solid legal architecture enabling significant mitigation 
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commitments from states, consistent with the level of urgency and ambition needed to limit 
climate change impacts. As Bodansky notes, ‘[the] comparatively weak provisions of the 
Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreements are unlikely, in themselves, to produce the 
necessary level of emissions cuts to prevent dangerous climate change’.84  
In this context, the COP17 held in Durban the following year was aimed at setting the route ‘that 
govern climate actions in the 2012-2020 time-frame’,85 towards the adoption of a legally binding 
instrument. To this end, the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(‘Durban Platform’) was established.86 The Durban Platform ‘provided the mandate for the Paris 
Agreement negotiations by establishing a new negotiating group …[the Durban Platform]’.87 The 
negotiation process in Durban repeated the pattern established in the preceding decade of climate 
negotiations, where ‘states are engaged, not in a negotiation of the text of an agreement, but rather 
[in] a meta-negotiation about what to negotiate’,88Indeed, the text of the Durban Platform reflect 
the tensions during its negotiation. It sets up ‘a process to develop a protocol, another legal 
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force’,89 which would end in 2015 with the adoption 
of the ‘new’ treaty. This provision reflects, for instance, the demand of the European Union, small-
island and least-developed countries, of developing ‘a fast-start mandate to negotiate a new 
legally-binding instrument engaging all countries, as a condition for its acceptance to a second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol’.90 Likewise, reflecting other states’ demands, the 
Platform provides ‘that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible 
cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international 
response’.91 This provision responded to the United States’ demand of having a ‘symmetrical’ 
mandate applicable to developing and developed states alike, as a condition to ‘accept a mandate 
to negotiate a new outcome of a legal nature’.92 These ‘meta-negotiations’, not surprisingly, were 
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also dominated by a lack of political will to make ambitious emission reduction commitments and 
incorporating explicit human rights language. The outcome document of the COPP17 in Durban 
made no explicit reference to human rights, undermining thereby the achievement made in Cancun, 
when human rights considerations were for the first time considered in the outcome document of 
the COP.  
As 2012 was the expiry year of the Kyoto Protocol, the COP18 held in Doha gave momentum to 
the climate change negotiations, as states had the last opportunity to decide upon a post-Kyoto 
commitment period in the climate regime. Importantly, ‘a second commitment period would define 
mitigation commitments of a clearly binding legal nature’.93As in previous COPs, negotiations 
were marked by big differences between developing and developed countries, which undermined 
the hopes of finally getting a post-Kyoto climate agreement and fulfilling the commitment made 
in Bali of having no gap between Kyoto and its succeeding regime.94 Yet, at the last minute of the 
COP in Doha, states agreed upon amending the Kyoto Protocol to extend its validity for another 
eight-year period from 2013 to 2020.95 This amendment to the Kyoto Protocol implicitly reflects 
the recognition of the insufficiency of the voluntary reduction emissions pledges from states under 
the Copenhagen Accord. The Doha amendment, therefore, ‘was made with a view to reducing 
their overall emissions … by at least 18 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2013 
to 2020’.96 The Doha Amendment needed to be accepted by at least three-quarters of the parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol,  in order to enter into force,97 which  was achieved in 2020, triggering as a 
result the entry into force of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.98 This means 
that (Annex 1-developed) states that have presented their emissions reduction targets for the 
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol are now legally bound by them. Yet, although 
the 18% minimum target compared to 1990 levels set in the Doha Amendment represents an 
increase of 5% in relation to the target established for the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
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Protocol; it should be noted that ‘the current global emissions pathway would likely result in an 
increase of global average temperatures of 3˚C or more, which is significantly higher than the 
temperature limits of less than 2˚C and as close to 1.5˚C as possible as contained in the Paris 
Agreement.99 This crucial shortcoming in the emissions reduction levels explicitly reflects the 
insufficiency of the measures taken under the international climate regime in order to hold global 
temperatures below the minimum required to limit unprecedented effects of climate change.100 
Therefore, climate action beyond measures stemming from traditional multilateral climate 
governance under the UNFCCC regime is much needed, for which ambitious climate policies at 
national and local level are crucial, including initiatives from civil society, like climate litigation. 
Focused on defining a clearer path for the final two years of the Durban Platform negotiations, the 
COP19 held in Warsaw,101 set the agenda to start drafting the new climate agreement to be 
negotiated in the next conference. Although  the report of the COP19 does not make express 
reference to human rights, it addressed some of the demands from developing countries, including 
increased climate finance through the Green Climate Fund and Long-Term Finance,102 and the 
framework for REDD-+,103 and established a mechanism for ‘loss and damage’ to associated with 
climate change impacts.104 Indeed, the focus in these areas implicitly make reference to human 
rights considerations given that they represent some of the ‘areas where potential tensions with the 
protection of human rights are particularly evident’.105 Besides addressing those areas, the COP19 
report also refers implicitly to human rights by acknowledging that ‘climate change represents an 
urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies, future generations and the planet’.106 
Remarkably, this provision not only reflects the increasing recognition of human rights 
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considerations in climate negotiations but, by including ‘future generations’, it also recognises 
implicitly the extratemporal nature of human rights impacts, which is increasingly being put in 
evidence through climate litigation cases invoking the rights of young and future generations.107 
Further, although it did not clarify what would be the legal  character (whether legally binding or 
not) of the future climate change agreement, the COP19 decision on ‘Further Advancing the 
Durban Platform’108 called states to present their intended nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs), in advance to the next COP in Lima, where the draft text of the ‘new’ agreement would 
be negotiated. 
The main outcome of the COP20 held in Lima was the adoption of the 'Lima Call for Climate 
Action', which called states Parties ‘to communicate their intended nationally determined 
contributions well in advance’109 of the COP21 in Paris, including an annex with elements of a 
draft negotiating text. Importantly for the recognition of human rights in the international climate 
framework, the annex with a draft negotiating text of the instrument, in its preambular part, 
included explicit reference to human rights in connection with environmental considerations and 
other rights. It stressed that: ‘…all actions to address climate change and all the processes 
established under this agreement should ensure a gender-responsive approach, take into account 
environmental integrity / the protection of the integrity of Mother Earth, and respect human rights, 
the right to development and the rights of indigenous peoples.’110 Despite the connection between 
the protection of the environment / Mother Earth and human rights was made in the draft 
negotiating text, it unfortunately did not make its way until the final text of the instrument. 
However, albeit amended, references to gender issues, the right to development and the rights of 
indigenous peoples, and even climate migration111 made their way into the final text of the 
agreement, setting thereby a milestone in the human rights’ trajectory in the international climate 
change realm and, certainly, in the relationship between human rights and climate change. Yet, 
one of the most challenging issues left to be resolved in Paris was the legal form of the climate 
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agreement, which was purposely left undefined. However, the COP20 in Lima decided that the 
final outcome ‘shall address in a balanced manner, inter alia, mitigation, adaptation, finance, 
technology development and transfer, and capacity-building, and transparency of action and 
support.112 After its closing, several negotiation meetings were conducted to build-up the final 
draft of the climate agreement to be negotiated in Paris, whose final version was delivered only 
fifteen days before the COP 21 started. Certainly, although the final draft text left crucial points 
undecided and pending before further negotiations in Paris, it had a value per se, for putting on the 
table a document to be negotiated upon, especially considering the sharp North-South differences 
manifested during two decades of climate negotiations,.113 As Bodansky describes, the UN climate 
regime, the end game of COPs is typically a process of trench warfare, in which virtually every 
word is fought over, and gains and losses are measured in brackets and commas’.114 Tracking the 
human rights trajectory amidst the ‘warfare’ of the making-of the climate change regime, whereby 
states negotiate their commitments towards the common goal of limiting the effects of climate 
change is relevant to the understanding of the relationship between human rights and climate 
change. It not only allows to grasp the context in which this relationship has arisen, but also the 
limitations of the climate regime - and of human rights thereby - to respond to the climate 
emergency as such and, therefore, the need to resort to other ‘avenues’ for radical and urgent 
climate action.115 Yet, setting the table for the final negotiation of the post-Kyoto framework 
amidst widely diverse states’ positions could be considered an achievement in itself.  
2.4 The Paris Agreement: Glass Half Full or Half Empty? 
The Paris Agreement was adopted by the COP21 held in Paris in 2015 and entered into force on 4 
November 2016,116 on the thirtieth day after fulfilling the condition that at least 55 Parties to the 
UNFCCC, accounting for at least 55 % of the total global greenhouse gas emissions, have 
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deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession with the 
Depositary.117  
The United States ratified the Paris Agreement on 3 September 2019, however, on 4 November 
2019, the President Trump administration notified its decision to withdraw from the Agreement 
which took effect on 4 November 2020 in accordance with article 28 (1) and (2) of the 
Agreement.118 However, the President elect, Joe Biden, announced the intention of the United 
States to re-join the Paris Agreement following his assumption of the Presidency in 2021.119 
Since the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992, until the last COP, before the adoption of the 
Paris Agreement, human rights considerations were largely absent in climate change negotiations. 
References to human rights have been limited and rarely explicit. The Kyoto Protocol did not make 
any kind of reference to human rights. Only the final decisions of the COPs held in Cancun (2010) 
and Lima (2014) included explicit references to human rights in the draft text to be considered in 
the negotiations of the future climate agreement. Therefore, the adoption of the Paris Agreement 
by the COP21 in December 2015 is meaningful from a human rights perspective since it is the 
‘first multilateral environmental agreement to make reference to human rights explicitly’.120 As 
such, the Paris Agreement constitutes a treaty-based bridge between the legal fields of human 
rights and climate change and thus symbolises the ‘official’ recognition that climate change has a 
human rights dimension. Certainly, it ‘includes the strongest human rights language in any 
environmental treaty’.121 and, therefore, the preamble of the Paris agreement refers to states’ 
obligations in relation to human rights. It states that: 
Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and 
consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of 
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indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities 
and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender 
equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.122 
Hereby the Paris Agreement implicitly recognised that the impacts of climate change affect a 
number of human rights and, principally, those from groups most vulnerable to climate impacts. 
As the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment puts it, the Paris Agreement 
‘signifies the recognition by the international community that climate change poses unacceptable 
threats to the full enjoyment of human rights and that actions to address climate change must 
comply with human rights obligations’.123  
Yet, as it was reflected in the outcome of several Conference of States Parties preceding the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement where human rights references were absent or indirect, the 
recognition of human rights considerations throughout climate change negotiations was not 
exempt from obstacles. In particular, a number of states, namely ‘Saudi Arabia, the United States 
and Norway explicitly objected to any reference to human rights in the operative part of the 
Agreement, and several Member States of the European Union (EU) expressed non-public 
objections’.124 Given the lack of support for the inclusion of human rights’ considerations in global 
climate action, the Paris Agreement can be deemed a ‘marginal victory for those advocating for 
building bridges between the climate regime and human rights law’.125  
Whilst the human rights reference is ‘only’ in the preambular part of the Paris Agreement, it should 
be borne in mind that, even though human rights references were not included in the core text, as 
had been vigorously advocated by developing countries and civil society groups,126 any reference 
to human rights could have been excluded from the final text of the Paris Agreement.127 In other 
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words, the fate of human rights in the Paris Agreement could have been worse. Therefore, despite  
slightness of the reference to human rights in the preambular part of the treaty, the inclusion of an 
explicit reference to human rights in the final text of the Paris Agreement ‘contributes to the 
development of a political narrative justifying climate action by reference to human rights.’128 The 
incorporation of human rights considerations in the Paris Agreement symbolises thus the human 
rights ‘passage’ into the realm of climate change and multilateral climate negotiations. It therefore 
allows climate change relevant issues such as mitigation and adaptation to be framed in human 
rights terms. In fact, there is a growing trend of rights-based climate claims emerging in judicial 
bodies worldwide, in which eminently climate change issues of mitigation and adaptation are being 
articulated with human rights arguments, even if not necessarily refer to the human rights provision 
in the Paris Agreement. However, while the human rights reference in the Paris Agreement can 
assist in building avenues to connect human rights and climate change international regimes, to 
consider individuals and communities’ rights in climate action, ‘because it specifies no concrete 
measures, its direct impact on the protection of human rights in climate action will remain very 
limited’.129 
As a legal instrument, the Paris Agreement has been considered the minimum level of consensus 
that States Parties could have achieved after several years of negotiations.130 As a result, the Paris 
Agreement leaves open operational and implementation questions. For example, as Clémençon 
notes, ‘[the] Paris Agreement is built entirely around voluntary country pledges -as different as the 
countries they are coming from – which are still far from adding up to achieving the objectives the 
agreement defines’.131 The Paris Agreement provides ample level of discretion to States Parties to 
determine their emissions reduction targets, thereby posing a good deal of scepticism on how the 
Treaty will accomplish its measurable goal of:  
…strengthen[ing] the global response to the threat of climate change […] including by 
holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above 
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pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and 
impacts of climate change.132  
This is probably the most remarkable achievement of the Paris Agreement, as, after years of 
negotiations and pressure, in particular from small island states, this specific science-based target 
made its way into the final text of treaty. In order to achieve this long-term goal, the Paris 
Agreement establishes its ‘aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as 
possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake 
rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science…’133 In order to do so, it 
further establishes the States Parties’ obligation to ‘communicate and maintain successive 
nationally determined contributions [NDCs] that it intends to achieve’,134 whereby [each] Party's 
successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party's then 
current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition’.135 In this way, 
‘the Paris Agreement specifies the “ultimate objective” of the UNFCCC, reflecting the consensus 
which had been reached in the intervening two decades’.136 In the light of the disparity amongst 
states’ positions with respect to the global problem of climate change, reflected in the climate 
negotiations preceding the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the consensus achieved, even if 
modest, should not be dismissed, even if the terms of the Agreement can be credibly criticized.  
First, from an international legal perspective, the Paris Agreement is a treaty within the definition 
of the Vienna Convention and, therefore, is legally binding upon its Parties. However, not all of 
its provisions create a legal obligation. As Clémençon argues:  
What exactly legally binding should mean with respect to the Paris Agreement became 
a particularly controversial issue on which countries ultimately use different 
interpretations. The Paris Agreement now is legally binding as far as the process staked 
out goes, but it does not contain legally binding provisions that require countries to 
take domestic legal action.137  
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As a result, when it comes to specifying the states’ concrete obligations to tackle climate change, 
the balance of the Paris Agreement is equivocal. While, on one hand, it sets, for the first time, a 
specific global emission reduction objective of 2°C and even, ideally, 1.5°C above pre-industrial 
level to limit global temperature increase, on the other hand, it lacks legally binding character with 
respect to states’ emission reduction commitments, contributing to that end. There is no provision 
in the Agreement specifying the actions that should be taken by the States Parties to fulfil the 2°C 
threshold objective. Rather, it leaves this point entirely to the discretion of states, which, in turn, 
leaves uncertainty on the feasibility of achieving the concrete 2°C emissions reduction objective.  
Secondly, the Paris Agreement provides a timeframe in which the long-term target of ‘[achieving] 
a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sink of greenhouse gases’ 
should be achieved in the second half of this century.138 This is linked to scientists’ insights picked 
up by many states during the Paris negotiations, such as the European Union, which insisted on 
the need ‘to completely decarbonize the world economy by the year 2100.’139 The inclusion of a 
time-bound, long-term objective in the Paris Agreement constitutes a notable achievement; 
however, it does not necessarily entail actual states’ actions oriented to achieve this objective 
through their voluntary pledges submitted in the form of NDCs. As such, the gravity of the concern 
is not matched by a binding legal obligation. 
Another important achievement in the Paris Agreement, connected to the states’ obligations to 
present their NDCs, is the five-years review mechanism. Accordingly, States Parties commit to 
‘communicate a nationally determined contribution every five years’,140 which shall ‘represent a 
progression beyond the Party's then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its 
highest possible ambition’.141 Although the implementation of the review mechanism will need 
further development, its inclusion has been crucial in ensuring a level of adaptability and 
operability of the Paris Agreement. Thus, the five-year review mechanism, in conjunction with the 
requirement that each NDC update should not be lower than the previous one, ensures an increase 
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in States Parties’ ‘level of ambition over time, something that was sorely missing in the Kyoto 
Protocol’.142 
Thirdly, the Paris Agreement lacks a specific provision to measure the financial support given by 
developed countries to developing countries. Along with mitigation and adaptation efforts, the 
Paris Agreement includes the objective of ‘making finance flows consistent with a pathway 
towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient development’.143 However, the Paris 
Agreement does not specify the means through which financial support should be made effective, 
leaving ample room for discretion to developed states to implement their obligations.144 In fact, 
financial support is also enshrined in the UNFCCC, 145 whereby developed states on the basis of 
the common but differentiated responsibilities principle are required to assume historical 
responsibility by providing financial support to developing states to implement climate action.146 
However, developed and developing countries ‘interpreted this entry differently’, over the years, 
leading to a misinterpretation which ‘created gaps in the execution and disbursement of funds 
where it is most needed’.147 As a result, the sources, methodologies, channels and extent to which 
developed states are required to fulfil financial commitments remains unclear. Such uncertainty 
about financial support poses serious risks to global climate action. Developing countries, despite 
having contributed the least to climate change, are commonly the first, and most severely, affected 
by its impacts, to varying degrees, and, therefore, depend on financial support to implement 
adaptation and mitigation measures. Therefore, the objective of climate finance for mitigation and 
adaptation remains unresolved under the Paris Agreement.  
Fourthly, the Paris Agreement represents a loss for states most affected by climate change -
frequently the poorest economies - and a win for industrialized states, led by the United States, 
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which throughout the negotiations of the treaty categorically opposed any recognition of a right to 
compensation for loss and damage for climate change impacts, due to historic emissions. Although 
the quarrelsome issue of loss and damage is acknowledged in the Paris Agreement, it does not 
provide any guideline on how to implement this provision. Article 8 states that ‘Parties recognise 
the importance of averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with the 
adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and 
the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage’.148 Yet, beyond 
recognising the issue of loss and damage, the Paris Agreement left ‘a great deal of ambiguity in 
the agreement on how this complex issue will be addressed’.149 Thus, amongst developing states, 
it remained the expectation that the issue of loss and damage be revisited in the future, particularly 
to assist climate action in the most vulnerable states, including by, for example, ‘providing 
concrete technical and financial advice’.150 
Finally, and crucially, the Paris Agreement does not refer to core themes directly linked to its main 
goal of holding the increase of global temperatures below 2°C-1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. 
In particular, the Paris Agreement does not address the need to change the current engine of the 
global economy based on the production, extraction, and commercialisation of fossil fuels, which 
is at the core of the problem of climate change.  
In this vein, the Paris Agreement focuses on the role of States in global climate action but does not 
address the environmentally harmful role that corporations play in climate change, particularly in 
certain industrial sectors, as , including private and state-owned corporations from both developed 
and developing countries.151 Rather, the Paris Agreement focuses in the position of the state to 
achieve its goals; and only recognises and encourages the role of corporations, along with a range 
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of other non-state actors, in contributing to state-led climate action. Indeed, as Streck notes, 
‘[i]nternational climate negotiations remain state-centric’.152 Yet, corporations have played an 
active role throughout climate negotiations, and have exerted strong influence on the positions of 
(some) states, impacting, thereby, the outcome and pace of global climate action. For example, 
Saudi Arabia, along with other oil producing states, and in close cooperation with large industries 
in the fossil fuels sector, has had a consistent obstructionist approach in climate multilateral 
debates. For instance, as Depledge points out, for Saudi Arabia, ‘“no” is the preferred outcome 
[which] can have a disproportionately high impact on the negotiations, not only by formally 
blocking agreements, but on a day-to-day basis by slowing down progress or souring the 
atmosphere’.153 A similar approach is also reflected in the influential role that the largest oil and 
gas corporations, such as, amongst others, Chevron, BP and Exxon Mobil, have in shaping 
international and domestic climate policy through national governments’ positions in climate 
negotiations.154  
It is, thus, not surprising that, instead of taking a restrictive approach towards corporate activity 
which seriously compromises climate action (notably on mitigation), the Paris Agreement takes a 
general and undifferentiated approach to all non-state actors. Indeed, non-state actors are explicitly 
recognised in the climate regime. The UNFCCC, for example, encourages that, in order ‘to 
promote the effective implementation of the Convention’, the Conference of States Parties shall 
‘[seek] and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and information provided 
by, competent international organisations and intergovernmental and non-governmental 
bodies’.155 Likewise, the Paris Agreement not only recognises the role of non-state actors in 
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climate action but also promotes engagement with non-state actors. In its preamble, the Paris 
Agreement ‘[recognizes] the importance of the engagements of all levels of government and 
various actors, in accordance with respective national legislations of Parties, in addressing climate 
change’.156 Moreover, Article 6 of the Agreement recognises States Parties’ role in pursuing 
voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions, for 
which it provides that they shall ‘[enhance] public and private sector participation in the 
implementation of nationally determined contributions’.157  
Therefore, the Paris Agreement - and the climate regime in general, fails not only to address the 
root of the problem of climate change by treating in an undifferentiated fashion the role of 
corporations in climate action, like other non-state actors, without considering the crucial role they 
play in the outcome of global mitigation efforts and, indeed, in the climate crisis. Similarly, the 
absence of references to the need to pursue and promote a global transit to the use of alternate 
sources of renewable energy aimed at phasing out the fossil fuel age prevents to provide the sense 
of urgency and necessary economic transitions that the whole problem of climate change entails.  
The Paris Agreement reflects the fluctuation that the international climate regime has with respect 
to the legal character and enforcement capacity of its normative frameworks. Climate change 
requires ambitious commitments with (mainly) high economic costs underneath that states are 
willing to undertake at a varying degree and, therefore, challenges its potential universality. 
Therefore, the legal binding character in the international climate change regime plays a crucial 
role in its effectiveness. As Bodansky, Brunnéé and Rajamani explain: 
For the regime to be effective, it must attract wide, if not universal participation, it 
must provide for deep cuts in global emissions, and it must be complied with. 
However, securing universal participation as well as deep cuts has proven difficult 
because of concerns about reciprocity, economic harm, and fairness or equity in burden 
sharing.158 
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On trying to secure both universality and, at the same time, ‘deep cuts’ from states, the 
Paris Agreement, ‘combines a bottom-up approach to promote flexibility and 
participation with a top-down system of international rules that to promote ambitions 
and accountability’.159 Thus, while ensuring wide participation, through (bottom-up) 
self-determined NDCs160, these contributions shall be progressive every five-years 
(top-down).161 Accordingly, only the latter obligation, ensuring increasing emission 
reduction targets legally binds states; while the extent of these targets remains at entire 
discretion of states. Therefore, the enforceability capacity of the Paris Agreement is 
limited. Article 15 of the Paris Agreement162 provides a mechanism to facilitate 
implementation of and promote compliance; however, it does not provide effective 
means to ensure compliance. It only provides ‘minimal guidance on the nature of the 
compliance mechanism’.163 Even if developed and implemented, its capacity of 
enforceability is weak. Among others, it provides that the committee in charge of the 
mechanism ‘shall be expert-based and facilitative in nature and function in a manner 
that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive. The committee shall pay 
particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of 
Parties’.164 Thereby, instead of contributing to ensure compliance, the mechanism 
seems to provide means to justify the lack of it, which makes its enforcement capacity 
weak. This may partly explain the limited effectiveness of the climate regime to 
address the urgent need of ambitious climate action oriented to dramatically dropping 
global emissions. According to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report, ‘[although] the 
recent announcements of net zero emissions goals are very encouraging, they highlight 
the vast discrepancy between the ambitiousness of these goals and the inadequate level 
of ambition in the NDCs for 2030’.165 
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Overall, the Paris Agreement leaves many issues unresolved. The impact of the Paris Agreement 
in addressing the effects of climate change remain to be seen in future years. However, for the time 
being, states commitments to reduce their emissions levels are still inconsistent with the 2°C 
minimum target set by the Paris Agreement. According to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report, ‘the 
world is still heading for a temperature rise in excess of 3°C this century – far beyond the Paris 
Agreement goals of limiting global warming to well below 2°C and pursuing 1.5°C.166 Yet, as a 
final outcome of years of negotiations and serious drawbacks, the Paris Agreement has an historic 
relevance as a steppingstone in global efforts to tackle climate change, and as an ‘official’ 
recognition of human rights in the field of international climate change law. 
 
3. The Road beyond Paris: Building Bridges between Human Rights and Nature? 
Human rights were almost excluded from the climate ‘party’ in Paris. As such, their inclusion in 
the preamble of the Paris Agreement, depending on perspectives, can be considered a small success 
for the development of the relationship between international human rights and the international 
climate regime. As the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment pointed out, 
shortly after the adoption of the Paris Agreement:  
This is a real achievement and, in this respect as in many others, the Paris Agreement 
is worth celebrating. In another sense, however, Paris is only the beginning. Now 
comes the difficult work of implementing and strengthening the: commitments made 
there. In that effort, human rights norms will continue to be of fundamental 
importance.167 
Imagination is needed in finding avenues through which human rights can make the most of their 
‘passage’ into climate action. At the same time, however, it is worth considering pragmatically the 
potential contribution of human rights in achieving the central issue of climate change, namely 
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reducing global emissions to hold global temperature below 1.5°C, the ‘ideal’ target established 
in the Paris Agreement and recommended by the IPCC.168  
Even if human rights had been included in the operative part of the Paris Agreement, their potential 
contribution to dramatically drop global emissions remain very limited. As Humphreys puts it: 
‘Human rights law has apparently little or nothing to say about the key problem facing climate 
change action: how are we going to bring carbon emissions down, dramatically and urgently, at a 
rate that will take us off the 4°path?’169 In a neoliberal global economy that puts capitalist unlimited 
growth objective as a first priority to the detriment of ecosystems and the rights of individuals and 
communities worldwide, incorporating thereby historic forms of colonialism, it is necessary to 
accept that ‘human rights are an important but limited means of addressing the injustices caused 
by anthropogenic global warming.’170 It could be said that even more concerning than the 
limitations of human rights in addressing climate justice issues or in contributing to curbing global 
carbon emissions is their flexibility and thus manipulability within this context of climate action, 
to the extent that rights can be used to enact ‘new forms of global authority over parts of the Global 
South.’171   
Nevertheless, despite their neoliberal ethos, human rights and ‘contemporary manifestation as 
trade related, market friendly human rights favourable to corporations, they remain a powerful 
language of ethics and resistance, and thus a means of addressing climatic harm and injustices’.172 
Their transnational character, indeed, both as a legal framework and as a shared language or 
rhetoric makes them, to varying degrees, apt to build bridges between initially unrelated areas. In 
the context of climate change, for instance, the Paris Agreement puts together two apparently 
unrelated and even, somewhat antagonistic elements. In addition to, and just below, the sole human 
rights provision in the Paris Agreement, the preamble also notes: ‘the importance of ensuring the 
integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans, and the protection of biodiversity, recognized by 
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some cultures as Mother Earth, and noting the importance for some of the concept of "climate 
justice", when taking action to address climate change’.173 
Just as in the case of human rights, the Paris Agreement recognises the importance of ecosystems 
and biodiversity as well as their special meaning for some cultures, which regard these as ‘Mother 
Earth’. In this way, the Paris Agreement makes a ‘concession’, among others, to indigenous 
peoples’ claims to include a provision recognising the importance of nature. In this recognition, 
the Paris Agreement does implicitly other ‘some’ cultures by suggesting that the importance of 
nature or Mother Earth is linked to the value conveyed to it by a given culture. Yet, the recognition 
of the importance of Mother Earth in the preamble of the Paris Agreement, similarly to its modest 
reference to human rights, could entail a very early step towards a broader recognition of the 
intrinsic value of nature, beyond its instrumental worth to satisfy human needs. As Adelman argues 
on the clauses pertaining to human rights and to nature: 
The first clause calls for an anthropocentric approach that respects and promotes 
human rights, whereas the second holds out the promise of an ecocentric approach. It 
alludes to the rights of Mother Earth which, along with climate justice, are recognized 
to be important albeit – as the preamble somewhat patronizingly puts it – only for 
‘some’. These perspectives are not intrinsically incompatible, but their juxtaposition 
does not promote a coherent conception of rights.174 
The Paris Agreement does connect two different approaches in international law. On one side, it 
recognises anthropocentric human rights and, at the same time, on the other hand, it implicitly 
recognises the ecocentric approach to nature, although it makes this approach exclusive to ‘some 
cultures’ only. Interestingly, despite both approaches reflecting apparently opposite views with 
respect to the natural world, they share, at the same time, a peripheral role and place within the 
Paris Agreement. In this sense, the Paris Agreement may provide an initial point of encounter upon 
which to build avenues in a way to include considerations of nature in the human rights regime. 
This is significant as the unique and urgent nature of climate change requires imaginative 
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approaches to international legal regimes, whose boundaries, sooner or later, and to a varying 
degree, may need to relax in light of climate change.  
 
4. Conclusion  
This chapter has tracked the main legal and policy developments that emerged in multilateral 
climate governance under the auspices of the UNFCCC (Conference of States Parties, agreements, 
and negotiations) to show how the incursion of human rights considerations in the international 
climate change law regime has developed. By doing so, it attempted to identify what the main 
concerns have been in the making of the international climate legal regime leading to the adoption 
of the Paris Agreement, and what the politics behind it have been - all of which is important to 
understand the extent of the problem of climate change, the political will to fix it, and the 
emergence and ultimate acceptance of human rights therein. Being one of the international legal 
regimes that most sharply reflect the North-South differences, notably with respect to states’ 
contributions to and impacts from climate change, the international law on climate change 
legitimises new forms of colonialism in the era of climate change. Contentious climate 
negotiations reflect the dynamics of power and wealth behind the making of international law on 
climate change. Thereby, mutatis mutandis, states most severely hit by climate impacts, such as, 
for example, small island developing states, often advocate for ambitious emissions reduction 
targets (e.g., small island states), whereas largest emitters states often avoid ambitious 
commitments and rather prefer keeping as much as possible ‘business as usual’. This chapter has 
attempted to show how the outcome of multilateral climate negotiations reflect neo-colonial forms 
of dominance, which have resulted, at least to some extent, in the adoption of international climate 
instruments, considered ‘false solutions’175 of the climate problem, such as the carbon trading 
mechanisms established under the Kyoto Protocol. In this context, the appearance of human rights 
in the scene of multilateral climate governance provides an initial point of convergence between 
both legal regimes, and an avenue to integrate the human dimension of climate change in global 
climate action.  
 




In this way this chapter sought to identify the relevant international legal frameworks and 
contextualise the legal and political scenario in which human rights made their entrance into the 
climate change realm, with the aim of paving the way to understand the increasingly widely 





CHAPTER 2:  
The Relationship between Human Rights and Climate Change 
 
I. Introduction 
The adoption of the Paris Agreement by the 21st Conference of States Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2015, and its entry into force in 2016, 
constitutes an important milestone for the international community in facing the challenges posed 
by climate change. The explicit recognition of human rights in the Paris Agreement as part of the 
considerations to be considered by States Parties in all their actions aimed at addressing climate 
change symbolises a breakthrough for the presence of human rights in the climate change arena. 
Climate change was, not so long ago, mainly regarded as eminently scientific and technical. Yet, 
the unique and complex nature of climate change poses serious challenges at all levels of society 
and requires responses from multiple fields, including international human rights law. It could be 
said then that the adoption of the Paris Agreement represents the point of entrance of human rights 
into the field of climate change. This chapter steps back from the euphoric assessments of the 
arrival of human rights into the field of multilateral climate change action to critically assess its 
role in the field of climate change. To that end, it is important to identify what the linkages between 
human rights and climate change are as well as the benefits of applying a human rights approach 
in climate action. 
Indeed, the human rights affected by climate change constitute the core of the relationship between 
human rights and climate change. Therefore, this chapter seeks to interrogate the relationship 
between human rights and climate change to understand how climate change, and the measures 
implemented to address it, can adversely affect human rights in section 1 and 2. By doing so, this 
chapter also seeks to identify what are the states’ human rights obligations stemming from the 
relationship between human rights and climate change. This understanding is a necessary precursor 
to grasping both the limitations of human rights in the context of climate change and its potential 
as catalyst of developments in the field of international human rights law. The benefits of a human 




2. The Origins of the Human Rights and Climate Change Nexus 
With the relationship between human rights and climate change having been recognised at treaty 
level, it is relevant to identify how human rights law connects with the environment, for example, 
through international environmental law, which, as Anderson notes, in the last quarter of the last 
century ‘reached a kind of maturity and omnipresence’.1 However, he states, ‘[like] human rights, 
environmental law houses a hidden imperial ambition’,2 which is materialised in the international 
legal normative order that puts humans at the centre of legal protection and treats non-human 
species and the natural world in general ‘as instrumental means to a distinctly human end’.3 It is 
widely acknowledged that the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment,4 ‘adopted by the first UN conference on the environment,’5 was ‘the first 
marker that signalled the need for the environmental world and the human rights world to come 
together.’6 Principle 1 of the Declaration states: 
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality, and adequate conditions of life, 
in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he 
bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and 
future generations. In this respect, policies promoting, or perpetuating apartheid, racial 
segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign 
domination stand condemned and must be eliminated.7 
This early connection between the human rights and environmental fields was subsequently 
furthered by the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,8 which builds upon the 
Stockholm Declaration. It provides that ‘human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable 
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development’.9 Together, the Stockholm Declaration and the Rio Declaration, show the instinctive 
anthropocentrism of international law. Both environmental provisions clearly ‘postulate a 
corresponding instrumentalist approach to the environment.’10 Whilst ’[avoiding] using a “rights” 
language’, 11 the Rio Declaration further provides that ‘[human beings] … are entitled to a healthy 
and productive life in harmony with nature.’12 In this sense, the Rio Declaration recognises 
somehow the linkage between humans and nature, however, it leaves the word ‘productive’ open 
to wide interpretations, which could be seen as contraposing with the ending statement of 
‘harmony with nature.’  
Despite these developments in relation to the environment, it was not until the early years of the 
twenty-first century that the linkages between human rights and climate change really started to 
arise. As Humphreys notes, ‘the complexity of climate change was noticed in the field of human 
rights earlier than in many other bodies of law because of the extraordinary human cost of climate 
change - and specifically because, by the early years of this century, those costs were beginning to 
be felt’.13 Indeed, in 2005 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights received the first 
climate case, the so-called ‘Inuit case’,14 in which the Inuit, an indigenous community living in the 
Arctic, brought to public attention the adverse impacts that global warming was having upon their 
human rights and immediate environment. Later, the adoption of the Male’ Declaration on the 
Human Dimension of Global Climate Change by representatives of small island developing states 
constituted a landmark step at multinational level in the recognition of the relationship between 
human rights and climate change. It held that: 
…climate change has clear and immediate implications for the full enjoyment of 
human rights including inter alia the right to life, the right to take part in cultural life, 
 
9 ibid, Principle 1. 
10 Günther Handl, ‘Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 
Declaration), 1972 and the Rio Declaration of Environment and Development, 1992’ (United Nations Audio-visual 
Library of International Law, 2012) at 3<https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/dunche/dunche_e.pdf> accessed 13 June 
2020.  
11 Knox and Pejan (n 5) 2. 
12 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, (n 8) Principle 1. 
13 Stephen Humphreys, ‘Climate change: too complex for a special regime’ (2016) 34(1) Journal of Energy & Natural 
Resources Law 51, 53. 
14 Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights seeking relief from violations resulting from global 
warming caused by acts and omissions of the United States [Inuit case], 7 December 2005. See chapter 4 for analysis 




the right to use and enjoy property, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right 
to food, and the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.15 
In this way, small island developing states brought, for the first time, attention to the fact that 
climate change has a human dimension and requested to the UN Office of the High Commissioner 
on Human Rights ‘to conduct a detailed study into the effects of climate change on the full 
enjoyment of human rights’.16 This led to the adoption of the first resolution on human rights and 
climate change by the UN Human Rights Council in 2008, providing that ‘climate change poses 
an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities around the world and has 
implications for the full enjoyment of human rights’.17 Subsequently, the UN Human Rights 
Council appointed in 2012 an Independent Expert to conduct a study on ‘the human rights 
obligations related to the enjoyment of a safe, clean healthy and sustainable environment’,18 whose 
mandate was extended in 2015 and renamed as Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the 
Environment; leading to several studies on the issue of human rights and the environment.19  
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In parallel, the Inuit case was followed by several cases which, by now, more than a decade after, 
have become a growing climate litigation trend with dozens of cases brought to courts worldwide. 
Those cases relate climate change impacts to human rights’ violations or threats suffered by 
individuals and communities worldwide. Likewise, in the contemporary era, many states have 
incorporated the right to a healthy environment in their constitutions or other national legislation. 
Today, ‘at least 155 nations have recognised the right to a healthy environment in legally binding 
instruments, at the national and/or the international level’.20  
All these developments, along with the human rights reference in the Paris Agreement,21 
demonstrate, in different terms and to varying degrees, the relationship between human rights and 
climate change, which is increasingly evidenced by climate-related events affecting the rights of 
individuals and communities worldwide. Indeed, climate change adversely affects a range of 
human rights, including the right to life, the right to health, the right to adequate housing, the right 
to food, the right to water, the rights of indigenous peoples and even the right of self-determination, 
among other rights. The latter right, for example, is particularly under threat in the small islands 
states in the Pacific Ocean, where sea level rise is putting at risk the right to self-determination of 
entire nations. Human rights are not only put at risk as a result of climate-related events, but they 
can also be adversely affected by climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. For instance, 
carbon offset mechanisms, implemented under the Kyoto Protocol, have raised criticism not only 
for authorising carbon colonialism,22 but also because they can put at risk human rights, 
particularly in the Global South,23  
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Overall, there is a level of consensus that human rights and climate change are interrelated. Whilst 
the effects of climate change upon human rights can seem rather obvious, it is important to 
highlight that the rights adversely affected by climate change are at the core of the relationship 
between human rights and climate change. Actual and projected climate impacts to human rights, 
such as the right to life, right to health, right to an adequate standard of living, and collective rights, 
such as the rights of indigenous peoples, right to self-determination, among other rights are what 
initially garnered attention to the relationship between human rights and climate change – a 
relationship that only a decade ago was still widely unnoticed and that was a matter of concern 
only for those who started to first feel the impacts of climate change on their lives and surrounding 
environment. Peoples living in the Artic or on small islands were the first to flag the potentially 
catastrophic effects of a changing climate to the world and, as a result, the first to deal with the 
scepticism and disregard around the relationship between climate change and human rights. In this 
respect, the (second appointed) Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Environment stated, at 
the start of his Mandate in 2018: 
In the past decade, the relationship between human rights and climate change has 
received increasing attention from the UN Human Rights Council, special procedures, 
Governments, and international bodies, including the Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC. An important milestone was the Malé Declaration on the Human 
Dimension of Global Climate Change, adopted by representatives of Small Island 
Developing States in 2007. The Male’ Declaration was the first intergovernmental 
statement explicitly recognizing that climate change has “clear and immediate 
implications for the full enjoyment of human rights”, including the right to life.24 
Certainly, the early signals given to the international community on the adverse impacts of 
climate change upon human rights in the most vulnerable areas to its effects were what 
initially raised awareness of the human dimension of the problem. The initial signals like the 
Male’ Declaration, gave traction to subsequent legal, policy and literature developments on 
the subject of human rights and climate change. Human rights thus emerged as a legal and 
rhetoric ‘tool’ to articulate how the early signals of climate change put at risk the ability to 
 
24 UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Environment, ‘Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on human rights 
and the environment: Statement on the human rights obligations related to climate change, with a particular focus on 




enjoy several human rights which, back then, over a decade ago, and even now, were less 
than obvious and were particularly hard to evidence, for example, in the context of technical 
climate litigation. 
 
3. Connecting Human Rights and Climate Change  
Climate change adversely affects several human rights both directly and indirectly. The increasing 
frequency and intensity of climate events as well as the gradual change of natural landscapes 
increasingly evidence the short and long-term impacts of climate change upon the ability of 
individuals and communities to enjoy human rights worldwide. In this context of a climate 
changing world, states are obliged by international human rights law to protect human rights of 
people, not only from actual rights’ harms resulting from climate events, but also in relation to the 
climate measures put in place to address the problem. The Paris Agreement makes that connection 
by requiring states to consider human rights considerations in the climate measures they take to 
address climate change. In order to identify how human rights are impacted by climate change and 
to see how those rights are developing in response to this challenge, I zoom in on some of the 
various rights that are manifestly impacted. This facilitates an understanding of the linkages 
between human rights and climate change and resulting states’ obligations within that relationship.  
In particular, it is important to bear in mind the premise that states, as duty bearers, have the 
obligation to preserve the rights of all human beings, the rights holders. Therefore, in the context 
of climate change, states are obliged to take positive actions to avoid climate impacts upon human 
rights. That means that states, under international human rights law are obliged to prevent climate 
impacts by undertaking climate mitigation measures oriented to reduce global emissions. 
Likewise, states, in the context of climate emergency, are obliged to take positive steps aimed at 







3.1 The Right to a Life Lived with Dignity 
The impacts of climate change upon the so called ‘supreme right’25 to life are indisputable. Climate 
events like hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, storm Sandy in the 
United States, wildfires in the United States and Australia, or heat waves across Europe remind us 
how devastating climate impacts can be in terms of human deaths. General Comment 36 provides 
that ‘[the] right to life is the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted, even in situations 
of armed conflict and other public emergencies that threaten the life of the nation’.26  As such, in 
the context of climate crisis, it could go without saying that the right to life cannot be derogated 
from.  
Besides, climate change also impinges on the right to life as a result of protracted climate events 
affecting other rights as well, particularly as a result of the effects on those already vulnerable to 
climate impacts. The report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations 
relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, found that ‘States 
have heightened duties with respect to members of certain groups that may be particularly 
vulnerable to environmental harm, including women, children and indigenous peoples’.27 The 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), acknowledging the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) findings, held that climate change will affect 
the right to life in various ways: 
A number of observed and projected effects of climate change will pose direct and 
indirect threats to human lives. IPCC … projects with high confidence an increase in 
people suffering from death, disease and injury from heat waves, floods, storms, fires, 
and droughts. Equally, climate change will affect the right to life through an increase 
in hunger and malnutrition and related disorders impacting on child growth and 
development; cardio-respiratory morbidity and mortality related to ground-level 
ozone. Climate change will exacerbate weather-related disasters which already have 
 
25 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6, Right to Life, UN Doc. A/37/40, 30 April 1982, para. 2. 
26 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 36, Right to Life, CCPR/C/GC/36 (replacing General Comment 
6), 3 September 2019, para. 2. 
27 UN Human Right Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the 




devastating effects on people and their enjoyment of the rights to life, particularly in 
the developing world.28 
This reflects the indiscriminate character of climate change and its intrinsic paradox; that is, whilst 
climate change is a global problem with global impacts, it disproportionally hits first and the most 
those who have contributed the least to the problem, whilst the largest contributors to climate 
change, like corporations, continue to benefit from a benign international normative framework 
that allows them to continue their activities in a ‘business as usual’ way. 
The right to life is widely protected in international human rights law. Article 3 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights establishes that ‘[everyone] has the right to life, liberty and security 
of person’.29 Similarly, Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
established that ‘every human being has the inherent right to life’.30 Indeed, as General Comment 
6 of the UN Human Rights Committee observes, the right to life is ‘a right which should not be 
interpreted narrowly’.31 According to the Committee, ‘the right to life has been too often narrowly 
interpreted’.32 The Committee also found, that the ‘expression “inherent right to life” cannot 
properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and the protection of this right requires that states 
adopt positive measures’.33 Therefore, as General Comment 36 highlights, [states] parties are … 
under a due diligence obligation to take reasonable, positive measures that do not impose 
disproportionate burdens on them in response to reasonably foreseeable threats to life originating 
from private persons and entities whose conduct is not attributable to the State’.34 In the context 
of climate change, the positive obligation to protect the right to life is especially relevant since 
potential climate impacts upon the right to life can be reduced by taking preventive measures. As 
Koivurova, Duyck and Heinämäki observe ‘[there] appears to be a general understanding that the 
right to life itself requires a precautionary approach by governments, which means that government 
 
28 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Relationship between Climate Change and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/61, 15 January 2009, paras. 22-23. 
29 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN Doc. A/810, 10 December 1948, Article 3 
30 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1996 (in force 23 March 1976), Article 6. 
31 General Comment 6, Right to Life, (n 25) para. 1. 
32 ibid, para. 5. 
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officials must prevent harms or threats to human life in cases where they may be foreseen’.35 This 
is particularly relevant in a climate crisis context whereby climate impacts can significantly be 
reduced by taking preventive (adaptation) measures to protect the right to life, also in connection 
with other rights. 
The Human Rights Committee, in General Comment no. 36, has fleshed out how the right to life 
applies in the context of climate change. The Committee recognises climate change as a threat to 
the right to life. It recognises that climate change threatens the right to life of present and future 
generations, and it also treats climate change on a continuum with environmental degradation and 
unsustainable development: ‘Environmental degradation, climate change and unsustainable 
development constitute some of the most pressing and serious threats to the ability of present and 
future generations to enjoy the right to life’.36 The Committee also refers to the interdependence 
of rights, by extending the applicability of the general comment beyond the right to life to a life 
lived with dignity and, importantly, the Committee emphasises that states have a duty to take 
measures to protect the right: ‘Implementation of the obligation to respect and ensure the right to 
life, and in particular life with dignity, depends, inter alia, on measures taken by States parties to 
preserve the environment and protect it against harm, pollution and climate change caused by 
public and private actors’.37  
The Committee proposes a range of measures that must be taken by the state in its protection of 
the right to life and a life lived with dignity. This includes measures to protect the environment 
and to deal with more immediate threats: 
States parties should…ensure sustainable use of natural resources, develop and implement 
substantive environmental standards, conduct environmental impact assessments and consult 
with relevant States about activities likely to have a significant impact on the environment, 
provide notification to other States concerned about natural disasters and emergencies and 
 
35 Timo Kuivurova, Sébastien Duyck, and Leena Heinämäki, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights’ in Erkki J. Hollo, 
Kati Kulovesi, Michael Mehling (eds) Climate Change and the Law 21 Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on 
Law and Justice (Springer 2013) at 292.  





cooperate with them, provide appropriate access to information on environmental hazards 
and pay due regard to the precautionary approach.38 
In this way, the Committee reflects the indivisibility and interdependence of international human 
rights law, the right to life and international environmental law and measures. Certainly, the right 
to life is intrinsically connected with other rights, whose impingement in the context of climate 
change can also affect the right to life, such as the right to health, water, or food. Therefore, states 
are obliged to take preventive measures to protect the right to life along with other rights, being 
one of them the right to health. 
Health ‘is a fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human rights’.39 
Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration establishes that ‘[everyone] has the right to a standard 
of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, 
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services’.40 Similarly, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognises ‘the right to the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health’.41 General Comment 14 of the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the right to the highest attainable standard of health 
provides an inclusive interpretation of the right to health,42 and points out that it ‘is not to be 
understood as a right to be healthy’.43 In addition to recognising health as a fundamental right 
indispensable for the exercise of other rights, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, in its General Comment 14, also emphasises the significance of health for a life lived with 
dignity: ‘Every human being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health 
conducive to living a life in dignity’.44 In this way, the right to health can also be connected with 
 
38 ibid. 
39 CESCR General Comment No. 14 (Art.12): The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, E/C.12/2000/4, 
(adopted at the 22nd Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 11 August 2000, para 1. 
40 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (n 29) Article 25(1). 
41 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted 16 December 1966 (in force 3 January 
1976) Article 12(1). See also other international instruments that recognise the right to health: American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man, OEA/Ser. L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1, Article XI; and the European Social Charter, 18 
October 1961, (revised in May 1996, entered in force in 1999) Article 11. 
42 This means ‘extending not only to timely and appropriate health care but also to the underlying determinants of 
health, such as access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and 
housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and access to health-related education and information, 
including on sexual and reproductive health’. CESCR General Comment No. 14 (n 39) para 11. 
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other rights particularly affected by the impacts of climate change and closely connected to the 
right to health, such as the right to food or water.  
The right to health is particularly sensitive to the impacts of climate change. Temperature rise, heat 
waves, floods, storms, wildfires, among other climate-related events, put at serious risk the health 
and wellbeing of people worldwide. Climate change can cause or exacerbate the effects of tropical 
and waterborne diseases, either through direct impact upon health or, indirectly, through its impact 
on closely related rights, such as the right to water or food. The IPCC 1.5°C Report projects with 
‘high confidence [that any] increase in global warming is projected to affect human health, with 
primarily negative consequences.45 Similarly, the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report projects that 
‘the urban poor, the elderly and children, traditional societies, subsistence farmers, and coastal 
populations’ are likely to feel the most the climate impacts to the right to health.46 Certainly, the 
adverse impacts of climate change upon the right to health are projected to hit low-income 
countries and the most vulnerable in societies most severely.  
With respect to the states’ duties to respect, protect and fulfil rights, General Comment 14 also 
provides a comprehensive interpretation of these obligations. It states that: 
[The] obligation to fulfil contains obligations to facilitate, provide and promote. The 
obligation to respect requires States to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly 
with the enjoyment of the right to health. The obligation to protect requires States to 
take measures that prevent third parties from interfering with article 12 guarantees. 
Finally, the obligation to fulfil requires States to adopt appropriate legislative, 
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional, and other measures towards the full 
realization of the right to health.47 
Accordingly, states are required not only to refrain from interfering with the right to health 
but also - bearing in mind the ‘progressive realisation’ of the right to health48 - to take active 
 
45 IPCC, ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C’ [1.5°C Report], Summary for Policymakers (2018), at 11 
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46  IPCC, Fourth Assessment Report ‘Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ (IPCC Working 
Group II contribution to AR4, 2007) at 43. 
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steps to protect the right to health. The Committee has clarified that this extends the 
application of the right to health ‘to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to 
safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition 
and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions’.49 The right to health is 
thus connected to the right to a healthy environment enshrined in many constitutions and 
which ‘serves as a bridge between the domains of the environment and human rights’.50 
General Comment 14 thus provides a strong basis to protect the right to health from ‘third 
parties’ interferences, which could aptly provide a basis for states to pass stringent legislation 
to regulate industries with high levels of carbon emissions that directly and disproportionally 
interfere with the right to health and other rights of people worldwide. 
Along with adequate food and clothing, the right to adequate housing is an integral part of 
the right to an adequate standard of living. Article 11 of the Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights states that: 
States Parties recognise the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for 
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing, and housing and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate 
steps for the realization of this right.51  
As with other economic, social, and cultural rights, this right is to be progressively realised by 
states, taking appropriate steps. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 
pinpointed the importance of the right to adequate housing to a life lived with dignity. General 
Comment 4 provides that ‘the right to housing should not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive 
sense which equates it with, for example, the shelter provided by merely having a roof over one’s 
head…Rather it should be seen as the right to live somewhere, in security, peace and dignity’.52  
There is ample evidence that climate change adversely impacts the right to adequate housing of 
millions worldwide, especially of those who are already in a disadvantaged position within 
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societies. This is because climate-related events exacerbate the situation of vulnerability of 
individuals and communities already suffering from poverty, marginalisation, and precarious 
housing. Climate change, among other effects, accentuates issues of migration from rural to urban 
centres or across state borders.53 The 2018 report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees also 
recognises that ‘climate, environmental degradation and natural disasters increasingly interact with 
the drivers of refugee movements’.54 Indeed, about 26.4 million people per year were displaced by 
climate or weather-related events between 2008 and 2015.55 For the coming years, the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report predicts with ‘high confidence’ urban risks associated with housing with a 2°C 
rise by 2080-2100, as ‘poor quality and inappropriately located urban housing is often most 
vulnerable to extreme events’.56 This puts at further risk the situation of people living in informal 
human settlements commonly built with precarious infrastructure on the outskirts of cities or on 
river banks, which are at the front line of exposure to increasingly extreme climate events.  
In a similar vein to the IPCC report, the Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing 
observes that climate change-induced extreme weather events pose risks to the right to adequate 
housing not only in urban settlements, but also in small island states. In her mission to the 
Maldives, the Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing cautioned that climate change 
will significantly impact the enjoyment of many human rights related to protecting the right to 
adequate housing for Maldivians, including by the loss of or contamination of freshwater sources; 
the total or partial destruction of houses and properties because of the rise in the sea level and 
natural disasters such as floods and cyclones; and the loss of livelihoods. Since many economic 
activities depend on the coastal ecosystem, climate change will affect communities’ livelihoods, 
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including through loss of land, and environmental changes affecting fisheries and agriculture and 
other livelihood activities.57  
This connects the right to adequate housing with other rights critically affected by climate change 
such as the rights to water, food, property, livelihood, private and family life, among others. It is, 
thus, crucial not to interpret rights ‘in a narrow or restrictive sense’,58 particularly in the context of 
climate change which has intricate and often overlapping implications for rights. State’s 
obligations in relation to the right to adequate housing, and other connected rights, include 
undertaking climate adaptation measures oriented at preventing severe climate impacts, especially 
upon those who already are in situations of vulnerability.  
This obligation also connects with States’ adaptation commitments under the Paris Agreement. Its 
Article 7 provides that: ‘Parties hereby establish the global goal on adaptation of enhancing 
adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a 
view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in 
the context of the [2°C-1.5°C] temperature goal referred to in Article 2’.59 Accordingly, climate 
adaptation measures may need to include, where applicable, and in consultation with, and with the 
participation of, the population affected, ‘relocating people from vulnerable areas’ as well as 
‘disaster preparedness, educating people on what to do in an emergency, emergency evacuation, 
providing disaster relief and temporary housing, and giving assistance to rebuild will be part of 
this right’.60 In this respect, it has been made clear that states will need to pay particular attention 
to ensure that vulnerable groups within societies, such as indigenous peoples are also included in 
the implementation of climate adaptation measures as they are ‘more likely to suffer inadequate 
housing and negative health outcomes, as a result, they have disproportionately high rates of 
homelessness and they are extremely vulnerable to forced evictions, land-grabbing and the effects 
of climate change’.61 The report of the UN Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing 
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as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination 
in this context, provides a clear example of the cross-cutting character of the human rights harms 
resulting from climate change, involving also ‘collective’ rights of indigenous peoples. 
Like the right to adequate housing, the right to food is a component of the right to an adequate 
standard of living. The Universal Declaration establishes that ‘[everyone] has the right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including 
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services’62 In a similar vein, Article 
11(2) of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognises the right to food as the 
‘fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger’.63 The Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights has, in addition, affirmed that ‘the right to adequate food is indivisibly linked 
to the inherent dignity of the human person and is indispensable for the fulfilment of other human 
rights’.64 This affirmation is self-explanatory – food is essential to a life, lived with dignity. 
However, despite these pronouncements under international human rights law, the recognition of 
the right to food has not really helped – at least not substantially – to mitigate starvation and 
malnutrition. According to the World Food Programme, ‘[there] are about 821 million people - 
more than 1 in 9 of the world population - who do not get enough to eat’.65 This dramatic situation 
is further aggravated by the effects of climate change. The World Bank estimated that the 2°C 
increase in average global temperature would put 100 to 400 million more people at risk of hunger 
and could result in over 3 million additional deaths from malnutrition each year.66 These projected 
impacts, as in the case of other rights, will more acutely affect the right to food in low-income 
states, not only in relation to ‘direct’ access to food, but also in relation to the states’ obligations 
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of ‘[improving] methods of production, conservation and distribution of food’.67 For instance, the 
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report estimates: 
Agricultural production, including access to food in many African countries and 
regions is projected to be severely compromised by climate variability and change. 
The area suitable for agriculture, the length of growing seasons and yield potential, 
particularly along the margins of semi-arid and arid areas, are expected to decrease. 
This would further adversely affect food security and exacerbate malnutrition in the 
continent.68  
Indeed, the right to food is closely related to the effects of climate change upon food availability, 
access, security, and production, which in turn connects with the right to a livelihood as climate 
change also impacts livelihoods like fisheries and agriculture, resulting from unpredictable rain 
patterns, expanding droughts and floods. Climate change will, thus, make less attainable the 
realisation of the right to food. General Comment 12 of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights establishes the realisation of the right to adequate food as ‘when every man, woman 
and child, alone or in community with others, has physical and economic access at all times to 
adequate food or means for its procurement’.69  
The right to food and its realisation is certainly complex: on the one hand, states are obliged to 
ensure everyone adequate food access and security to have a healthy life but, on the other hand, 
emissions should be dropped. However, ‘industrial agriculture is a major contributor to climate 
change’, which in turn threatens the availability of food production worldwide.70 Therefore, the 
adoption of climate measures and new technologies aimed at reducing emissions from the 
agricultural industry and adapting to more extreme weather conditions is crucial. The potential of 
agroecology has been consistently advocated to mitigate the effects of climate change on the ability 
to realise the right to food. The Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food presented several reports 
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calling on states to adopt agroecology as a way to address the food needs in relation to climate 
change and poverty challenges.71 Similar initiatives should be considered by states to limit the 
impacts on the right to food associated with climate change. 
A crucial part of a right to life, lived with dignity is the emerging right to water, which like the 
right to adequate housing and the right to food is a component of the right to an adequate standard 
of living. Despite the importance of water for human and non-human life and its 
interconnectedness with the ability to enjoy other human rights, the right to water is still making 
its way into full recognition in international human rights law. As McCaffrey notes, ‘the notion of 
a right to water emerged largely from non-binding documents adopted within the context of the 
United Nations, and … there does not yet appear to be a consensus among states on the existence 
of the right’.72 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does not 
recognise explicitly the right to water. In fact, there are no express references to the ‘right to water’ 
as such in human rights treaties. Only the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women73 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child74 refer to the 
importance of access to water.  
General Comment 15 of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
acknowledges, however, the right to water as ‘a prerequisite for the realisation of other human 
rights’.75 It provides that ‘[the] human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, 
acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses’.76 In a 
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similar way to the previously discussed rights to housing and food, the right to water is part of the 
right to an adequate standard of living. General Comment 15 establishes: 
The right to water is also inextricably related to the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health … and the rights to adequate housing and adequate food … The 
right should also be seen in conjunction with other rights enshrined in the International 
Bill of Human Rights, foremost amongst them the right to life and human dignity.77 
Due to the intrinsic connection between the right to water and other human rights such as the right 
to life, health, adequate housing and food, climate impacts upon the ability to enjoy the right to 
water also put at risk the realisation of those related rights. In this vein, the report of the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the relationship between climate 
change and human rights found that the ‘[p]rotection of the right to life, generally and in the context 
of climate change, is closely related to measures for the fulfilment of other rights, such as those 
related to food, water, health and housing’.78 This interconnectedness between rights has also been 
noted by the UN General Assembly, which recognised ‘the right to safe and clean drinking water 
and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human 
rights’.79 In the same vein, the Human Rights Council has recognised the ‘right to safe and clean 
drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and 
all human rights’.80 Yet, as Singh points out, ‘[while] water is yet to be explicitly recognised as an 
independent self-standing human right in international treaties, … international human rights law 
already entails specific obligations related to access to safe drinking water’.81  
The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report warns that climate change is projected to reduce renewable 
surface water and groundwater resources in most dry subtropical regions intensifying competition 
for water among sectors.82 Also, the World Bank foresees that even in a 2°C warming above 
preindustrial temperatures scenario, 1 billion to 2 billion more people may no longer have enough 
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water to meet their needs.83 Moreover, climate change is projected to cause water scarcity: many 
‘semi-arid areas (for example, Mediterranean basin, western United States, southern Africa and 
north-eastern Brazil) will suffer a decrease in water resources due to climate change’.84 In regions 
particularly prone to water scarcity, such as the Middle East and North Africa, which ‘is already 
very short of fresh water and faces difficulty in meeting the needs of fast-growing population’,85 
the climate impacts upon people’s right to water are striking. The IPCC has stated: ‘An additional 
155 to 600 million people may suffer an increase in water stress in North Africa with 3°C rise in 
temperature … Competition for water within the region and across its borders may grow, carrying 
the risk of conflict’.86 Therefore, climate change impacts upon the right to water can generate 
additional social tensions and exacerbate conflicts.  
Climate change requires protection of the right to life and the right to a life lived with dignity. 
Grasping this means really recognising the interdependence of human rights. This is particularly 
challenging in the case of people who already are marginalised within society and for whom 
climate impacts posit them in an even more vulnerable situation such as, for example, indigenous 
peoples, who often live in disadvantaged areas within states, facing water pollution and scarcity. 
This is inter alia because, similarly to Third World states (and within them), ‘many indigenous 
peoples have a similar history of colonization and oppression, which has resulted in their increased 
vulnerability given their physical locations and limitations on potential adaptation’.87  Therefore, 
states’ (climate) action aimed to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and their lands is essential. 
In fact, in light of the climate crisis, human rights may greatly benefit from incorporating non-
Western views in its relational approach to nature, which may embrace a relational approach more 
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3.2 Collective Rights in a Healthy Environment 
Indigenous peoples are the ‘subject’ of rights in international human rights law that probably best 
reflect the Western approach of domination to nature. Indigenous peoples share a ‘history of 
oppression,’88 whose knowledges, which embrace a special relationship with nature, have 
traditionally been ignored in the development of international law. Amid a humanly made climate 
crisis, a non-capitalist approach to the environment could contribute to a much-needed 
reimagination of the human rights approach to nature, by connecting climate change impacts with 
harms to (collective) rights of indigenous peoples and their unique approach to the natural world. 
Paradoxically, despite their minimal emissions contribution to climate change and ancestral 
connection to nature, indigenous peoples are among those first and most severely affected by the 
effects of climate change, which ‘has the potential to impact all of [their] … rights, as climate 
change threatens indigenous land, which is often uniquely connected to indigenous identity and 
cultural and natural resources’.89 
The rights of indigenous peoples have gradually been recognised in international instruments. The 
International Labour Organization Conventions No 10790 and No 16991 are the only legally binding 
treaties (for ILO member states92) especially dedicated to indigenous peoples. Both Conventions 
recognise the right of indigenous peoples to property and to not be removed from the lands where 
they reside. However, Convention No 107’s protection in this regard is more limited as it provides 
room to remove indigenous peoples from the lands where they traditionally reside based on 
national security or the national interest of economic development.93 Convention No 169 embeds 
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a wider protection in this regard allowing removal of indigenous peoples from their habitual lands 
only if it is consensual and as an exceptional measure.94   
More recently, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,95 which, ‘[although it] ‘is 
not legally binding, has helped to create and extend international legal norms and standards around 
the treatment of indigenous peoples’.96 The Declaration recognises the right of indigenous people 
to enjoy all recognised human rights collectively or individually.97 The preamble of the UNDRIP 
acknowledges the rights of indigenous peoples to sustainable and equitable development and 
management of the environment.98 The Declaration provides for the right to the conservation and 
protection of the environment.99 In addition, the preamble of the Paris Agreement calls upon states 
to respect, promote and consider the rights of indigenous peoples in taking climate change 
action;100 and, in Article 7(5), specifically acknowledges the importance of indigenous peoples’ 
traditional knowledge in combating climate change.101  
Such advancements in the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples, even if only in the 
preamble, and the recognition of the knowledge of indigenous peoples in the operative part is 
crucial, because their rights, along with those of other groups, are disproportionally impacted by 
the effects of climate change. Generally, given their close relationship with the environment and 
dependence of its natural resources, indigenous peoples tend to experience the effects of climate 
change earlier and more profoundly. Climate change disproportionally threatens their existence 
and their identity as a community, given that ‘many indigenous communities. share a unique legal 
and spiritual connections to their environment’.102 Therefore, natural resources depletion resulting 
from the over-exploitation of marine resources in many areas or environment degradation resulting 
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from, for example, the contamination of rivers by mining extraction or oil production activities, 
put under direct and severe threat the survival of indigenous peoples.  
The traditional ways of life, livelihoods and practices of indigenous peoples are under threat owing 
to various factors. In addition to climate change, indigenous peoples are often already in a very 
disadvantaged position within societies. Indigenous peoples constitute about 5% of the world’s 
population, but they account for nearly 15% of the world’s poor.103 Among other factors, 
indigenous peoples are ‘more likely to lower incomes, poorer physical living conditions, restricted 
health care, education and other services ….104 Climate change thus exacerbates the already 
existing situation of vulnerability of indigenous people. They become even more vulnerable and 
prone to unemployment, poverty and migration to urban areas resulting, in turn, in discrimination 
and marginalisation.105 For all these reasons, climate change poses an additional threat to the 
survival of indigenous peoples, the maintenance of their traditional livelihoods and their cultural 
and spiritual practices. Accordingly, states should take concrete steps to ensure indigenous 
people’s participation in policy-making processes that affect their ancestral environment, 
including measures aimed to adapt or mitigate climate effects. Such participation is also crucial 
part of the wider collective, and contested, right to self-determination. 
The Charter of the United Nations enshrines the self-determination of peoples.106 The right of self-
determination is also explicitly provided for in Article 1 of both the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Shared article 1 states: ‘All 
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.107 Further, both 
Covenants provide that ‘States Parties…shall promote the realization of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations’.108 States have, therefore, the obligation to ensure that peoples keep the political 
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status they have determined and have the necessary means for their subsistence at their disposal.109 
According to General Comment 12 of the Human Rights Committee, ‘[t]he right of 
self-determination is of particular importance because its realisation is an essential condition for 
the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and 
strengthening of those rights’.110 The right to self-determination is, therefore, a preliminary right, 
whose realization will allow in turn the realisation of all other rights. 
However, climate change poses a serious threat to the realisation of the right to self-determination 
for several states, particularly small island and low-laying states, whose very existence is under 
threat due to the rapid rise of sea levels causing the loss of territory and potentially complete 
submergence under water in a matter of years. The inhabitants of these states are greatly dependent 
on coastal life and marine ecosystems as a mean of subsistence and of maintaining their livelihoods 
and traditions, and therefore, other rights associated with those climate impacts are also affected. 
The right to self-determination can be thus understood, as collective in essence because its respect 
or threats to it affects the rights of peoples as a community. In addition to the potential threat that 
climate change poses to the ability of entire states to realise their right to self-determination, 
climate change can have collateral effects such as climate change-induced migration, conflicts for 
resources and displacement of peoples within a country or from one country to another.111 This 
would not only cause the violation of the right to self-determination but also the potential violation 
of other rights severely affected by climate change. 
The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report projects with very high confidence  that’[due] to sea level rise 
projected throughout the 21st century and beyond, coastal systems and low-lying areas will 
increasingly experience adverse impacts such as submergence, coastal flooding, and coastal 
erosion’.112 Alarmingly, for some coastal nations and low-laying states, the impingement to the 
right to self-determination seems to be only a matter of time with nothing in place to avert the 
human-generated effects of climate change. The President of Kiribati has reflected this by stating 
that ‘we have to reconcile ourselves with the reality that our islands will be under water, unless we 
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do something very significant and substantial’.113 Certainly, the IPCC report foresees with high 
confidence that ’[c]oastal systems and low-lying areas are at risk from sea level rise, which will 
continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilized’.114 This means that even 
if far-reaching climate measures are undertaken now, the impingement to the right to self-
determination of peoples from (some) small island states along with other rights would be 
somewhat inevitable, challenging thereby the human rights’ ability to address climate change.  
Indeed, the situation of small islands states, among others severely impacted by human-induced 
climate change, reflects most clearly the paradox of climate change, whereby those who 
contributed the least to the problem of climate change, principally through carbon emissions, are 
those who are experiencing most severely its effects. The threat to the rights of individuals and 
communities of states disproportionally affected by climate change impacts, including the rights 
of indigenous peoples and self-determination, require a human rights’ participatory approach that 
allows them to be informed of and participate in the decision-making process of measures affecting 
them, as well as having access to justice.  
Stemming from international environmental law, ‘participatory’ rights, which include the right to 
information, the right to participate in the decision-making process and the right to access to 
justice, if well implemented, can support individuals and communities in dealing with the 
challenge of climate change. In the context of climate change, procedural rights are relevant as a 
means of facilitating the participation of local population in the planning, development and 
implementation of climate change measures that affect them.  
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development establishes these 
participatory rights. It provides that: 
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have 
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public 
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authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their 
communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States 
shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making 
information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative 
proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.115 
Irrespective of their implementation, these procedural rights foresee the participation of impacted 
populations in climate-decisions undertaken in a given community. In the context of climate 
change, such participation generally relates to adaptation measures. Such procedural or 
participatory rights, thus rely on an ‘approach [that] promises environmental protection essentially 
by way of democracy and informed debate’.116 These rights have the potential to prevent 
counterproductive effects of climate adaptation measures in a given area by ‘creating legal 
gateways for participation’,117 which can help in particular to prevent conflicts arising from the 
implementation of environmentally sensitive projects or adaptation measures, often unilaterally 
decided by states. 
The report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the relationship 
between climate change and human rights, recognises that ‘[awareness-raising] and access to 
information are critical to efforts to address climate change. For example, it is critically important 
that early-warning information be provided in a manner accessible to all sectors of society’.118 
Likewise, the report also recognises that ‘[participation] in decision-making is of key importance 
in efforts to tackle climate change’.119 It states that before decisions are made, there should be 
‘adequate and meaningful consultation with affected persons’.120 Indeed, procedural rights are 
particularly relevant in the context of climate change, whereby controversial projects, potentially 
affecting human rights, could be presented by governments as part of their climate adaptation 
efforts,121 given that, as Grecksch and Klöck note ‘[climate] change adaptation is a political process 
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and reflects power constellations and does not always include all affected stakeholders’.122  Yet, 
despite the fact that ‘the actual state of their realization domestically’ remains a matter of concern, 
the procedural rights to information, participation in the decision-making process and access to 
justice are considered to ‘arguably represent [today] established human rights’.123 At the end of 
the day, however, the recognition of collective and participatory rights is a moot point, if there is 
not a change in attitude to the environment itself. In this regard, the right to a healthy environment 
might be key.  
Considered the ‘most far-reaching case for environmental rights’,124 the right to a healthy 
environment aptly reflects the interconnectedness between human rights and the environment. One 
could say that, irrespective of its level of recognition, the human right to a healthy environment 
implies an acknowledgement of the dependence of humans - and human rights - on the natural 
world. However, while the importance of the environment to human life is undisputable, there 
remain several aspects to be clarified on the scope of the right to a healthy environment and the 
state obligations it generates in the context of climate change.125 Yet, although the actual 
usefulness of its recognition and its legal basis are still disputed, the right to a healthy environment 
is widely accepted  and ‘is now a firmly established legal principle’ in legislations across the 
world,126 to the extent that it is even considered ‘an emerging norm of international customary 
law’.127  
What is already beyond doubt is that climate change poses a serious threat to a number of 
recognised rights and, consequently, the right to a healthy environment provides a point of 
convergence that connects rights with environmental harms resulting from climate change. 
Notably, the right to a healthy environment, even if from an anthropocentric perspective, relates 
climate impacts suffered by humans with those suffered by the environment and its components, 
positing both as part of the same wholeness affected by climate change. In this sense, the right to 
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a healthy environment would provide an avenue for an advanced anthropocentric interpretation of 
the human right.  In other words, it is not necessary to deprive human rights from their innate 
anthropocentric approach to nature for them to gradually move away from their instrumentalist 
approach where this is seen as ‘storage of raw materials’,128 towards one in which the natural world 
is valued on its own. As Anderson, referring to Redgwell, notes: 
…it is entirely possible to exercise human rights with a view to protecting the intrinsic, 
rather than instrumental, value of other species. It should be equally possible to enforce 
environmental rights in a non-instrumentalist way, and thereby diminish although not 
eliminate the human-centred quality of the rights. The crucial point is that the 
anthropocentric nature of human rights may be a matter of degree rather than a simple 
binary question.129 
The right to a healthy environment, despite criticisms which question its very existence or 
effectiveness,130 could, therefore, work as an initial point for the reimagination of rights. 
With the right to a healthy environment, ‘the dam of anthropocentrism has clearly been 
breached’.131 
A definite advantage to the right to a healthy environment is its wide and fast-paced recognition 
in national constitutions and other domestic legislation. According to Boyd, 100 countries have 
constitutionally recognised the right to a healthy environment and about 100 have incorporated it 
explicitly in national legislation.’132 Yet, at the global level, there is still no legally binding global 
instrument that includes this fundamental right.133 This wide recognition of the right, despite its 
shortcomings with respect to its effectiveness and the corresponding state obligations it 
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generates,134 will likely continue growing in national and international law, and as part of the 
proliferating rights-based climate ligation trend in courts worldwide.135  
3.3 The Impact of Climate Change Measures on Human Rights 
Human rights and climate change are also linked through the responses given at local, national, 
and international level to the challenges presented by climate change. The measures taken by states 
and implemented at different levels, while developed as a response to tackle climate change, have 
the potential to threaten and violate human rights causing then a contrary effect. The measures 
taken to protect people and ecosystems from the effects of climate change can have a negative 
impact on the human rights of people who such actions intend to protect. There is wide consensus 
on the split of climate change action between mitigation and adaptation measures, whose 
implications on the realisation of human rights will be discussed in the next sub-sections. 
3.3.1 Mitigation  
According to the United Nations Environment Programme website, mitigation ‘refers to efforts to 
reduce or prevent the emission of greenhouse’.136 This should be done in a way ‘consistent with 
limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’.137 The IPCC Special Report, on the severe 
impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, projects with ‘high confidence’ 
that: ‘[under] emissions in line with current pledges under the Paris Agreement (known as 
Nationally Determined Contributions, or NDCs), global warming is expected to surpass 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels, even if these pledges are supplemented with very challenging increases 
in the scale and ambition of mitigation after 2030’.138 Mitigation efforts are thus a prerequisite to 
substantially reduce global emissions, for which climate action at every scale of society is needed, 
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and where states’ action play a central role at the domestic and international level, through 
multilateral climate governance.  
 
Mitigation measures against climate change have been diversified in different programmes. Under 
the umbrella of the Kyoto Protocol139 the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) ‘allows a 
country with an emission-reduction or emission-limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol 
(Annex B Party) to implement an emission-reduction project in developing countries. Such 
projects can earn saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne 
of CO2, which can be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets’.140  
 
However, the CDM mitigation programme has been widely criticised for, far from helping to 
address climate change,141 having contributed to human rights violations, especially in the Third 
World. For example, in the cases of Bajo Aguán in Honduras and Olkaria in Kenya, CDM projects 
have been related to pre-existing conflicts of land ownership.142 Both cases indicate that 
‘responsibilities of host governments for human rights infringements in the context of CDM 
projects might range from direct and gross violations by state security forces as in Bajo Aguán to 
dubious behaviour of companies as in Olkaria and the failure of a host state to sufficiently regulate 
this’.143 Climate mitigation measures, therefore can have an adverse impact on the enjoyment of 
rights of individuals and communities of the least developed areas, who not only suffer the 
increasing threat and, in many cases, violations of their human rights resulting from climate change 
impacts, but also from the negative impact of climate mitigation measures taken at international 
and national level. 
 
Similarly, the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD/REDD+) 
programme144 has been questioned for its potential impact on the human rights of communities, 
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whose livelihoods and culture depend on forests.145 Particular concern exists in relation to the 
effects of this programme on the human rights of indigenous peoples. Potentially, indigenous 
peoples can lose their traditional territories and suffer restrictions of their rights over their lands 
under REDD/REDD+ projects. As Savaresi points out, ‘[access] to forests and their resources has 
implications for the enjoyment of numerous human rights, including the right to life, the right to 
respect for private and family life, the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions and property, as 
well as the prohibition of discrimination’.146 Accordingly, mitigation projects like REDD/REDD+ 
can also generate migration, displacement, and discrimination against  displaced communities, 
who may be forced to abandon their traditionally occupied lands and the culture intrinsically 
connected to it.147 In consequence, other fundamental rights could also be potentially jeopardised 
as a result of the implementation of mitigation projects such as,  the right to water, right to food, 
right to health and right to culture, among other human rights.148 Certainly, states should take into 
account human rights considerations when implementing mitigation measures to avoid harms to 
the rights of individuals and communities affected by them, which often are already in 
disadvantaged positions within society. That is the case of indigenous peoples in particular, whose 
rights, including their participatory rights, can potentially be put at risk by climate mitigation 
projects. A similar situation occurs in the case of climate adaptation measures.  
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like forest preservation shifted land use from agriculture, threatening the right to food ‘. Human Rights Council, 
‘Discussion on the adverse impacts of climate change on States' efforts to realize the right to food’, 6 March 2015 






Alike mitigation, climate adaptation measures aimed to prepare for, and limit climate change 
impacts can also put at risk the ability of enjoyment of human rights. Adaptation refers to 
preparation for and adjustment to the unavoidable effects of climate change. According to the 
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, ‘[b]oth the failure to adapt and the 
implementation of adaptation measures can interfere with human rights, particularly for the most 
vulnerable’.149 In contrast to mitigation policies, the area of action and impact of adaptation 
policies is mostly circumscribed to the local or regional level. Therefore, adaptation is generated 
with the central or regional government at the core of initiatives which in turn are applied at local 
and community levels.  
Adaptation projects are developed with funds –allocated through the Adaptation Fund, which is 
oriented to finance projects in developing countries or areas vulnerable to climate change 
impacts.150 The contributions to the Adaptation Fund are gathered at international level, however, 
adaptation projects are commonly implemented at local level, often in developing states, thereby, 
increasing the chance of violating the human rights of the most vulnerable within societies. This 
is because ‘[vulnerability] to climate change can be exacerbated by the presence of other stresses. 
Non-climate stresses can increase vulnerability to climate change by reducing resilience and can 
also reduce adaptive capacity because of resource deployment to competing needs’.151 The IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report found that, ‘residents of already vulnerable regions and communities 
confront a range of stresses that affect their sensitivity to climate change events as well as their 
ability to adapt. These stresses include poverty, inadequate access to basic resources, food and 
water insecurity, high incidences of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, and conflict’.152 In addition, as 
Hall and Weiss observe, ‘adaptation practices, in comparison to mitigation, have the potential to 
infringe on particular rights in particular ways, implicating unique and corresponding human 
duties’.153 Therefore, human rights analysis can better address issues related to adaptation than it 
 
149 United Nations Environment Programme, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights’ (UNEP 2015) 22. 
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can issues related to mitigation.154 Thus, in addition to countering several of the logistics based 
objections to applying a human rights framework to climate change, an adaptation framework can 
incorporate important human rights considerations.155  
Overall, human rights considerations are relevant in the design and implementation of climate 
adaptation programmes. Particular attention should be paid to the exercise of collective procedural 
human rights by the inhabitants of local communities where adaptation programmes often take 
place. The right of information, right of access to justice, right of participation in the policy-making 
process, among other collective human rights, should be a central part in the adoption and 
execution of adaptation projects to protect affected communities and its environment. 
 
4. The Human Rights Approach to Climate Change 
As it has been discussed, climate change puts at risk the ability to enjoy a number of recognised 
human rights of individuals and communities worldwide, which can also be adversely affected by 
climate measures put in place to tackle the problem. In this sense, unlike a purely scientific 
approach to respond to the challenges posed by climate change, a human rights approach, despite 
its limitations, provides several benefits when applied in the context of climate change. First, 
human rights provide a powerful rhetorical language that helps to understand the human dimension 
of climate change. Certainly, human rights put the ‘human face’ to the problem.156 As Obokata 
notes, ‘first and foremost, a human rights framework puts individual human beings at the centre 
of any action against climate change’.157 Irrespective of the extent of human rights realisation 
worldwide, the language of human rights helps, thus, to understand the human dimension of the 
problem, and put the victims and potential victims of human rights violations at the centre of the 
climate debate. The wide acceptance of human rights helps to realise the human cost of no action 
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As the most international legal language, human rights bring the weight of law to climate action 
by drawing attention to the climate’s ‘new’ realities arising worldwide because of the effects of 
climate change that reflect its impacts upon the rights of individuals and communities worldwide.  
Second, human rights provide a well-developed normative and institutional framework, including 
a network of national, regional, and international human rights judicial, and quasi-judicial, bodies 
that can help to understand and develop the relationship between human rights and climate change. 
In this sense, human rights ‘[provides] a conceptual framework for policies on climate change’.158 
Human rights institutional frameworks thus provide human rights-based guidance for the 
development and implementation of climate change policies. Indeed, human rights are equipped 
with a pre-existing robust body of international instruments that legally bind states, which 
facilitates identifying states’ obligations arising in the context of climate change. Through their 
judicial ‘branch’, human rights can aptly provide ‘avenues for those affected by climate change to 
seek a remedy’.159 This is proved by the increasing number of human rights-based climate cases 
being brought to courts across the world.160 In this sense, although still at an embryonic stage, 
‘human rights law … [provides] an ‘accountability framework for damages associated to climate 
change’,161 which can facilitate redress to the victims of climate-related human rights violations. 
The various human rights treaty bodies are also supplemented and informed by a host of 
international human rights mechanisms, including the special procedures of the Human Rights 
Council. The appointment of the role of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the 
Environment shows a human rights approach to the climate change can contribute to address the 
problem by advancing understanding, inter alia, on the relationship between human rights and 
climate change, its implications, and the states’ obligations thereby.  
Third, human rights provide a forum of discussion and point of cohesion between different fields 
in relation to the multifaceted challenge of climate change. In that sense, human rights help to 
break down silos between fields, which, particularly in the context of climate change, can be 
unnecessary and even obstructive. For example, the wide recognition of the right to a healthy 
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environment, despite criticism for its ambiguity regarding its content and implications, provides a 
strong point of connection between human rights, the environment, and the context of climate 
change. The wide recognition of the right to a healthy environment in national legislation provides 
an opportunity to address climate change comprehensively.  
Importantly, from a long-term perspective, increasing synergies between the human rights and 
environmental legal fields can provide an opportunity to gradually incorporate an ecocentric 
dimension to anthropocentric human rights. This does not imply a complete break with the innate 
anthropocentric approach of human rights to nature, but it nuances it in a way to help rethinking 
of the human y human rights relational approach to nature, which is also a central dimension of 
the problem of climate change. Whether climate change will allow time for human rights and 
human rights operators to ‘digest’ that transition is a different matter.  
However, despite its benefits, human rights application in the context of climate change poses 
several technical challenges. Issues of causation, attribution, extratemporality and 
extraterritoriality are obstacles that human rights will have to surmount in order to be ‘fit’ to be 
applied in the context of climate change. Moreover, human rights, as a state-centric framework, 
excludes to a significant extent from their radar of action, at least in terms of legally binding 
obligations, crucial actors in the context of climate change, namely corporations. Corporations 
remain largely unimpacted and unregulated by international human rights law, which appears to 
be unable to address corporate climate-sensitive activity. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter zoomed-in on the relationship between human rights and climate change. It presented 
the human rights that are adversely affected by climate change and explored how climate change 
violates and threatens a number of rights, including the rights to life, right to the highest attainable 
standard of health, right to adequate housing, right to adequate food, and right to water of millions 
worldwide because of the effects of climate change. It demonstrated that these rights are required 
for a life, lived with dignity and, as such, are indivisible and interdependent. The chapter also 




participatory rights, and the right to a healthy environment, which are put at risk due to climate 
change.  
Undoubtedly, climate change impacts disproportionally the rights of the most vulnerable 
worldwide who, paradoxically, have contributed the least to the problem and, yet feel first and 
worst the impacts of climate change. In addition, climate change measures aimed to combat 
climate change can also adversely impact human rights, having a counterproductive effect in 
climate action. This chapter discussed how mitigation and adaptation measures put in place have 
the potential to endanger fundamental human rights, particularly of those most disadvantaged in 
societies, such as indigenous peoples affected by climate measures. As a way to prevent this, 
human rights norms should comprehensively inform the design and implementation of states’ 
climate actions, as provided for in the Paris Agreement. Finally, this chapter also identified some 
of the significant benefits of applying a human rights approach in the context of climate change. 
Certainly, human rights help in understanding climate change from a human perspective, which, 
recognised or not, implies an environmental dimension too. However, as long as the environment 
continues being portrayed in legal systems as instrumental to capitalist interests of humans and, 
particularly, ‘quasi-human’ corporations, human rights can offer little to tackle climate change in 




CHAPTER 3:  
Corporations, Climate Change and Human Rights 
   
 
1. Introduction 
It could be said that whilst there is a relatively recent but well-recognised relationship between 
human rights and climate change, there is - at least within traditional multilateral climate 
governance institutions - a less well-established relationship between climate change and 
corporate behaviour. As previously discussed, climate change is an urgent and multi-faceted 
problem that, as such, requires urgent responses from different fields (including human rights) 
and from all actors of society. Corporations, as main contributors of carbon emissions leading 
to climate change, have a central role in global efforts to dramatically reduce emissions in a 
way to limit global temperature increase above the 1.5°C maximum target of the Paris 
Agreement. Therefore, far-reaching climate action should address disproportional corporate 
emitting activity as a central measure to tackle climate change. A number of scientific reports 
provide comprehensive evidence of the compelling emissions’ contribution of corporations - 
especially from those in the fossil fuels sector1- to climate change and its acceleration in the 
last decades. According to ‘The Carbon Majors Database’:   
Fossil fuels are the largest source of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in 
the world. The fossil fuel industry and its products accounted for 91% of global 
industrial greenhouse gases [‘emissions’] in 2015, and about 70% of all 
anthropogenic greenhouse gases emissions. If the trend in fossil fuel extraction 
continues over the next 28 years as it has over the previous 28, then global average 
temperatures would be on course to rise around 4ºC above preindustrial levels by 
the end of the century. This would entail substantial species extinction, large risks 
 
1 ‘Since [1988], the fossil fuel industry has doubled its contribution to global warming by emitting as much 
greenhouse gas in 28 years as in the 237 years between 1988 and the birth of the industrial revolution. Since 1988, 
more than half of global industrial GHGs can be traced to just 25 corporate and state producers. Paul Griffin, ‘The 
Carbon Majors Database: CDP Carbon Majors Report 2017’ (Climate Accountability Institute, 2017) at 2. 
<https://b8f65cb373b1b7b15feb-
c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/002/327/original/Carbon





of regional and global food scarcity, and could cross multiple tipping points in the 
Earth’s climate system, leading to even more severe consequences.2  
Accordingly, any effort oriented to significantly limit the impacts of climate change should 
target corporate activity in the first place. Nevertheless, despite the increasing evidence of the 
catastrophic effects of climate change upon the environment and people across the world and 
the key role of corporations therein, corporate actors have continued to disproportionally 
contribute to global carbon emissions leading to climate change. Indeed, only 100 companies 
were responsible for more than 70% of the global greenhouse gases emissions between 1988 
and 2015.3 Yet, establishing accountability of corporations for their disproportional emitting 
activity contributing to climate change leading to human rights and environmental impacts has 
hardly been put at the centre of climate mitigation efforts. As Simons notes, ‘[while] it may be 
possible to discern at least a rhetorical willingness among powerful corporate actors to consider 
binding legal obligations to address some of the environmental impacts of commerce that 
contribute to climate change, any discussion of binding international human rights obligations 
still meets with strong resistance, if not vehement opposition’.4 In light of the urgent need of 
far-reaching and effective mechanisms to tackle climate change,  establishing corporate legal 
accountability can help not only to determine the responsibility of corporations for human rights 
harms resulting from climate change, but may also help to deter, at least to some extent, 
dangerous ’business as usual’ corporate emitting activity of contributing to climate change. 
This chapter therefore focuses on accountability gaps as legal challenge - and not merely as a 
moral or economic fact - where corporate human rights obligations are not enforceable. In this 
vein, this chapter attempts to explain why the contribution of human rights law in limiting 
climate change by addressing corporate activity, as the main source of the problem, is so 
limited. To that end, section two of this chapter interrogates why corporations enjoy a 
benevolent regulatory framework that fails to hold them accountable for harmful emitting 
activities contributing to climate change, which in turn facilitates exploitation of nature, 
 
2 ibid, at 7. 
3 ‘The highest emitting companies since 1988 that are investor-owned include: ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, Chevron, 
Peabody, Total, and BHP Billiton. Key state-owned companies include Saudi Aramco, Gazprom, National Iranian 
Oil, Coal India, Pemex, and CNPC (PetroChina). Coal emissions from China are represented by the state, in which 
key state-owned producers include Shenhua Group, Datong Coal Mine Group, and China National Coal Group.’ 
ibid, at 8. 
4 Penelope Simons, ‘International law’s invisible hand and the future of corporate accountability for violations of 




particularly, in the Third World. In section three, this chapter discusses the role of corporations 
in the global problem of climate change from a TWAIL perspective in order to understand their 
privileged position as central capitalist agents in achieving unlimited economic growth, all the 
while contributing disproportionately to climate change. Subsequently, in section four, this 
chapter explores some of the reasons behind the difficulty to establish corporate legal 
accountability, including: the state-centrism of human rights; the elusive corporate form, which 
facilitates corporations to escape liability; the corporate power to influence efforts (or lack 
thereof) to hold them accountable; and the often advantageous position of corporations vis-à-
vis host states, particularly in the Third World. In section five, this chapter discusses the 
attempts to establish legal instruments regulating corporate activity from a human rights 
perspective, which are mainly voluntary-based and, as such, are largely ineffective in limiting 
corporate emitting activity. Finally, this chapter discusses some hard-law attempts to regulate 
human rights corporate behaviour. Overall, this chapter argues that the flexible approach of 
human rights to corporate regulation, helps to legitimise the exploitation of nature which is at 
the core of the climate crisis and, at the same time, perpetuate (neo)colonial relationships 
between powerful states and corporations and the Third World. Despite its general benefits, soft 
law regulation does not help but rather may contribute to corporate impunity for human rights 
and environmental harms in the context of climate change. It concludes that, due to its cross-
cutting and multi-faceted character, climate change provides a unique and unprecedented global 
scenario that pushes for changes in the way that (human rights) law regulates corporate 
(emitting) behaviour. International law and, indeed, international human rights law are not 
exempt from the climate’s emergency call for radical measures to tackle climate change and 
the need for evolution in their relational approach to nature. In this sense, as this thesis argues, 
the urgency and uniqueness of climate change could be a decisive factor in generating much 
needed international human rights law reform and in overcoming some of its structural 
weaknesses. 
 
2. The Problem: Corporate (Un)accountability 
In light of the increasingly frequent and severe impacts of climate change upon human rights 
and the environment, to which corporations significantly contribute, establishing corporate 
legal accountability for the impacts of the actions of corporations disproportionally contributing 




Diamond and Plattner, the concept of accountability ‘implies subjecting the power to the threat 
of sanctions; obliging it to be exercised in transparent ways; and forcing it to justify its acts’.5 
They identify two dimensions of accountability: enforceability and answerability. 
Answerability ‘indicates that being accountable to somebody implies the obligation to respond 
to nasty questions.’6 On the other hand, enforceability ‘implies the idea that accounting actors 
do not just ‘call into question’ but also eventually ‘punish’ improper behaviour and, 
accordingly, that accountable persons not only tell what they have done and why, but also bear 
the consequences for it, including eventual negative sanctions’.7 
In the context of the climate crisis, the lack of corporate legal accountability entails the absence 
of means to enforce obligations to corporations. Recognising the factors involved in the lack of 
effective mechanisms to establish corporate legal accountability could thus help at least to 
partly understand how the planet as a whole reached the current situation of nearly climate 
collapse. In this sense, seeking regulatory paths to hold corporations accountable for emissions 
contributing to climate change, particularly those in the extractive sector, could work as a 
disincentive to ongoing and future disproportional corporate emission activity and, in turn, 
gradually contribute to climate mitigation.  
At the same time, examining some of the reasons for the absence, of corporate accountability 
can assist on understanding how the structures of power embedded in the system of international 
law and institutions are reflected, with particular attention to the international climate change 
and human rights regimes. As Newell points out, ‘accountability is essentially about power: the 
division of rights and responsibilities between state, market and civil society actors and the 
means for realizing these’.8 In this vein, the privileged legal position of corporations as powerful 
market actors within the structures of power that distribute rights and obligations, as well as the 
consequences thereof should be scrutinised.  This is because as Newell notes, a ‘framework of 
power allows us to raise critical questions about who is served by particular (global) governance 
arrangements: on whose behalf is power exercised’.9 Accordingly, scrutinising (some of) the 
factors underpinning the lack of corporate accountability helps also to identify how the 
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structures of power serve particular capitalist interests personified by the corporate  actor in the 
context of climate change. 
It is hence essential to understand the relationships amongst the corporation, climate change 
and human rights, in such a way as to identify channels to develop corporate legal accountability 
for human rights impacts related to climate change. These relationships are mainly based on the 
fact that emissions released from corporate activity disproportionally contribute to human-
induced climate change, whose effects in turn adversely impinge on numerous recognised 
human rights, protected under international human rights law. This means that corporate legal 
accountability in the context of climate change should address corporate action or series of 
actions that generate emissions leading to the effect of climate change. It should thus be borne 
in mind that ’accountability is not an end in itself. Rather it is a means to an end and requires, 
therefore, that the end be specified’.10  
Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change states the end of 
the international regime of climate governance, namely ‘to achieve …stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system’.11 However, there is a clear discrepancy 
between this objective and the lack of mechanisms put in place to address the main obstacle to 
achieve that end: corporate emitting activity. As Newell puts it, ‘governance gaps and 
accountability deficits, especially with regard to the central, but often unregulated, role of 
market actors in the governance of climate change, undermine the effectiveness of global 
responses to this pressing threat’.12 Therefore, the lack  of weakness of a legal accountability 
framework oriented to regulate climate-sensitive corporate behaviour blatantly undermines 
global efforts to tackle climate change, which so far have been ineffective to meaningfully 
address  the main source of the problem. Or, put differently, corporate emitting activity, to a 
great extent, leads to climate change, and the lack of means to hold corporations legally 
accountable for their actions results in harmful corporate behaviour remaining unaddressed, 
which in turn maintains the problem of disproportional corporate emissions leading to climate 
 
10 ibid, 129. 
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change and its consequential harmful impacts upon human rights and the environment as a 
whole. 
3. Corporate (Un)accountability from a TWAIL Perspective 
In TWAIL accounts, it is well established that international legal and institutional frameworks 
facilitate the means to perpetuate neo-colonial forms of dominance over the Third World, which 
facilitate the corporate aim of generating unlimited economic profit, even at the cost of activities 
contributing to climate change, and it’s devastating impacts worldwide, particularly in the Third 
World. Indeed, as Simons, notes, ‘[international] law has been used progressively since colonial 
times to protect and facilitate foreign investment and trade activity while at the same time 
undermining the ability of Third World states to control and regulate transnational corporate 
actors’.13 In the context of the climate crisis, the TWAIL claim of neocolonialism is clearly 
manifested. It holds that the ‘new’ international economic order to which the newly sovereign 
states must integrate themselves has conveniently established a system of international laws 
and institutions that, despite formal sovereignty and independence, helps to maintain the 
dominant paradigm of colonialism. As Anghie argues: 
… international law and institutions nevertheless proclaim themselves intent on 
bridging that division [between advanced and backward states], on promoting 
global equality and justice. This … [is] inherently problematic because it is 
precisely the international system and institutions that exacerbate, if not create, the 
problem that they ostensibly see to resolve.14  
Brought to the realm of climate change, this would imply that international laws and institutions 
conforming the system of international climate governance, far from tackling the main sources 
of the problem of climate change – for instance, by regulating highly emitting activities of states 
and corporations – they, to a great extent, promote the main sources of the problem they seek 
to resolve, perpetuating thereby neocolonial relationships between Third World  and wealthy  
states and corporations. For instance, the effectiveness of the implementation of the ‘flexibility 
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mechanisms’, under the Kyoto Protocol,15 have been criticised as ‘dubious’ because ‘many of 
these claimed reductions do not represent “real emission” reductions … given [that] these 
offsets can be purchased and used to legitimate further greenhouse gas emissions in the 
North’.16  
Such systemic asymmetry endorsed by neoliberal legal and institutional frameworks enables 
thus favourable soft regulation of corporate activity, which is at the heart of the problem of 
climate change and its human rights and environmental consequences. As a result, the lack of 
effective mechanisms to establish corporate legal accountability authorised by the international 
legal and institutional system, including but not limited to the international regime of climate 
governance, reflects the normality of the status quo, which protects the interests of powerful 
states and corporations, and legitimises the exploitation of nature in the name of economic 
growth, particularly in the Third World. Indeed, as Anghie reflects, the ‘non-European 
sovereignty suffered – and continues to suffer – a particular vulnerability that arises from the 
system of economic power into which it was integrated even as it became sovereign’.17 In this 
context, the economic essence of the problem of climate change and its unviability becomes 
evident.  
Certainly, the climate crisis evidences that the capitalist system pursuing unlimited economic 
growth based on an extractive fossil fuels economy is no longer viable. Clearly, direct legal 
action to control corporate activity that is causing climate change is a priority. As Humphreys 
suggests, ‘in order to keep more oil in the ground, as we must, concrete drastic action is needed: 
banning it; phasing it out; putting a moratorium on exploration; fining overproduction; 
criminalising it’.18 However, meaningful climate action entails a drastic shift in the international 
legal and institutional apparatus, which would undermine the very structures over which it has 
been built. As Simons interrogates, one might ask whether international law is an appropriate 
means by which to address this imbalance and to protect individuals effectively from the 
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activities of corporate actors.19 Yet, climate change represents a unique and cross-cutting global 
challenge that calls upon unprecedented action, including in international (human rights) law. 
Even if reforms are resisted at first, it may only be a matter of time before initial steps involving 
radical measures targeting corporate activity are taken by governments. But there is no time in 
the context of climate crisis. As Mickelson reflects, governments, as well as industry and 
individuals, ‘have resisted the unpalatable prospect of re-evaluating many of our assumptions 
at a fundamental level’.20 However, the ‘disastrous implications of maintaining the status quo 
are invoked with increasing frequency and urgency. The ramifications are increasingly difficult 
to ignore’.21 Indeed, the absence of mechanisms to establish corporate legal accountability is 
some of the main reasons behind the status quo, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
4. Unpacking the Lack of Corporate Accountability  
This section seeks to unfold some of the reasons explaining why there are limited or no means 
to establish corporate legal accountability, particularly in relation to human rights harms, 
resulting from climate change. With the aim of understanding the limits of human rights in the 
context of climate change by addressing the key aspect of the problem of climate change, which 
is largely result of disproportional and extended release of carbon emissions associated in big 
part to corporate emitting activity, I point out to: the state-centric nature of human rights 
obligations; the elusive corporate form; the corporate power to influence efforts to hold them 
accountable for human rights harms; and the corporate position vis-à-vis Third World host 
states, as some of the main factors leading to the status quo of corporate (un)accountability. 
4.1 The State-centric Nature of Human Rights 
Since its emergence, human rights have been thought of as a state-centered field. International 
human rights law arose as a response from states to other states in order to avoid abuses against 
their own citizens. As Koskenniemi notes, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
‘written as part of the establishment of a new system of global peace-making in the aftermath 
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of the horrors of the Second World War’.22 In that context, human rights were developed on the 
basis of a vertical and bilateral structure composed by the state, as ‘guarantor’ of human rights 
(the duty bearer), and the individual as the ‘recipient’ of human rights (the rights holders). 
However, ‘the relationship between the state and the individual under international human 
rights law is non-reciprocal in character’.23 As Karavias explains, ‘the State, as the traditional 
bearer of obligations, has no claim to human rights protection. Inversely, individuals, as the 
exclusive rights holders, have no human rights obligations’.24 At the same time, states play a 
dual role in relation to their human rights obligations towards individuals. On the one hand, 
states can play a positive or active role where they are obliged to take ‘positive’ actions to 
guarantee individuals’ rights. And, on the other hand, states can also play a negative or passive 
role where they are required to refrain from actions that impinge on the ability of individuals to 
enjoy a human right.25  
In theory, according to the existing human rights framework, corporations are excluded from 
that vertical relationship between duty bearers (states) and rights holders (individuals), whereby 
the first have duties to protect, respect and fulfil obligations with respect to the latter. 
Accordingly, corporate actors are not part of this ‘legal relationship between the human rights 
obligor and an individual under international law [which] is bilateral in nature’.26 This bilateral 
scheme would imply that, at least in principle, corporations are technically unable to hold 
human rights obligations. Karavias, in this respect points out that obligations under international 
law, notwithstanding their source, address ‘in principle the conduct of sovereign States. Lack 
of sovereignty meant lack of capacity to bear obligations’.27 However, he also notes that 
corporate activity can interfere with human rights and such interference can trigger ‘the 
responsibility of the state for breaches of its positive obligations’.28 Accordingly, the state-
centred nature of international human rights law strengthens the notion that corporations have 
only indirect human rights obligations. This is because states are deemed primary holders of 
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23 Markos Karavias, Corporate Obligations under International Law (Oxford Scholarship Online 2014) at 177. 
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human rights obligations towards individuals, regardless of the gradual (yet limited) 
acknowledgement of corporate obligations under international human rights law. As Karavias 
observes with respect to establishing corporate human rights obligations, the ‘establishment of 
one or more human rights obligations binding upon the corporation results in the elevation of 
the corporation to the status of an obligor under international human rights law’.29 Certainly, 
the establishment of corporate obligations would ‘give rise to a relationship between the 
individual as the human rights beneficiary and the corporation as the bearer of the 
corresponding obligation’.30 In this sense, the relationship between the corporation and the 
individual would thus ‘essentially mirror that of the State. Thus, a corporation would owe an 
obligation to respect the right of an individual beneficiary, and this obligation would also 
operate in a bilateral non-reciprocal manner’.31  
In consequence, determining corporate human rights obligations towards the goal of achieving 
corporate accountability for human rights harms, including those resulting from climate change 
impacts is problematic, at least conceptually. In words of  Baxi, this is ‘because the eminently 
state-centric human rights discourse extends primarily to state actors, and is thus not entirely 
open to translocation to the real world of trade, business and industry’.32 Thus, establishing 
corporate legal accountability for human rights abuses would have to deal first – at least to some 
extent – with ‘relaxing’ the state-centrism of human rights in such a way that corporations, in a 
similar way to the state relationship vis-à-vis individuals, act as duty bearers under international 
human rights law, despite the state maintains its primary role as guarantor of human rights. This 
is reflected in some corporate human rights duties that are already recognised either explicitly 
or implicitly in some international law instruments, including human rights and environmental 
treaties.33 For example, common Article 5.1 to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that: 
‘Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the 
rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided 
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for in the present Covenant’. In a similar vein, other human rights treaties explicitly establish 
the application of their provisions to states and non-state actors, without leaving room for doubt 
on their applicability to corporations and the role of states in ensuring corporate observance of 
their provisions. For example, Article 2(e) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women requires states: ‘To take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise’.34 Yet, 
human rights instruments clearly establishing corporate obligations are limited as well as the 
enforceability mechanisms available. Therefore, corporate (un)accountability remains being a 
challenge to address harmful corporate activity contributing to the effect of climate change and 
its human rights and environmental implications. In a context of climate crisis, urgent state 
action should involve enacting national legislation aimed at implementing and enforcing 
international treaties involving corporate activity. This is a complex step for states, lacking 
institutional and legislative capacity as well as political will to adopt strict measures to prevent 
and sanction corporate human rights harms at the domestic level. 
4.2 The Elusive Corporate Form 
The multinational character of large corporations makes establishing corporate accountability 
problematic. Corporations are often registered within a home jurisdiction while operating at the 
same time through multiple branches either at home or abroad, and with different legal 
relationships between their multiple branches and the headquarters. Da Costa points out that 
multinational corporations ‘have legal autonomy of their subsidiaries and affiliates from the 
parent corporation (each one is covered by the legal regime of the country where they are 
registered/incorporated). This gives MNCs considerable advantage’.35 Indeed, the intricate 
network between parent corporations and its branches often regulated under different legal 
frameworks makes it difficult to determine the applicable law or jurisdiction when it comes to 
establishing corporate liability for misconduct in any of the places where they operate. This 
complexity makes the corporate form intrinsically elusive of  liability mechanisms capable to 
establish corporate accountability for their wrongdoings. This is especially manifested in the 
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context of environmental and human rights harms perpetrated by corporations operating outside 
their home state, particularly in the Third World.36  
 Indeed, the elusive character of the corporate form helps to avoid their liability in cases of 
corporate harmful behaviour and, in fact, favours the existing lack of corporate accountability. 
This does not imply to say that the corporate form per se is responsible for corporate emissions 
disproportionally contributing to climate change; but rather, that the elusive corporate form 
provides the legal conditions facilitating unaccountability of corporations for the harmful 
consequences of their behaviour, especially when this occurs abroad. Blumberg, for instance, 
points out to the ‘inherent limitations of the American legal system (and of other Western legal 
systems as well) in achieving corporate accountability on the international level and in 
effectively enforcing legal restraints on corporate behaviour abroad’.37 He finds that these 
‘fundamental structural problems largely arise from the widespread use by American and other 
multinational parent corporations of foreign-owned subsidiary corporations to conduct the 
overseas business of the enterprise’.38 Certainly, this practice puts additional difficulty to 
determine the liability of parent corporations for the wrongdoings of their subsidiaries abroad, 
resulting, in the worst case scenario, in corporate impunity.39 
In the context of climate change, the lack of corporate accountability poses a major obstacle to 
deter potentially harmful corporate behaviour in the long term, given the significant emissions 
contribution from corporations. If the call from science to hold global temperatures below 
1.5°C40 (as per the highest goal of the Paris Agreement)41 is seriously considered, the need to 
stop harmful corporate emitting behaviour, particularly in the fossil fuels extractive sector 
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substantially contributing to global carbon emissions,42 should be a matter of urgency. To that 
end, it is important to highlight the primary role of states (both home and host states) in 
developing mechanisms to hold corporations accountable through international and domestic 
regulatory frameworks for their high emissions levels leading to climate change, which 
adversely impact human rights and the environment worldwide.  
However, the problem of corporate (un)accountability has a deeper dimension, as Blumberg 
further notes, ‘the major source of the problem arises from the ancient concept of the corporate 
juridical entity that, particularly in the case of large public corporations, departs sharply from 
the economic reality of modern business enterprise’.43 Accordingly, in order to overcome ‘the 
limitations inherent in traditional concepts of entity law [which] present a major challenge to 
national corporation law and to international law’,44 it is essential to put in place innovative and 
non-traditional approaches to corporate accountability, particularly in relation to breaches of 
their human rights obligations. Otherwise, there is an imminent risk of continuing in the, 
climate-wise, ‘business as usual mode’, with foreseeable devastating consequences for the 
planet and its inhabitants. 
4.3 Corporations’ Position vis-à-vis Third World (host) States 
Related to the elusive form of the corporate entity, another factor contributing to the lack of 
corporate accountability is the position of corporations as potential investors in relation to host 
states, keen to receive foreign investments, especially in the Third World. As Wagner puts it in 
respect to chemical corporations, ‘Third World countries, out of a desperate need for hard 
currency, are trying hard to attract multinational chemical corporations to enter joint 
ventures.’45 In a context in which foreign investment is seen as the door leading to the goal of 
economic development, which often leads (Third World) governments to downplay or 
disregard potentially harmful business activity. In this respect, Rajagopal observes how a 
‘standard repertoire of legal changes recommended through law and development initiatives‘ is  
initiated to facilitate such development and foreign investment, to the extent that, as he puts it, 
‘any changes deemed necessary in the Third World are now justified in the name of 
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development’.46 In this scenario, corporations hold an advantageous position vis-à-vis host 
states, where low-income states are willing to facilitate corporate investments, even despite 
potential internal opposition often resulting in human rights violations.47 For instance, projects 
in the mining extractive sector, one of the most ‘attractive’ investment sectors in the Third 
World often go hand-in-hand with tensions between government authorities, supportive of 
foreign investments, and local communities opposing the mining project ‘out of fear that if the 
project is allowed to continue, the local environment will suffer irreparable harm’.48 Indeed, as 
Wagner notes, manufacturers are ‘eager to set up their plants in relatively unregulated third 
world countries. These third world countries, delighted to have large multinational 
manufacturers located within their borders, are often willing to turn a blind regulatory eye to 
the multinationals' activities’.49 It is thus not surprising that, under this scenario, national 
regulatory frameworks oriented to hold corporations accountable for environmental and human 
rights harms resulting from their activities, particularly in the Third World, sounds more like 
an utopia.  
However, within the context of the climate crisis, Third World states may likely be increasingly 
under pressure to impose more stringent environmental and human rights requirements or 
constraints to corporate investors, which in turn would imply additional challenges to attract 
foreign investments. This because on the one hand, governments are expected to attract foreign 
investment to ‘inject’ cash flow into their economies and, on the other hand, they are obliged 
to protect human rights from potential harms by third parties’ corporations. Indeed, the 
increasing impacts of climate change might gradually act as a reminder of the risks embedded 
in capitalist endeavours of at all cost economic growth first, even at the expense of the 
environment and its components. Yet, while the existing structural forces behind neoliberal 
economic laws and policies persist, host (Third World) states , will likely continue in the 
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recurrent ‘dilemma’ of attracting foreign investments through, for example, lose regulatory 
frameworks,  whereas  home states of the parent corporation are  unable to establish regulatory 
control over subsidiaries hosted abroad. As Da Costa frames the issue: 
A sort of dilemma in this context is that states seeking to host MNCs subsidiary 
companies try to lure them to come and operate in their territories (often with 
generous tax breaks, combined with minimal monitoring of human rights and 
environmental issues).50 On the other hand, the domestic regulation of the parent 
company by its home state will normally not apply to its subsidiary companies 
abroad.51 
These dynamics between corporate investors and host states, in addition, lead to ineffective 
environmental and social impact assessments to determine the viability of corporate projects; 
absent or weak legal and institutional frameworks regulating corporate activity in host states; 
corruption; among other domestic problems that add on to the disadvantaged position of Third 
World states vis-à-vis corporate investors.52 Altogether these factors make the task of 
establishing corporate accountability for human rights harms complex. As Simons argues, 
‘powerful states have used international law and international institutions to create a globalised 
legal environment which protects and facilitates corporate activity’,53 which, in turn, can ‘also 
[contribute] to the erosion of human rights governance capacity’.54 This structural 
dysfunctionality of the international and institutional legal system has serious consequences for 
the environment worldwide, to which the realisation of human rights is inextricably connected 
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4.4 Corporations: Powerful Non-state Actors 
 
Another factor that adds on to the lack of effective mechanisms to establish corporate 
accountability is the economic power and influence of the corporate ‘quasi-person’, which, in 
fact, can be comparable to that of states. As Karavias notes:  
On the one hand, corporate entities have managed to muster enough economic 
power to dwarf the power of certain States.55 On the other hand, apart from the 
quantitative aspect of economic capacity, corporations have begun to exercise 
functions comparable to those of the State… Corporations have entered ‘what 
used to be in many countries “reserved” state businesses in the “public service 
fields”.56 
This level of empowerment that goes beyond the economic, and is comparable to state 
power, has been granted to corporations by international law and institutions.57 As a 
consequence, the ‘rights and protections enjoyed by these powerful actors were created 
by international law and facilitated by the interventions of international financial 
institutions and  these ‘rights are often enforceable in international arbitral tribunals’.58  
However, when we look at the other side of the coin, that is, at the level of duties acquired by 
empowered corporations, it does not minimally correspond with those of the state, for instance, 
in relation to human rights obligations. Corporate actors have consistently opposed attempts of 
developing legally binding human rights obligations applicable to them. As Simons observes, 
‘[this] resistance has characterised the debate on business and human rights for decades’.59 
Therefore, it could be said that, corporations — and the neoliberal system of laws and 
institutions supporting them — have managed to construct  a (super) legal person with powers 
alike states, but without their legally binding duties, such as human rights obligations. This 
privileged position of corporations is endorsed by international legal and institutional 
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frameworks that enable asymmetrical relations of power; and whose exercise can have 
deleterious implications for human rights and the environment, particularly, in the Third World. 
Certainly, while ‘national governments, even the most powerful among them, face growing 
difficulty in controlling the activities of business … The issue, rather, is what significance it 
has for the emergence of a global system of power’.60 In particular, it is important to determine 
what the implications of corporate power are for Third World states as well as for human rights 
and the environment. As Simons points out, ‘it is the Third World states which face the greatest 
challenges … [as] a significant proportion of corporate violations of human rights or complicity 
in such abuses take place within these states’.61 The Report of the Special Representative of the 
UN Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises found the gap in the governance of corporations to lie at the heart of the 
problem: 
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the 
governance gaps created by globalization - between the scope and impact of 
economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse 
consequences. These governance gaps provide the permissive environment for 
wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation. 
How to narrow and ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to human rights is our 
fundamental challenge.62 
Indeed, globalization provides the perfect scenario for the neoliberal forces to work at their 
best, meaning that the quintessential capitalist corporate person is able to maximises economic 
growth while adjusting discretionally human rights, and environmental considerations, 
particularly in the Third World. According to Chimni, ‘[i]n the era of globalization, the reality 
of dominance is best conceptualized as a more stealthy, complex and cumulative process. A 
growing assemblage of international laws, institutions and practices coalesce to erode the 
independence of third world countries in favour of transnational capital and powerful States’.63 
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In this context, corporate power has implied that their ‘legal rights have been expanded 
significantly over the past generation. This has encouraged investment and trade flows, but it 
has also created instances of imbalances between firms and States that may be detrimental to 
human rights’.64 In effect, the expansion of corporate privileges reaffirms the position of 
corporations in the international legal order and strengthens their power vis-à-vis (Third World) 
states, which results in an imbalance between corporate rights and their actual obligations, 
creating the conditions for dangerous corporate activity leading to climate change and its 
resulting impacts upon human rights and the environment. 
All in all, the state-centeredness of human rights law, the elusive corporate form, its position 
vis-à-vis (host) states, and the corporate power are some of the factors that influence the existing 
lack of corporate legal accountability for human rights harms. Considering the climate crisis, 
this acquires additional relevance. Indeed, corporations have traditionally operated under a 
minimal international human rights framework, whereby ‘soft law has been a principal default 
mechanism for connecting human rights and business in recent decades’.65 The lack of effective 
mechanisms to ensure corporations’ greater legal standing for non-compliance of human rights 
obligations and their enforceability not only undermines the realisation of human rights but also 
puts at risk the environment as it leaves at discretion of corporations to undertake a form of 
voluntary self-regulation and its actual extent.66 In this scenario, the low regulation of corporate 
activity, particularly in the Third World and the absence of mechanisms to ensure accountability 
of corporation for misconduct, provides the pervasive conditions for potential human rights and 
environmental harms, configurating thereby neocolonial relationships. As a result, a plethora 
of attempts to establish corporate human rights obligations, either through ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ law 
instruments largely considered within the UN system and outside it, have proliferated, yet with 
little success, as will be discussed in the next section.  
 
 
64 UN Human Rights Council (n 62) para. 12. 
65 Justine Nolan, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Rights: Soft Law or Not Law?’ in Surya Deva and 
David Bilchitz (eds) Human Rights Obligations of Businesses: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? 
(Cambridge University Press 2013) at 1. 
66 As a result, states and corporations often resort to international arbitration to resolve legal disputes, commonly 
relating to foreign trade and international contracts. For examples on international arbitration, see Julian Lew, 





5. Corporate Human Rights Obligations: is ‘Soft-law’ enough?   
The absence of effective means to establish corporate legal accountability reflects the disparity 
between the rights and obligations of corporations. In the last decade, there have been several 
initiatives from intergovernmental organisations as well as from industry to develop norms that 
regulate corporate human rights activity, which so far have mainly been based on voluntary 
corporate commitments. Early attempts to regulate business activity and human rights started 
in the 1970s. The Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations,67 which emerged after 
nearly one decade of negotiations under the auspices of the UN, was one such early attempt. 
Although the Draft Code failed, largely because it was not welcomed within the industry 
sector,68 it included relevant provisions related to the protection of the environment, which, 
back then, would have signified a notable step towards addressing corporate activity with 
human rights and environmental implications. The Draft Code, for instance, provided that: 
Transnational corporations shall/should carry out their activities in accordance with 
national laws, regulations, administrative practices, and policies relating to the 
preservation of the environment of the countries in which they operate, and with 
due regard to relevant international standards. Transnational corporations 
shall/should, in performing their activities, take steps to protect the environment, 
and where damaged to [restore it to the extent appropriate and feasible] [rehabilitate 
it] …69 
This provision emphasises the environmental considerations that corporations should consider 
when operating abroad which, along with the Draft Code’s provision on international 
cooperation — requiring that ‘corporations…be prepared where appropriate to co-operate with 
international organisations in their efforts to develop and promote national and international 
standards for the protection of the environment’70 — were a progressive attempt for its time. 
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Considering the low or non-recognition of the relationship between human rights and the 
environment back then, the Draft Code provisions on the environment and international 
cooperation could have been an important initial step to address corporate responsibility in 
cases of human rights and environmental harms resulting from corporate activity in host 
states.71 
In addition to the initiatives developed within the UN system, which were generally ‘less 
intrusive’ in corporate activity and, instead, sought to establish partnerships with them;72 other 
international organisations also developed similar initiatives but taking a different approach. 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) developed its Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Socials Policies in 1977, which has subsequently 
been updated.73 This Declaration connects the role of business and human rights with the 
environment and, with its update in 2017, it makes reference to important developments in the 
field of climate change such as the Paris Agreement.74 In a similar way, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development also developed a set of Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises,75 however, unlike the ILO initiative, it dedicates a chapter to the protection of the 
environment based on international environmental legal instruments as well as private 
standards.76Altogether, these developments reflect the diversity in the role and approaches taken 
in the long process towards developing human rights norms regulating corporate activity. These 
developments have also included private and more specific initiatives oriented to regulate 
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corporate activity at geographical or sectorial level, which in turn reflect the engagement of 
specific industry sectors with the so-called issue of ‘business and human rights’.77  
Subsequently, the UN rebooted its efforts to regulate corporations through voluntary corporate 
commitments in the early 2000s with initiatives such as the UN Global Compact,78 and the 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises.79 
The Global Compact, on the one hand, is a corporate-led initiative consisting of a set of guiding 
principles on different themes, including human rights and the environment. On the 
environment, for instance, the Global Compact provides that businesses ‘should support a 
precautionary approach to environmental challenges; undertake initiatives to promote greater 
environmental responsibility; and encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally 
friendly technologies’.80 Although this set of overarching principles would hardly amount to 
corporate legal accountability for environmental damage, or human rights harms, they provide 
legal language, through the ‘precautionary’ approach and environmental ‘responsibility’, which 
can help  as a basis of claims seeking remedies for environmental or human rights harms. The 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations, on the other hand, were adopted 
unanimously by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.  
However, the UN Commission on Human Rights only noted it as a draft proposal with no legal 
standing.81 Yet, the Draft Norms constituted an important step towards the regulation of human 
rights corporate activity. They made express recognition of the potential harmful impacts on 
human rights and the environment of business operations;82 and made clear linkages between 
international and national environmental law to this end.83 Both initiatives, despite galvanising 
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multilateral and private efforts to integrate rules applicable to corporate activity on human 
rights, environment protection, labour rights, among other themes, lacked capacity to be 
enforced. Particularly, the Draft Norms, despite its innovative and comprehensive approach in 
dealing with the contentious issue of ‘business and human rights’ through something more than 
the ‘classical’ approach based on voluntary commitments, they proved the dominant reluctance 
from states and corporations to ‘share’ human rights obligations.84  
More recently, one of the most renowned developments in the debate on ‘business and human 
rights’ is the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,85 issued in 2011 by the 
UN Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises (SRSG).86 The Guiding Principles is a soft-law framework on 
‘business and human rights’ grounded on three pillars: the state duty to protect (Pillar I), the 
corporate responsibility to respect (Pillar II), and the access to remedy (Pillar III). Contrary to 
previous soft-law attempts to regulate human rights-related corporate behaviour, at difference 
of the Draft Norms, the Guiding Principles were endorsed by the UN Human Rights 
Commission,87 which somehow granted the Guiding Principles with ‘extra’ authority as a soft-
law instrument. The long awaited Guiding Principles were thus expected to be an operational 
instrument that would clarify the content of corporate human rights obligations.88 However, 
although the Guiding Principles received ‘wide praise from business leaders and many non-
governmental organisations’, they have also been criticised as ‘too weak’.89 As Nolan puts it, 
the intended practicality of the Guiding Principles ‘has resulted in the extension of a consensual 
regime of softly developed regulation that encourages but does not require (in a legally binding 
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sense) corporations to respect human rights’.90 Yet, the Guiding Principles provide a set of 
norms that corporations are due to observe to respect human rights, which include provisions 
particularly relevant in the context of climate change, such as, for example, the principle of 
‘human rights due diligence’.91  
In the context of the climate crisis, the principle of due diligence is key to legally grounding the 
duty of corporations to take steps to reduce their emissions levels contributing to climate 
change. The Guiding Principles also recognise the ‘independent’ existence and application of 
human rights obligations to states and corporations;92 and, consequently, recognise that these 
should be observed by states and corporations independently. This recognition is important 
because it explicitly stipulates that this provision is not exclusive in such a way that its 
compliance, either by States or corporations, does not exclude the other of observing its human 
rights obligation. 
In relation to human rights linked to the environment, the Guiding Principles, as part of the first 
pillar – the state duty to protect – recognise that the ‘failure to enforce existing laws that directly 
or indirectly regulate business respect for human rights is often a significant legal gap in State 
practice’.93 While this clearly points out to a number of areas where the human rights 
obligations of states apply unambiguously, such as  property and labour laws, it should also be 
implied to extend to the obligation to regulate corporate emissions. The context of climate 
change provides a scenario where the applicability of the General Principles could be 
materialised and its effectiveness ‘as an authoritative instrument of soft-law’94 put to the test. 
In this sense, the uniqueness of climate change as an urgent problem that requires emergency-
like responses can accelerate or facilitate their ‘maturity’ as law and, in turn, as a legally binding 
instrument capable of eventually triggering corporate liability. As Orchard argues, ‘a central 
property of soft-law as a norm-generating mechanism is its ability to contribute to the 
internalisation of new norms within states by becoming entrenched in domestic legislation. 
Internalisation increases norm robustness’.95 This process of maturation of soft law norms may 
be accelerated in the context of climate change. In fact, the Guiding Principles are gaining 
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presence in climate change debates.96 Accordingly, in connection with Principles 18 and 19 of 
the Guiding Principles, the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights 
obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, 
endorsed the Principles, holding that: 
Business enterprises should conduct human rights impact assessments in accordance 
with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which provide that 
businesses ‘should identify and assess any actual or potential adverse human rights 
impacts with which they may be involved either through their own activities or as a 
result of their business relationships’, include ‘meaningful consultation with 
potentially affected groups and other relevant stakeholders’.97 
The context of climate change indeed can potentially contribute to the ‘internalisation’ of the 
Guiding Principles in a way to gradually trigger their evolution, for example, in national climate 
legislation. Besides, the increasing recognition of the relationship between human rights and 
climate change may also accelerate the process of internalisation of soft-law on business and 
human rights. In other words, the application of the Guiding Principles in the context of climate 
change may facilitate their ‘maturation’ in law.  
Orchard, in examining the evolutionary process of the normative guiding principles of internal 
displacement, asks: ‘how is it possible to tell if these guiding principles, as soft law, have 
contributed to the formation of a new norm? How can we tell if the principles have contributed 
to a change in state practice that one would anticipate from a new norm?’.98 Bringing these 
questions to the ‘business and human rights’ debate, how can we tell if the Guiding Principles 
have contributed to a change in corporate practice that one would anticipate from a new norm? 
Only time will conclusively tell. In the meantime, it is hoped that corporations would 
meticulously observe the Guiding Principles in their regular operations, ‘even’ as soft law. As 
Nolan points out, soft law can often be ‘more attractive to the relevant stakeholders (in this case 
particularly to business and governments alike) because it may contain aspirational goals that 
aim for the best possible scenario with few constraints if such goals are not met’.99  
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Yet, all in all, the practical effectiveness of the General Principles as the current main 
international normative framework regulating human rights business activity is very limited 
and does not necessarily contribute to establishing corporate legal accountability for human 
rights and environmental abuses – which, despite conceptual separations, in practice, go hand 
in hand.100 Specifically, its non-legally binding character leaves ample room for corporations 
to elude responsibility for human rights and environmental abuses caused by its operations, 
especially in the Third World. Consequently, the legal comfort zone where corporations 
operate, far from helping to establish corporate legal accountability instead, can potentially 
contribute to corporate impunity, in cases of human rights violations and environmental damage 
caused by corporations. Certainly, as Clémençon summarizes, ‘[private] sector voluntarism has 
been invoked for the last two decades, yet it has never amounted to measurable shifts away 
from business-as-usual’.101 The plethora of ‘soft law’ instruments arisen in the last decades 
proves the absence or insufficiency of mechanisms to hold corporations accountable for human 
rights abuses and environmentally harmful behaviour. Yet, there have also been some recent 
attempts to achieve a normative binding instrument addressing this problem, which will be 
discussed in the next sub-section. 
 
6. Hard-law: the Key to Corporate Accountability? 
There have been some initiatives oriented to addressing the limitations previously discussed 
and developing a stronger regulatory framework establishing human rights obligations of 
corporations. At the multilateral level, efforts to develop a legally binding instrument 
articulating corporate human rights obligations have been developed within the UN system for 
some years. In 2014, an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group was established upon 
the initiative of a group of developing states (Ecuador, South Africa, Bolivia and Venezuela), 
which proposed to the Human Rights Council the elaboration of a legal instrument to regulate 
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transnational corporations.102 The Working Group was established with the mandate ‘to 
elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights 
law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises’.103 However, the 
establishment of the Working Group generated opposition from ‘home states of many 
multinationals, including the European Union and the United States’.104 Despite opposition, 
some years after its establishment, the Working Group issued in 2018 the first draft of the future 
legally binding instrument called ‘Zero Draft’.105 It included relevant provisions for the 
protection of human rights from business activity. Notably, it included a provision on legal 
liability, which is addressed comprehensively. Article 10 of the Zero Draft provided that states 
‘shall ensure through their domestic law that natural and legal persons may be held criminally, 
civil or administratively liable for violations of human rights undertaken in the context of 
business activities of transnational character’.106   
Further, the Zero Draft tackles the problem of corporate liability from its roots while still 
recognising the primary role of states in human rights protection, including from corporate 
activity. In a comprehensive manner, the Zero Draft provides for a wide application of liability, 
in which corporations and natural persons can be held liable for human rights abuses. For 
instance, Article 10 distinguishes between different types of liability - civil and criminal - and 
persons possible to be held liable, and expressly provides that one form of liability does not 
exempt liability from the other. It states that: ‘[civil] liability of legal persons shall be 
independent from any criminal procedure against that entity’.107 In a similar way, it provides 
that: ‘[criminal] liability of legal persons shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of 
the natural persons who have committed the offences’.108 This wide approach to liability in a 
legally binding human rights instrument would provide a strong point of departure to establish 
corporate legal accountability in the context of climate change for human rights harms and, 
even environmental damage in connection to human rights, such as, for example, the right to a 
healthy environment. Moreover, Article 10 also includes the ‘criminal liability of the natural 
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persons who have committed offences,’109 which entails the possibility of establishing 
individual liability of corporate decision-makers, such as Chief Executive Officers (CEOs).110 
In this way, the Zero Draft pens up the possibility of holding CEOs of large corporations in the 
extractive sector, responsible for at least one third of global emissions, criminally liable at 
domestic level. This adds to the existing debate on the individual responsibility for crimes 
related to the environment in the domain of international criminal justice.111  
The Zero Draft also takes an innovative approach to prevention by requiring states to enact 
legislation where corporate operators ‘shall undertake due diligence obligations throughout 
such business activities’.112 This reaffirms the primary authority of the state to ensure 
corporations observe their obligation of due diligence. The Zero Draft also goes a step further 
by proactively providing a non-exhaustive list of states’ obligations of due diligence.113 Yet, 
the absence of developed states, home of most of the largest corporations to whom an eventual 
legally binding instrument would apply, undermines the treaty-making process itself and its 
prospects of success. Subsequently, in an effort to address some of the concerns raised, the 
Working Group produced a reviewed version of the Zero Draft in 2019, which maintained its 
original wide approach to legal liability.114 Although the challenges of producing a legally 
binding instrument regulating the contested issue of ‘business and human rights’ will likely 
persist, efforts in that direction may already provide relevant insights for the regulation of 
corporate activity through national legislation.  
Indeed, relatively recent legislative developments in France and Germany provide early insights 
for the regulation of corporate activity with human rights implications. Based on UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (General Principle 1 on the Duty to Protect), both 
countries have developed their National Action Plans. These ‘are designed to assess the actual 
as well as the potential adverse human rights impacts with which a business entity may be 
involved’.115 The National Action Plans are thus part of the national legislation implementing 
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the Guiding Principles. For its part, Germany enacted its Nation Action Plan in 2016.116 
Similarly to the Zero Draft proposal, ‘the German National Action Plan incorporated a 
provision on corporate civil liability applicable to corporations and the principle of due 
diligence’.117 The plan identifies the core elements of due diligence in the field of human 
rights118 and establishes that due diligence applies ‘to all enterprises, regardless of their size, 
sector …, operational context within a supply or chain an international dimension’.119 By 
identifying the components embedding the principle of due diligence and its scope, the German 
provision takes a preventive approach of human rights harms resulting from corporate activity. 
Remarkably, the German provision also contemplates the use of remedies in cases of human 
rights harms resulting from corporate activity abroad.120 In a similar move, France also sought 
to implement its soft-law obligations based on the Guiding Principles and enacted its loi de 
vigilance in 2017.121 This legislative development on human rights and corporations has been 
‘considered to be the most advanced national instrument, which holds corporations responsible 
for human rights violations, due to its relatively high standard for due diligence, that can be 
penalized quite strongly’.122 In its Principle 17, for instance the French law enshrines that 
‘business enterprises should carry out human rights due diligence’,123 and recognises its 
‘ongoing’ character as ‘human rights risks may change over time’.124 In addition, on access to 
remedies, the French National Action Plan contemplates the possibility of ‘extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of French criminal courts … [in cases of] offences committed abroad by French 
companies’.125 This advancement in national legislation may reflect the first signs in direction 
towards establishing the liability of corporations for their wrongdoings, even when they operate 
through subsidiary companies abroad. In this way, the French provision provides avenues to 
hold corporations accountable for human rights harms, which could also have environmental 
implications, through national legislation. 
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Although relatively new, these developments constitute early examples showing that national 
legislation can provide the easiest and, perhaps, the most effective means to establish corporate 
legal accountability. These developments, also show that, even if corporate obligation ‘mature’ 
into ‘hard law’, states remain central in efforts to hold corporations accountable for human 
rights violations. German and France newly legislation on business and human rights reflects 
the prevailing primary role of the state in actions oriented to establish liability of corporations 
for human rights violations, including in relation to climate change impacts.126 Yet, similar 
instruments regulating corporate emitting activity may be harder to implement in developing 
states, as they are often keen to attract foreign corporate investment, particularly in the 
extractive sector. Further developments in this direction in the context of climate change may 
usefully provide complementarity between National Action Plans and climate change 
legislation at the national level, and pave the way for initial developments to establishing 
corporate legal accountability. Certainly, developments in Germany and France do provide 
something of a breakthrough to hold corporations accountable for human rights and 
environmental harms through legally binding legislation. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Often states find themselves in a conflict of interests in regulating corporate activities in such a 
way to hold corporations accountable for human rights and environmental harms. On the one 
hand, states are duty bearers of the obligation to protect the human rights of individuals and, on 
the other hand, states  need to attract and facilitate foreign investment as a source of economic 
growth and development. Therefore, states remain in a key and, at the same time problematic 
position to direct the efforts to hold corporations accountable for human rights harms resulting 
from corporate emitting activity leading to climate change. However, even in the absence of an 
international legally binding instrument enshrining the human rights obligations of corporate 
actors, it does not mean that such obligations and resulting corporate accountability for their 
inobservance do not exist. Corporations hold human rights obligations and are, at the least 
indirectly, accountable for human rights violations caused by the impact of their activities. 
Corporations are accountable on the basis of the obligations acquired through states, in 
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fulfilment of the duty to respect human rights where they operate, and the existing body of ‘soft 
law’ human rights obligations regulating corporate activity, such as the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights.  
The plethora of multilateral and private-led initiatives seeking to regulate corporate activity 
through different types of soft-law instruments reflects the need to set a minimum normative 
framework regulating corporate behaviour. Notably, despite their limitations as legal 
instrument guiding corporate behaviour, the UN Guiding Principles represent the prevailing 
and most widely recognised approach to the issue. Certainly, the Zero Draft constitutes a 
potential point of departure from the existing non-legally binding approach to corporate activity 
towards a more stringent regime. On the whole, the international apathy towards achieving 
corporate accountability and, in particular, the reluctance of powerful states to establish any 
kind of legally binding instrument to achieve corporate accountability appears to bode badly 
for the achievement of meaningful international climate action. Yet, there may be some cause 
for optimism in light of developments in national legislation in France and Germany, which in 
light of the developments drawing from the principle of ‘due diligence’, recently enshrined in 
national legislation of France and Germany to regulate corporate activity. 
In addition, the lack of mechanisms to establish corporate accountability and ‘soft’ approach to 
corporate human rights obligations seem to be increasingly challenged in the context of  climate 
litigation, where a growing number of lawsuits are being brought against corporations by 
individuals and groups adversely affected by climate change impacts resulting of  
disproportional emitting activity. In this sense, the magnitude and uniqueness of the impacts of 
climate change in the ability of enjoyment of human rights and the environment, directly linked 
to the enjoyment of rights, may prove their potential to challenge the traditional state-centric 
approach of human rights. In turn, it opens new avenues to establish corporate accountability 
by prompting rethinking and eventual correction of human rights weaknesses, including by 
developing mechanisms to establish corporate accountability for human rights abuses, 
favouring the position of power of corporations, especially in the Third World.  
All in all, however, states remain and likely will maintain a primary and crucial role in 
establishing and enforcing corporate accountability for human rights harms, especially in a 
climate change scenario. However, thanks to bottom-up initiatives from grassroots movements, 
corporations, in addition to states, are increasingly being asked to answer for their emissions 
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Rights-based Climate Litigation: An Avenue to Tackle Climate Change? 
 
1. Introduction  
Government responses to address the ongoing climate crisis as a global emergency,1 both 
domestically and through traditional multilateral institutions, have outright failed.2 Rights-
based climate litigation is arising as an avenue to prompt far-reaching climate responses from 
governments.3 Governmental climate action entails the implementation of mitigation and 
adaptation measures. These include enacting more stringent policies that regulate, in particular, 
corporate activity with the aim of holding corporations accountable for human rights violations, 
resulting from the impact of their activities upon the environment. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, however, there is a lack of legally-binding mechanisms to establish corporate 
accountability for human rights and environmental harms resulting from (corporate) activities 
significantly contributing to climate change. Particularly, there are no well-established 
mechanisms reflecting clear corporate human rights obligations related to the environment. In 
a dramatically climate changing world this is problematic. This makes it technically challenging 
to hold corporations accountable for rights violations resulting from the impact of their 
activities upon the climate, which, in practice, can result in corporate impunity. This by no 
means implies an absence of corporate human rights obligations.  
These claims can be grounded, fully or partially, in human rights terms. In this sense, human 
rights emerge as an innovative climate litigation strategy increasingly being deployed in courts 
worldwide by individuals or groups adversely affected by the impacts of climate change. 
This chapter aims, first, to identify how the deployment of human rights considerations in 
climate claims can contribute to global climate action through climate litigation. Specifically, 
with the help of rights-based litigation cases, this chapter examines human rights as a tool to 
overcome the legal challenges posed by the context of climate change, including causation, 
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attribution, and the extra-temporal and extraterritorial dimensions of human rights. By doing 
so, this chapter also seeks to determine whether the context of climate change can potentially 
act as a catalyst for the fundamental rethinking of the human rights’ relational approach to the 
environment, as to potentially generate their expansion or reform. 
Indeed, human rights are ‘often understood to be the quintessence of an anthropocentric legal 
domain’.4 Anthropocentrism, ‘in its original connotation in environmental ethics, is the belief 
that value is human-centred and that all other beings are means to human ends’,5 which, from 
an environmentalist perspective, is considered ‘ethically wrong and at the root of ecological 
crises’.6 As a result, the Anthropocene, embeds ‘the idea that the Earth has been capitulated into 
a new geological era as a result of extensive human modification of the Earth System, primarily 
in the form of climate change.’7 Climate change is, therefore, a consequence of a legally liberal 
and anthropocentric relationship between human beings and the environment, whereby human 
beings lie at the core as a supreme and privileged component of it, for which all the rest of the 
components of the natural world serve an utilitarian purpose. As it is now increasingly evident, 
such an anthropocentric approach to the environment, supported by law, including human rights 
law, is unsustainable. Climate litigation thus provides a platform that somewhat evidences the 
inherent problems of the anthropocentric approach of human rights law to nature, such as the 
exclusion of elements neglected at its inception (e.g., the environment, future generations).  
For instance, the environment and future generations traditionally fall outside the scope of legal 
protection and consideration under human rights law. They are not considered, as human beings 
are, as part of a unity on Earth,8 beyond time and space. Rather, human rights law focuses on 
the protection of present human beings as independent entities and overlooks both their 
environment and their future generations. Therefore, by neglecting such fundamental notions 
as the environment or future generations, the exploitation of the environment to satisfy the 
needs of actual human beings, without care for nature or future generations is validated. In this 
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context, rights-based climate litigation allows thus the exposure of ‘human stories’9 of harms 
to rights– that include and relate to the harms against the environment resulting from climate 
change impacts. Therefore, potential, or actual human rights harms presented in the form of 
rights-based claims, as it is argued, evidence the wrongfulness or, at least, the incompleteness 
of human rights law’s neoliberal and anthropocentric approach because it facilitates 
environmental exploitation instead of protection, which ultimately also impacts the prospects 
of the very existence of future generations. Notably, corporations have a main role in such a 
scenario, given that corporate ‘global dominance is perhaps as much a key marker of 
Anthropocene trajectories as is the climate crisis itself”.10 
The context of climate change, I argue, has the potential to catalyse rethinking or even, in the 
long term, the correction of certain intrinsic notions in human rights law. I argue that the context 
of climate change has the potential to trigger human rights law rethinking in such a way as to 
drive the field beyond its traditional anthropocentric approach and towards a more integrated 
one, which also considers elements like the environment and future generations as equivalents 
with present human beings, in the universe. Climate litigation constitutes, in this line of 
argument, a sort of testing ground that can potentially trigger rethinking and even initial reform 
of human rights foundations. I further argue that human rights law contributes to climate action 
by providing an international legal framework under which rights violations resulting from the 
impacts of climate change can be articulated as legal strategies in, for instance, climate 
litigation. Either deployed as a basis or complement of climate claims, human rights language 
can help to overcome the challenges presented by the climate change scenario to establish 
accountability for rights violations. Human rights law thus offers avenues to start addressing 
complex issues such as causation, attribution, and the extra-temporal and extraterritorial 
dimensions of human rights in the context of climate change. 
Although rights-based claims will be the main focus of this analysis, cases that are not explicitly 
or primarily grounded in human rights law are not excluded as they may, and do, have rights 
implications, and help to understand the general climate litigation spectrum. Human rights law 
has only recently emerged as one among several strategies in which to ground claims and 
improve odds in climate litigation. Consequentially, only preliminary projections can be made 
on the performance and impact of human rights considerations in the climate litigation arena 
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and wider climate action at this point in time. Indeed, it is too early, and the case law is still 
limited.11 However, the increasing deployment of rights considerations in climate cases and the 
expanding recognition of the linkages between human rights and climate change are being 
reflected in the growing attention to this field in scholarly work.12 
In Section 1, this chapter explores the global landscape of climate litigation. It provides an 
overview of the main features and trends of climate litigation and discusses the potential 
litigation scenarios based on the nature of the parties to a case as well as the role of climate 
science therein. Section 2 presents climate litigation case law, with special focus on cases 
grounded in human rights law in order to examine how rights considerations are being deployed 
in an attempt to overcome complex issues of causation, attribution, extra-temporality and 
extraterritoriality presented by the climate change context. Section 3 reflects on the effect of 
the context of climate change as a catalyst for rethinking and ultimately reforming human rights 
law to consider elements previously neglected and /or misrepresented, such as the environment 
and future generations. This chapter concludes, first, that human rights can contribute to global 
climate action as an ‘umbrella’ legal framework that helps in overcoming legal challenges 
presented in the context of climate change, thereby, contributing to global climate action in the 
long term; and, second, that the context of climate change can potentially generate human rights 
evolution by generating rethinking of fundamental notions and, eventually, reforms in human 
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2. Climate Litigation and Human Rights 
Indeed, nothing short of radical and far-reaching action -which current measures do not provide- 
can constitute an adequate reaction to imminent climate catastrophe. Government responses 
continue to be inefficient in implementing measures to dramatically reduce global emissions. 
In this context, climate litigation provides an avenue for civil society to prompt the mitigation 
and adaptation measures to address the climate crisis. In this vein, Fisher, reflects on litigation 
as a response to institutional failure.13 She points out that: 
[The] story of the institutional response to climate change has been primarily a story 
of institutional failure. Initially that story was a ‘tragedy of the commons’ in which 
private actors failed to act collectively to deal with the problem they created.14 
Added to this has been the failure at the international level to develop a globally 
binding regime and at the national level to develop robust regulatory regimes. This 
is not to say that action has not been taken, but that most action taken has been 
presumed to fall short of what is needed.15 
In this context, contrary to the traditional multilateral climate governance, rights-based climate 
litigation constitutes, to a great extent, a source of civil society-driven responses to the climate 
crisis. Climate litigation emerges as an alternative path to the traditional mechanisms of 
international climate governance led by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and typified, initially, in the Kyoto Protocol and, later, in the Paris Agreement. In 
fact, the adoption of the Paris Agreement signified the consolidation of the recognition of the 
relationship between human rights and climate change. As a result, the number of rights-based 
claims in climate litigation has been invigorated since its adoption.16 Indeed, as Bouwer points 
out, ‘rather than obviating any need for citizen action on climate change, [the Paris] Agreement 
opens the door to significantly more litigation about climate issues, not less.’17  
 
13 Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Climate Change Litigation, Obsession and Expertise: Reflecting on the Scholarly Response 
to Massachusetts v. EPA’ (2013) 35(3) Law & Policy 236, 1. 
14 ibid, 240 citing Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 (3859) Science 1243. 
15 ibid,240. 
16 In the same vein, Preston also notes that ‘the growing recognition of role of human rights in dealing with climate 
change was [ultimately] recognised in the 2015 Paris Agreement. In turn this has engendered greater reliance on 
rights […].’ Preston, (n 12) 134. See also, Jacqueline Peel and Jolene Lin, ‘Transnational Climate Litigation: The 
Contribution of the Global South’ (2019) 113(4) American Journal of International Law, 679. 




In addition, the recognition of the right to a healthy environment has been enshrined in 
numerous constitutions18 and other national legislations of  the world in the last decades -‘about 
two-thirds of … constitutions refer to a healthy environment;’19 and will likely be increasingly 
deployed in rights-based climate litigation. One of the characteristics of the emerging climate 
litigation trend20 is that it includes an increasing number of  claims targeting corporations, for 
their significant emissions levels, contributing to  climate change effects.. . As Ganguly, Setzer 
and Heyvaert point out, ‘the turn to private litigation targeting corporations is, furthermore, 
consistent with the transnationalisation of climate change governance in response to inadequate 
international regulation by states under the auspices of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’.21 Climate litigation thus, inter alia, serves to fill 
the void caused by ineffective climate regulation addressing disproportional emitting activity 
by public and private actors. Nevertheless, it should be noted that climate litigation is open to 
all kind of non-state actors, including corporations. In fact, corporations are the largest group 
of litigants with a wide range of claims generally filed against states.22 This chapter, however, 
focuses on claims filed by individuals and civil society representatives, which are partly or fully 
based on human rights arguments. 
The objectives of climate litigation, thus, vary depending on who the claimants are in a given 
dispute. On one hand, corporate claimants mainly challenge governments’ regulatory and 
procedural decisions.  On the other hand, claims from individuals or civil society groups can 
seek compensation for human rights harms or, in light of the climate crisis, seek to prompt 
increased climate action from governments. In the latter case, the aim of claims can take 
different shapes. Cases range from claims seeking more ambitious emission reduction targets 
and more stringent climate policies from governments; claims seeking to avoid or challenge 
 
18 ‘[The] right to a healthy environment enjoys direct constitutional protection in 100 countries.’ David Boyd, 
‘Catalyst for Change: Evaluating Forty Years of Experience in Implementing the Right to a Healthy 
Environment’ (2018) Wake Forest University, North Carolina 17, 18. 
19 John Knox, ‘The Global Pact for the Environment: At the crossroads of human rights and the environment’ 
(2019) 28(1) Review of European Comparative & International Environmental Law 40, 42. 
20 This is considered a ‘second wave’ of climate litigation by some scholars. ‘The first wave of private climate 
litigation spanned 2005 to 2015 and was mainly concentrated in the United States. Several lawsuits filed in state 
district courts were dismissed on the grounds of non-justiciability of a political question…  The second wave is 
characterised by a broader range of arguments and litigation strategies than its predecessor, and unfolds within a 
rapidly evolving scientific, discursive and constitutional context [in the years preceding and following the adoption 
of the Paris Agreement]’. Geetanjali Ganguly, Joana Setzer and Veerle Heyvaert, ‘If at First You don’t Succeed: 
Suing Corporations for Climate Change’, (2018) 38(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 841, 842-6. 
21 ibid, 845-6. 
22 Michal Nachmany and Joana Setzer, ‘Global trends in climate change legislation and litigation: 2018 snapshot’ 
(Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment; and Centre for Climate Change Economic 
and Policy, May 2018) at 5 <https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Global-trends-




licensing of projects with high environmental impacts; claims seeking court adjudication of 
corporate accountability for behaviour leading to climate impacts; claims seeking compensation 
for adaptation costs; among others.23 Despite its limited effect so far, the emerging case law 
have the potential to foster political will needed to increase mitigation and adaptation efforts, 
raising awareness about the risk that climate change impacts pose upon human rights and the 
environment, and exposing the role of states and private actors therein. Climate litigation, 
therefore, helps to develop a narrative whereby there is they (corporations and/or the state 
apparatus) and an us (individuals and communities, now and in the future, who will be 
devastated by climate change). Millner and Ruddock, for example, observe that ‘[e]ven 
unsuccessful cases can expose weaknesses in the law and highlight the need for law reform’.24 
Certainly, the ‘disclosure of the truth and punishment of wrongdoers serve to address the 
structural causes of climate change and resulting human rights violations’.25 This ‘punishment’ 
can come not only from a court’s decision in a climate case, but also from the public opinion 
which, as a result of a case may opt for reducing or condemning the consumption of certain 
goods or services.  
From a rights perspective, climate litigation provides an avenue to bring to the attention of 
courts cases of actual or potential rights violations resulting from climate impacts. In this 
context, the deployment of rights-based arguments in climate litigation arises as a legal tool that 
usefully helps to articulate with a human rights framework the adverse effects of climate change 
upon individual and group rights across the world. More ambitiously and in the long term, 
rights-based climate litigation can potentially be a source of structural rethinking and reforms 
in human rights, in a way to consider elements neglected by their neoliberal ethos,26 such as the 
environment and future generations. Importantly, climate litigation, in general, and rights-based 
climate litigation, in particular, opens the opportunity to hear, understand and, ultimately, 
expand international human rights law’s understanding on the environment. The unprecedented 
contributions garnered in Third World societies have thus the potential to trigger rethinking and 
even to correct the anthropocentric relational approach of human rights to the environment. 
 
23 See Joana Setzer and Rebecca Byrnes, ‘Global trends in climate change litigation: 2019 snapshot’ (Grantham 
Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, July 2019) 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/GRI_Global-trends-in-climate-change-
litigation-2019-snapshot-2.pdf> accessed 20 April 2020.  
24 Felicity Millner and Kirsty Ruddock, ‘Climate Litigation: Lessons learned and future opportunities’ (2011) 36(1) 
Alternative Law Journal 27, 27.  
25 Margareta Wewerinke-Singh, ‘Remedies for Human Rights Violations Caused by Climate Change’, (2019) 9 
(3) Climate Law 224, 242.  





This does not mean converting human rights into a non-anthropocentric field which would 
certainly seem to deprive them from their essence. Rather, it may gradually help human rights 
to recognise the environment and its components as a subject (not object), with inalienable 
rights to be respected – irrespective whether these are called so or recognised as such - and, in 
consequence, change humans’ and human rights’ relational approach to the natural world.27  
Rights-based litigation also provides an opportunity to generate potentially far-reaching 
responses from governments to the climate crisis, including enabling stricter regulation of 
corporate activity and, as a result, facilitating the means to establish corporate accountability 
for rights violations resulting from climate impacts. In this way, climate litigation emerges as a 
sort of ‘alternative avenue’ to shape not only traditional human rights understandings, but also 
traditional climate governance mechanisms. The proliferation of climate litigation worldwide 
and the emergence of right-based climate litigation thus provides a path to reaffirm the 
cruciality of human rights in the climate debate, often disregarded in the context of global 
climate governance. 
Moreover, rights-based litigation also provides a tool to raise public awareness of the historic 
contributions made by large emitters states and corporations. In this sense, civil society would 
be empowered to symbolically sanction corporations (e.g.  from consumers). This can affect 
corporate reputation and, as a result, potentially lead to positive changes in the behaviour of 
some corporations, even if these ‘win’ a case. As Preston points out, ‘[even] if the applicants 
do not succeed in court, these cases will contribute to the evolution of climate change 
jurisprudence and place public pressure on legislators and major emitters to reduce GHG 
emissions’.28 Climate litigation thus could also serve a ‘didactic function’ towards society on 
climate change-related issues, whose effects could only be identified in an extended period.  
The didactic function of climate litigation has amply been discussed in the context of 
international criminal trials.29 Douglas regarded these trials as ‘exercises in collective 
pedagogy, [that] claimed to provide detailed and accurate representations of the larger sweep 
 
27 See, for example, Christopher Stone. ‘Should Trees have Standing? Law, Morality and the Environment’ 
(Oxford University Press 2010). 
28 Preston (n 12) 509. 
29 Yet, there has been criticism to the neutrality of trials’ lessons, for example, in the context of international 
criminal trials. See, for example, in the context of international criminal law, Tor Krever, ‘International Criminal 




of historical forces that issued in acts of mass atrocity.’30 Put back in the context of climate 
litigation, rights-based climate cases also have the potential to raise awareness on the real 
impacts of climate change on the lives of individuals and groups beyond scientific projections 
and, also, on the role that states and corporations have played thereon.31 Ineluctably, such 
awareness could in turn generate responses from society outside the courtrooms that can 
influence global climate action in the mid and long term. 
2.1 The Geography of Climate Litigation 
The increased visibility of climate change impacts upon the environment and the ability to enjoy 
recognised human rights by individuals and communities is, to a great extent, mirrored in the 
increase of climate litigation cases worldwide. According to the Climate Change Litigation 
database of the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law and Arnold & Porter, at the time of 
writing, more than 1700 climate cases have been filed so far worldwide, including pending 
decision cases.32 The large majority of these cases, over 1300, were filed in the United States; 
whereas over 400 cases were filed outside it.33 According to the Grantham Research Institute 
on Climate Change and the Environment, amongst jurisdictions outside the United States, 
Australia (over 100 cases) has the highest number of cases followed by the United Kingdom 
(over 70 cases).34 Although the number of cases is still limited in jurisdictions outside these 
three states, the pace and geographical distribution of cases being filed worldwide indicate that 
climate litigation activity will continue growing in other jurisdictions, including the Third 
World.35 This may trigger opportunities to incorporate developing countries’ climate 
experiences and knowledges, like those from indigenous peoples, into (rights-based) climate 
jurisprudence. For instance, recent groundbreaking cases taken in courts in Colombia, South 
Africa and The Philippines demonstrate that the Third World is increasingly taking part of this 
trend. In addition, corporations also play a key role both as claimants and defendants in the 
 
30 Lawrence Douglas, ‘The Didactic Trial: Filtering History and Memory into the Courtroom’ (2006) 14(4) 
European Review 513, 514. 
31 Other factors that can likely influence the public awareness process also include where, when or who the parties 
of a case are. For a detailed discussion, see ibid; and Mark Wolfgram ‘Didactic war crimes trials and external legal 
culture: the cases of the Nuremberg, Frankfurt Auschwitz, and Majdanek trials in West Germany’ (2014) 26(3) 
Global Change, Peace & Security 281. 
32 Climate Litigation Database (n 11).  
33 ibid. 
34 Climate Change Laws of the World database\ <https://climate-
laws.org/litigation_cases?geography%5B%5D=9> accessed 30 October 2020. 
35 According to the 2019 policy report of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 
“[climate] change litigation continues to see a geographic expansion. There are now cases in the Americas, Asia 
and the Pacific region, and Europe. Several cases are being brought in low- and middle- income countries.” Setzer 




current climate litigation ‘wave’. Certainly, climate litigation ‘is increasingly viewed as a tool 
to influence policy outcomes and corporate behaviour’. But, although corporations remain ‘the 
single most represented group of claimants’,36 their participation in climate litigation cases as 
such ‘has fallen’.37  
When pieced together, this reality of climate litigation pours cold water on the idea of climate 
litigation as a path to accelerate climate action. It should be kept in mind that climate litigation 
remains a complementary and emerging avenue to significantly influence global climate action 
by inter alia, contributing to global mitigation efforts. This is not to say that it does not have 
the potential to contribute towards that end. Certainly, the use of human rights considerations 
in climate litigation is at an embryonic stage yet. According to the Climate Litigation database, 
out of the whole spectrum of climate litigation cases registered worldwide, at the time of 
writing, only 47 are categorised as human rights climate cases,38 although human rights 
considerations can still be captured under other categories, either implicitly or explicitly. 
Indeed, the growth of rights-based climate cases reflects, as Peel and Osofsky note, ‘a trend 
towards petitioners increasingly employing rights claims in a climate change context, and a 
growing receptivity of courts to this framing…[and, moreover] with worsening impacts from 
climate change…, linkages between climate change and rights protection are likely to become 
even more salient, attracting further litigation on this basis’.39 Therefore, while the use of human 
rights based arguments in the climate litigation scene is still limited, its potential should not be 
dismissed. Furthermore, rights-based climate litigation also provides opportunities to rethink 
basic understandings of human rights such as its relational approach to the environment and 
future generations, and it provides the chance to explore the capacity of human rights law to 
adjust and correct itself accordingly.  
2.2 Who are the Litigants? 
Although climate claims can be categorised in multiple ways, depending on the litigant parties 
to a case, climate litigation can essentially present three different scenarios: inter-state claims, 
claims between a state and non-state actor, and claims between non-state actors. 
 
36 Michal Nachmany and Joana Setzer (n 22) at 5. 
37 Setzer and Byrnes, (n 23) at 4. 
38 Climate Litigation Database (n 11). 




2.2.1 Inter-State claims 
So far, no interstate climate case has been filed before a court. However, given the increasingly 
harmful impacts of climate change globally, it seems it will be only a matter of time until that 
happens. There is enough evidence of the tremendous impact of climate change on entire states, 
especially on those most vulnerable to climate impacts, to suggest that in the near future a state 
could sue another state for its carbon emitting activities that have contributed to climate change. 
Indeed,  ‘the rapid ice melting and resulting sea level rise in the Pacific Ocean will likely prompt 
small islands states, particularly vulnerable to the effects of the climate crisis, to file an interstate 
climate claim’.40 For example, in the aftermath of cyclone Pam, which severely hit Vanuatu in 
2015, a government representative stated that the country was ‘exploring all avenues to utilise 
the judicial system in various jurisdictions – including under international law – to shift the 
costs of climate protection back onto the fossil fuel companies, [and] governments that actively 
and knowingly created this existential threat’.41 In a similar vein, in 2002, the Prime Minister 
of Tuvalu stated that his government was considering bringing a contentious case against the 
United States and Australia to the International Court of Justice in response to their refusal to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol.42 Similarly, the President of Palau announced that his government, 
along with Marshall Islands, was planning to seek an Advisory Opinion from the International 
Court of Justice on the states’ legal responsibility ‘to ensure that any activities on their territory 
that emit greenhouse gases do not harm other States’.43 Although no climate case has been filed 
so far, the possibility of inter-state climate litigation remains reasonable, especially for the most 
vulnerable states, which are increasingly and disproportionally suffering the impacts of climate 
change. In such a (yet) hypothetical scenario, the traditionally cautious approach of the 
International Court of Justice might be tested to address complex legal challenges posed by the 
context of climate change. 
 
 
40 See Keely Boom, ‘See you in court: the rising tide of climate litigation’ (The Conversation, 28 September 2011) 
<https://theconversation.com/see-you-in-court-the-rising-tide-of-international-climate-litigation-3542> accessed 
20 September 2020.  
41 Lisa Cox, ‘Vanuatu says it may sue fossil fuel companies and other countries over climate change’ (The 
Guardian, 22 November 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/22/vanuatu-says-it-may-sue-
fossil-fuel-companies-and-other-countries-over-climate-change> accessed 20 September 2020. 
42 Rebecca Jacobs, ‘Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in Tuvalu‘s Threat to Sue the United States in 
the International Court of Justice’ (2005) 14(1) Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 103, 114. 
43 UN News website (‘Palau seeks UN World Court opinion on damage caused by greenhouse gases’ UN News 22 




2.2.2 Claims between States and Non-State Actors 
Claims against states can be brought by a wide range of non-state actors, including corporations.   
Almost 75 per cent of cases have been brought against governments, typically by corporations 
or individuals’,44 although ‘the number of corporations as plaintiffs has fallen’45 Claims brought 
by corporations against governments often seek to overturn administrative decisions that 
include the denial of licenses such as ‘a coal-fired power plant or water extraction’ or the 
allocation of allowances, for example, for the ‘production of renewable energy’.46 At the same 
time, individuals and civil society groups are increasingly active actors in climate litigation as  
they represent the actual or potential victims of climate impacts.  
In addition, litigation between states and individuals or groups of non-state actors will likely 
increase as climate impacts are growing in number and intensity worldwide (e.g., for adaptation 
measures). However, since litigation between states and non-state actors can also involve 
corporate non-state actors challenging governments’ decisions on licensing, environmental 
impact assessments and regulatory measures, which may also increase as governments’ 
regulatory measures become more stringent.47  
2.2.3 Claims between Non-State Actors 
There exists also climate litigation between non-state actors, in which states are not involved. 
Corporations have also filed claims against other non-state actors, although to a lesser degree 
than against states. Some corporations, for instance, have sued environmental activists or 
scientists involved in acts aimed at preventing the development of projects considered 
environmentally harmful. In these cases, corporations have sought preventive measures or 
criminal liability of individuals for attempts to block the course of their projects.48 For example, 
 
44 Setzer and Byrnes (n 23) 9. 
45 ibid, 4. 
46 Nachmany and Setzer, (n 22) 5.   
47 ibid, 6. 
48 For example, back in 2008, in the so called ‘The Kingsnorth Trial’, six environmental activists, who used 
climate change arguments in their defence, were acquitted by the Maidstone Crown Court (England and Wales, 
2008) for trespassing and causing criminal damage to a coal-fired power station. Maidstone Crown Court, 2008.  
See, John Vidal, ‘Not guilty: the Greenpeace activists who used climate change as a legal defence’ (The 
Guardian, 11 September 2008) 





the company Shell filed claims (more than once) against environmentalists for blocking its 
drilling activities in the Arctic.49  
These cases help to raise public awareness about climate change impacts upon people and the 
environment worldwide, including identifying who are the actors behind activities leading to 
such effects and the urgency of taking action at every level of society to mitigate them. In this 
context, some of the challenges that human rights face when applied in the context of climate 
change will be explored. 
2.3 The Role of Climate Science: An Asset to Overcome Causation and Attribution 
There exists a connection between human rights, climate change and science in the context of 
climate litigation. Climate science plays an increasingly important role in climate litigation by 
informing litigants about the continuous findings in climate science. According to Setzer and 
Byrnes, the ongoing trend of climate litigation has benefitted ‘from the growth and 
consolidation of climate science in the last decade’.50 Indeed, findings in the field of climate 
science have provided evidence of the decisive role that current and past emissions resulting 
from human activities have played in in global climate change and their potential effects in the 
near future.51 The continuous insights of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) have been essential to trigger wide recognition of the links between human activity and 
climate change. In this respect, Godwin points out that ‘[through] a series of five reports starting 
in 1990, the IPCC has managed to establish as a political "given" that the earth is warming, and 
 
49 See Shell Offshore v. Greenpeace, Shell presented a complaint before the District Court of Alaska against 
Greenpeace for ‘stalking and chasing’ Shell’s Artic drilling vessel and sought injunction to prevent interference 
with ‘oil and gas exploration drilling in the United States Outer Continental Shelf’. The Court granted a preliminary 
injunction to Shell. Some months later, the Court found Greenpeace to be in contempt of its order barring 
interference by hanging suspended activists from bridge in Portland preventing the transit of a Shell vessel and 
imposed increasing hourly penalties for the time that activists remained blocking the vessel’s transit. Federal 
District Court of Alaska District, Case No 3:15-cv-00054 SLG HRH, 30 July 2015. Similarly, in 2012, Shell 
Offshore sought injunction from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of Alaska, to prevent protesters 
blockage of its activities by occupying its drilling vessels in the Artic. Shell Offshore v. Greenpeace, Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for the District of Alaska, No. 12-35332, 12 March 2013. 
50 Setzer and Byrnes, (n 23) 8. 
51 In the context of climate litigation, one of the most recurrent sources of climate science are the findings of the 
IPCC. See, for example, on the growing recognition of climate science insights from the IPCC, Ganguly, Setzer 
and Heyvaert (n 20) 851-2.   In addition to the IPCC findings, there are also renowned works focused on the role 
of corporate activity in climate change. See, for example, Richard Heede, ‘Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide 
and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010’ (2014) 122 Climatic Change 229; Peter 
Frumhoff, Richard Heede and Naomi Oreskes, ‘The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon Producers’ 
(2015) 132 (2), Climatic Change 157; and B. Ekwurzel, J. Boneham, M. Dalton, R. Heede, R. Mera, M. Allen and 
P. Frumhoff, ‘The Rise in Global Atmospheric CP2, Surface Temperature, and Sea Level from Emissions Traced 




that human activity is a significant cause’.52 This reliance on findings in climate science, 
particularly from the IPCC, has been reflected in in climate litigation to support technical 
aspects of claims, such as causation and attribution issues. For instance, in Urgenda Foundation 
v the State of the Netherlands,53 climate science was strategically used to assist judges in 
overcoming causation issues. In its judgment, The Hague District Court relied heavily on the 
Fourth and Fifth reports of the IPCC to conclude that the ‘Dutch reduction target is…below the 
standard deemed necessary by climate science and the international climate policy.’54 However, 
reliance on IPCC climate science by courts to scientifically ground their findings has not gone 
without criticism on several grounds.  
First, uncertainty is still one of the factors most resorted to by defendants and judges to deny or 
be wary of the use of climate science as a basis to establish the causal link in climate litigation. 
This is, for instance, reflected in Massachusetts et al v. Environmental Protection Agency et 
al,55 in Judge Scalia’s dissenting opinion. Relying on the 2001 National Research Council 
report, he held that: ‘The science of climate change is extraordinarily complex and still 
evolving. Although there have been substantial advances in climate change science, there 
continue to be important uncertainties in our understanding of the factors that may affect future 
climate change and how it should be addressed.’56 
Certainly, courts have traditionally been reluctant to base their findings on science. This is 
added to the burden of proof that claimants should overcome, which in part ‘stems from gaps 
and uncertainties in relevant climate science’.57 As Peel notes, the ‘The casting of climate 
change as a “global” problem has fostered the development of scientific and legal institutions 
 
52 Jean Goodwin, ‘The authority of the IPCC First Assessment Report and the manufacture of consensus’ (Iowa 
State University Digital Repository 2009) at 1 < https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/engl_conf/3/> accessed 20 September 
2020. Thereby, for example, Godwin illustrates the progressive recognition of the findings of climate science by 
United States (one of the largest emitters) as follows: “The fourth report was the occasion for the Bush II 
administration's shift from statements like this: ‘We do not know how much effect natural fluctuations in climate 
may have had on warming. We do not know how much our climate could or will change in the future. We do not 
know how fast change will occur, or even how some of our actions could impact it” in 2001, with its typical 
assertions of ‘uncertainty’ as a reason for inaction, to statements like this: “[The IPCC report] reflects the sizeable 
and robust body of knowledge regarding the physical science of climate change, including the finding that the 
Earth is warming and that human activities have very likely caused most of the warming of the last 50 years’, in 
2007.” 
53 Urgenda Foundation v the State of the Netherlands, ECLI:NL: RBDHA:2015:7196, Rechtbank Den Haag 24 
June 2015 [hereinafter, Urgenda]. 
54 ibid [4.31] (vi). 
55Massachusetts et al v. Environmental Protection Agency et al, No 05-1120, 549 US, US Supreme Court, 2 April 
2007.  
56 ibid, Scalia dissenting opinion, 549 (2007) at 7. 




addressing the problem at the international level with less attention paid, until recently, as to 
how climate change might manifest at the local level… Scientific uncertainties in the available 
evidence regarding the localised impacts of global warming are easily exploitable by defendants 
seeking to deny that GHG emissions can be linked to global warming or specific climate change 
impacts’.58 Therefore, despite the increased receptivity to climate science-based arguments in 
claims shown by courts in subsequent cases like Urgenda,59 its use as a strategy should still be 
taken cautiously or, at least, not as a guarantee for claimants to overcome the burden of proof 
in climate litigation.  
A second factor that has triggered criticism of the use of climate science by courts in climate 
litigation has been the undesirability of placing under the scrutiny of judges scientific arguments 
about which they have limited or no technical expertise in order to decide on a climate claim. 
In fact, it could be considered too much risk for judges to justify their findings on scientific 
arguments, when their capacity to decide upon a given matter can potentially be challenged, 
even more where a judgement is considered to have climate policy implications. Accordingly, 
on ‘the merits of climate policies in the courtroom’,60 Bergkamp and Hanekamp argue that:  
[Even] if the court is authorized under the applicable laws of procedure and 
evidence to examine a whole body of science in relation to a broad area of 
government policy, it would not be able to complete the task, given the resources 
required. Courts are not equipped to address broad policy issues and weigh the 
conflicting interests involved in setting targets for any particular area. They do not 
have advisory bodies to advise on the relevant scientific, economic, and financial 
issues … Moreover, courts cannot quickly and regularly adapt their opinions to 
reflect the latest science or changed public priorities; judicial policymaking would 
produce entrenched, counter-productive, and costly risk regulation. Consequently, 
courts should refuse to hear these kinds of cases, or deny the remedy sought, on the 
ground that the issue raises a ‘political question’61 or its judgment would have 
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59 See Urgenda (n 53). 
60 Lucas Bergkamp and Jaap Hanekamp, ‘Climate Change Litigation against States: The Perils of Court-Made 
Climate Policies’ (2015) 24 European Energy and Environmental Law Review 102, 105. 
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implications for unrepresented third parties that the court cannot even begin to 
assess.62  
However, while it is true that judges may lack specialized knowledge in climate science, it 
cannot be expected that courts refrain from hearing those cases on the basis of their lack of 
specific knowledge on a matter. Certainly, climate science is not the only highly complex area 
where judges lack or have limited technical expertise. If the lack of expertise in certain areas 
was a reason to prevent courts from hearing a case, courts would not be able to hear cases in 
many other specialised and evolving areas, which also may have political and other 
implications. Instead, cases involving specialised technicalities in climate litigation should 
continue to increase as well as the reliance on climate science in the judiciary, in particular, on 
the IPCC findings, as the IPCC is the only internationally agreed scientific body endorsed by 
states.63 As in Urgenda, for instance, judges can make use of their judicial expertise to assess 
elements of proof and arguments provided by the parties as well as to select the most reliable 
sources available to reach their conclusions.  
In this sense, Urgenda demonstrates the Dutch court’s willingness ‘to embrace the IPCC 
assessment reports as incontrovertible evidence of climate change as a serious humanitarian 
and planetary threat’.64 However, despite the growing receptivity and reliance on climate 
science by courts and ‘the existence of robust scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate 
change’,65 litigants should keep in mind that, at least for now, climate science might continue 
to face certain reticence from courts in the near future. Yet, this should not be a reason to dismiss 
its potential to contribute in overcoming some of the challenges that human rights face in the 
context of climate change, particularly, to address causation and attribution hurdles in climate 
litigation (to be discussed later in this chapter). Also, to a broader extent, the use of climate 
science in climate litigation helps to simplify key scientifically proven facts for non-specialized 
audiences, including judges, litigants, and society in general. As Averill points out, ‘lawsuits 
bring complex climate science to an understandable level and explain how causes such as 
 
62 Bergkamp and Hanekamp (n 60) 107. 
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greenhouse emissions can results in injuries to human rights and ecosystems far away in time 
and space’.66 
 
3. Rights-based Climate Litigation: Examining the Human Rights Performance in the 
Context of Climate Change  
The context of climate change presents complex challenges, which, so far, have been difficult 
to overcome in the context of climate litigation. These challenges include issues of causation, 
attribution, and the extratemporality and extraterritoriality of human rights. While climate 
litigation is ‘already drawing upon the advancements in climate attribution science, and courts 
might be more open to the notion of individual corporate responsibility for climate change 
harm, provided that partial or contributory causation can be scientifically proven with respect 
to the defendant’s conduct’;67 establishing accountability for rights violations resulting from 
climate impacts is still problematic. As a result, rights-based arguments are increasingly being 
used either to articulate actual or potential climate-related rights violations, or as a 
complementary tool in other type of claims, mainly oriented to challenge regulatory 
frameworks. As Preston points out, ‘[the] basis of the litigation remains the constitutional rights 
… that are infringed’,68 which, added to the wide recognition of the right to a healthy 
environment in national constitutions, has led, for example, in South Asian countries, to ‘an 
increase in litigation …claiming that governmental action and inaction has infringed this 
right’.69 As part of this rights litigation trend, there is also an increasing number of cases 
grounded in international or regional human rights instruments attempting to overcome 
technical challenges in climate litigation, that are starting to prove a level  of success, either 
within or outside the courtrooms. 
3.1 Establishing the Causal Link 
The problem of causation applied in the context of climate change refers to the ‘difficulty of 
establishing a direct link between GHG emissions and human rights violations, including issues 
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of rising atmospheric temperatures and consequent environmental implications’.70 The problem 
is that the way from point A (emissions) to point B (human rights violations) is not 
straightforward. As Quirico notes, the ‘link between GHG emissions and first- and second-
generation rights is indirect and includes two more steps, that is, rising atmospheric 
temperatures (climate change) and further environmental changes (general causation)’.71 Since 
the big share of global GHG emissions comes from human-produced CO2 emissions, from 
which ‘fossil fuel burning alone is more than half the net force’,72 contributions to human-
produced GHG emissions are controllable. Also, this means that the causal link between a 
public or private (human) action contributing to global GHG emissions leading to climate 
change - the cause of the problem - and its harmful effects upon individuals’ rights and the 
environment is, even if complex, traceable.73 However, given that the sources of GHG 
emissions are multiple and cumulative throughout time, the burden of proof on the claimants’ 
side to establish the causal link between an action causing GHG emissions and its indirect 
effects upon rights is (still) very difficult to overcome. As a result, causation is considered, at 
least for now, ‘the most important hurdle to be taken in a climate change suit’.74 Yet, the 
increasing evidence from science of the effects of humanly produced emissions on the climate, 
added to the increasing impacts of climate change across the planet, will likely push courts to 
handle science findings in the least ‘compromising’ way while still hearing claims based on 
rights violations resulting from climate impacts.  
In addition, proving causation is essential in a climate claim as it is the basis to resolve other 
legal challenges such as attribution and apportionment, among those who executed the action 
contributing to climate change and its resulting impacts. In this context, the deployment of 
human rights considerations in climate litigation contributes a path to overcome causation 
obstacles. However, whereas this could reasonably work in the case of defendant states as their 
human rights obligations are clearly established in international and national legislation, in the 
case of corporations -which are responsible for about two thirds of the current global 
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emissions,75 it is more uncertain as there is not yet consensus on the content and extent of their 
human rights obligations.76 In the absence of legally-binding corporate human rights 
obligations, it is obviously more difficult to establish liability for corporate behaviour leading 
to climate-related rights violations. Therefore, in short, in order to prove causation, claimants 
would have to demonstrate, at a minimum, that the following four elements are present within 
a claim: First, an action by the defendant that generates (or allows to generate, in the case of 
states) GHG emissions; second, a human rights obligation held by the defendant; third, a 
climatic impact resulting from the (cumulative) defendant(s) action of generating GHG 
emissions (e.g. sea level rise); and, fourth, a harm upon individuals or groups (or ecosystems), 
which affects their ability to enjoy one or several human rights.  
There have been several attempts to overcome these sorts of de facto requirements to establish 
causation in climate claims, with limited success. However, the contributions of climate 
science, and increasing receptivity towards relaxing causation hurdles by courts, along with the 
growing frequency and intensity of climate impacts, upon people and the environment, provide 
some room to expect a gradual lessening of causation barriers.77 
3.1.1 The First Alarm Bells: the Inuit Petition  
The first attempt to overcome causation issues with the use of human rights legal arguments is 
illustrated by the petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights seeking relief 
from violations resulting from global warming caused by acts and omissions of the United 
States.78 In 2005, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, a non-governmental organization 
representing the Inuit residents in the Artic region,79 filed the petition claiming that the effects 
of global warming were adversely impacting a range of human rights of the Inuit.80 These 
include the right to enjoy the benefits of their culture,81 the right to use and enjoy the lands they 
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have traditionally used and occupied,82 the right to use and enjoy their personal property,83 the 
right to the preservation of health,84 the right to life, physical integrity and security,85 the right 
to their own means of subsistence,86 and the rights to residence and movement and inviolability 
of the home.87 Specifically, the petition asks the Inter-American Commission, inter alia, to 
recommend the United States ‘to adopt mandatory measures to limit its emissions …, [and take] 
into account the impacts of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions on the Arctic and affected Inuit in 
evaluating and before approving all major government actions’.88  
The Inuit petition was grounded in several international and regional human rights instruments, 
such as the American Declaration of Human Rights and Duties of Man,89 the Charter of the 
Organization of American States,90 the American Convention on Human Rights,91 the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,92 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,93 and 
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.94 The Inuit petition sought 
to ‘obtain] relief from human rights violations resulting from the impacts of global warming 
and climate change caused by acts and omissions of the United States’;95 and that the 
Commission asserted the negative obligation of the United States ‘to abstain from interfering 
with fundamental rights’.96 The Inuit Petition stated that ‘the United States … has a clear duty 
not to degrade the Arctic environment to an extent that infringes upon the Inuit’s human right 
to enjoy the benefits of their culture.97 Also, the petition engaged with other regional 
instruments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights98 and the African Charter on 
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Human and Peoples’ Rights,99 which could help to demonstrate the connection between climate 
change impacts and, for example, the violation of the Inuit right to property.100 Moreover, with 
the use of available climate science, the petition argues that ‘the United States is the largest 
contributor to global warming and its damaging effects on the Inuit’.101 Whilst recognising 
some degree of uncertainty in relation to climate science, the claimants alleged that: 
The dominant role of the United States in carbon emissions correlates well with the 
country’s estimated contribution to the global temperature increase. U.S. greenhouse gas 
emissions between 1850 and 2000 are responsible for 0.18ºC (30%) of the observed 
temperature increase of 0.6ºC during that period... Although the actual correlation 
between cumulative emissions and temperature increase is subject to some uncertainty, 
there is no doubt that the United States has contributed far more to global warming than 
any other country.102 
The petition, therefore, relies ‘on the negative obligation to abstain from interfering with 
fundamental rights’.103 At the same time, it claims that the United States observes its positive 
obligations to take measures to reduce its GHG emissions as per its international obligations, 
inter alia, under the UNFCCC.104  The petition, thus, strategically uses climate science not only 
to demonstrate the causal link between the United States’ actions and the resulting Inuit’s rights 
violations, but also to demonstrate the disproportionality between its GHG emissions and those 
from other emitters, which explains the rationale of addressing the United States’ actions in 
particular.  
The petition was not admitted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The 
Commission found it insufficient ‘to determine whether the alleged facts would tend to 
characterize a violation of the rights protected by the American Declaration’.105 However, the 
petition has a significant value beyond its ‘no win’ outcome. 
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The petition has the merit of pioneering arguments before the judiciary showing the ‘human’ 
implications of climate change. By attempting to prove causation, the petition illustrates the 
complexity of establishing the causal link - the challenge of connecting, scientifically, 
geographically, and temporally the United States emissions to Inuit rights violations. This 
proved to be an argument that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was not ready 
to support at that point in time. As Osofsky notes, ‘they must persuade the Commission to 
crosscut not only different types of law, but also multiple disciplines’.106 As such, the Inuit 
petition entails an early ‘example of creative lawyering’107 in climate litigation to address 
challenges of causation, attribution and extraterritoriality by deploying human rights 
considerations.  
In addition, beyond its adverse outcome, the Inuit petition could be considered a successful 
case. It drew public attention to the potentially catastrophic effects of climate change upon 
peoples’ rights and ecosystems worldwide.108 As such, the Inuit case was the first time that the 
human dimension of the problem of climate change was raised before a human rights institution, 
which, back at the beginning of this century, did not have the level of attention that it has now. 
Certainly, it ‘generates publicity that helps to raise awareness about the way in which climate 
change is impacting the Inuit and about international human rights tribunals as appropriate 
institutions for addressing cross-cutting problems’.109 Considering that the linkages between 
human rights and climate change were far from clear by then and, instead, they were mainly 
regarded as two unrelated areas, the impact of the Inuit petition in climate litigation is 
significant. It paved the way to subsequent climate cases pursuing government action, including 
through rights-based claims.110  
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3.1.2 The Athabaskan Peoples Case 
Following the path paved by the Inuit, a new petition to the Inter-American Commission was 
filed in 2013 on behalf of the Athabaskan Peoples, settled in the Arctic areas of Canada and the 
United States, which, at the time of writing, is still pending a decision.111 The petition requested 
the assistance of the Inter-American Commission in obtaining relief from rights violations 
resulting from the acts and omissions of Canada.112 It argued that ‘Canada’s failure to 
implement available black carbon emissions reduction measures that could slow the warming 
and melting that causes these harms violates many rights guaranteed to the Athabaskans in the 
Inter-American human rights system’.113 These include the right to enjoy the benefits of their 
culture,114 the right to property,115 the right to the preservation of health,116 and the ‘right to 
their own means of subsistence,117 recognised by the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of the Man.118 Further, the petition argues that Canadian legislation ‘does not provide an 
adequate or effective remedy for the harms caused by the emission of black carbon’.119 Contrary 
to its predecessor, the Inuit petition, the Athabaskan Peoples petition strategically focuses on 
the remedies for rights’ harms, rather than on the source of the problem (carbon emissions) in 
order to prove causation. The Athabaskan Peoples petition relies on the lack of ‘adequate or 
effective’ legislation within the existing national environmental, tort and constitutional 
legislation to support the claim of remedies for the harms caused by Canada’s black carbon 
emissions.120 In this way, the petition anchors the claim in Canada’s ‘obligation to fulfil human 
rights, which has a positive content and compels states to act and take measures so as to mitigate 
GHG emissions’,121 which also applies in relation to adaptation measures.122 Still, the 
Athabaskan Peoples’ petition must overcome the technical difficulties of proving causation. As 
de la Rosa Jaimes reflects: ‘[T]he petitioners will have to prove legally sufficient causation 
between the harm resulting from climate change and the acts or omissions of the Canadian 
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government. The crucial element to success will be that the petitioners demonstrate how 
environmental degradation, due to anthropogenic climate change, can violate their human 
rights’.123 
Accordingly, despite the fact that individuals and groups (particularly, indigenous peoples) are 
the most disproportionately affected by climate impacts and given the multiplicity of emissions 
sources, the burden of proof of causation remains on their side. In justifying not resorting to 
Canadian tort law,124 as it offers ‘no reasonable chance of success’,125 the Athabaskan Peoples’ 
petition captures the high threshold required to overcome the burden of causation:  
Those emitters that have statutory authorization to emit these contaminants would 
be protected from liability. Regarding those that do not, the petitioners would need 
to bring an incalculable number of claims to include all such emitters and such 
claims would encounter difficult challenges addressing the issues of causation and 
apportionment of liability. Given the number of sources of black carbon emissions, 
Arctic Athabaskan peoples would face considerable difficulty establishing 
causation with respect to a particular harm, particularly given that the chain of 
causation may be long and complex, and the types of harm very widespread.126  
Similarly to the Inuit petition, in order to overcome causation, the Athabaskan Peoples’ petition 
also relies on climate science to build the causal link between Canada’s black carbon emissions, 
the climate change effects in the Arctic environment, and its impact upon Athabaskans Peoples’ 
rights.127 The petitioners have argued that emissions cuts are essential to the viability of their 
environment. They note that: 
‘…deep cuts in carbon dioxide remain the backbone of efforts to limit long-term 
adverse consequences of climate change in the Arctic and globally, reductions in 
emissions of the short-lived climate pollutants black carbon, tropospheric ozone 
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and methane have been identified by scientists as the best, and perhaps only, 
strategy to reduce near-term warming and melting in the Arctic…’128  
As such, the petition aims to scientifically demonstrate that ‘Canada’s failure to sufficiently 
regulate black carbon emissions is violating Arctic Athabaskan peoples’ human rights’.129 In 
Consequently, Canada would be breaching its ‘positive obligation to protect human rights’,130 
which involves the states’ duty to ‘take effective steps to ensure the conservation and 
sustainable use of the ecosystems and biological diversity on which the full enjoyment of human 
rights depends’.131 Accordingly, on the basis of the states’ duty to protect, the Athabaskan 
Peoples’ petition argues that ‘Canada is obligated to protect Arctic Athabaskan peoples from 
harm to their human rights resulting from rapid Arctic warming and melting, particularly where 
Canada has contributed to that harm by failing to adequately regulate black carbon 
emissions’.132 
The Athabaskan Peoples’ petition is, thus, another example of ‘creative lawyering’, which 
follows in the footsteps of the Inuit petition, but intends to overcome causation barriers by 
building a stronger causal link between Canada’s actions (releasing black carbon emissions) 
and the resulting rights harms (climate change effects in the Arctic). As De la Rosa Jaimes 
notes, ‘[without] a strong link, it will be difficult for the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights to conclude that Canada’s failure to implement more effective regulation of black carbon 
emissions amounts to a human rights violation’. 133 It is likely, she further notes, that the absence 
of the scientific link scuppered the Inuit Petition before the Inter-American Commission.134 
However, subsequent advancements in the field of climate science and the proliferation of 
rights-based climate cases across judicial systems worldwide, including in the Inter-American 
system of human rights provide some room for expectation in the Athabaskan Peoples’ case. 
Today, more than a decade after the Inuit petition, causation remains a complex challenge in 
climate litigation. However, subsequent developments in climate science and litigation 
worldwide, as well as the widespread recognition of the right to a healthy environment, 
 
128 ibid, 6. 
129 ibid, 21. 
130 Quirico (n 70) 189. 
131 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to 
the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment A/HRC/37/59, 24 January 2018. 
132 Athabaskan Peoples, (n 111) 54. 
133 Verónica De la Rosa Jaimes, ‘The Arctic Athabaskan Petition: Where Accelerated Warming Meets Human 





including within the Inter-American system,135 provide grounds for increased hopes for a 
(more) favourable outcome in the Athabaskan Peoples’ petition than that the Inuit petition had 
in its day. Its outcome is of particular relevance, given the numerous indigenous peoples across 
several states136 that are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts. As such, the 
petition’s outcome ‘will set the course for protecting the rights of indigenous peoples in the 
future’.137 The Athabaskan Peoples’ petition thus provides an opportunity to see how the Inter-
American Commission’s approach to climate change as a threat for the enjoyments of human 
rights evolves within the climate change context, through revisiting, inter alia, causation issues. 
In this sense, the Athabaskan Peoples’ petition provides the Inter-American Commission’s with 
a refreshed opportunity to ‘make advancements regarding human rights claims related to the 
negative effects of anthropogenic climate change’,138 and, thus, develop the approach taken in 
the Inuit petition.   
Such advancements include the subsequent Advisory Opinion issued by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights in 2018, in response to a request made by Colombia on the interpretation 
and scope of the obligation to respect rights, under article 1, the right to life, under article 4. 
and the right to humane treatment and personal integrity, under article 5 of the American 
Convention.139 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Advisory Opinion represents a 
milestone in rights-based climate litigation as it provides potential leeway to ease some of the 
legal challenges that human rights law faces in the context of climate change. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, on setting the interpretation criteria of its opinion, sheds 
light on critical issues including the interrelationship between human rights and the 
environment, and the human rights impacted by environmental degradation, including, notably, 
the right to a healthy environment.140 By doing so, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
recognises the right to a healthy environment as a ‘fundamental right for the existence of 
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humanity’,141 and ‘as a right in itself’.142 Furthermore, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights  acknowledged that other human rights, such as the right to life, health, food, water, 
housing and self-determination, are also vulnerable as a consequence of environmental 
degradation, which  implies the existence of states’ environmental obligations to comply with 
under the Convention.143 In this way, the Advisory Opinion builds bridges which could be 
strategically interpreted towards the relaxation of causation hurdles in future climate 
litigation.144 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights engages in-depth with the issue of causation in its 
Advisory Opinion to Colombia. As Atapattu and Campbell-Duruflé note, causation is 
complemented ‘by the formulation of preventive duties and obligations of conduct that are most 
relevant to the climate challenge’.145 The Advisory Opinion does provide an exhaustive account 
of the ‘State obligations in the face of potential environmental damage in order to respect and 
to ensure the rights to life and to personal integrity’.146 This includes the ‘obligation of 
prevention’147 of rights violations resulting from damage to the environment, the observance of 
‘the precautionary principle’,148 the obligation of cooperation,149 and ‘procedural obligations to 
ensure the rights to life and to personal integrity in the context of environmental protection’.150 
In this sense, by identifying the specific state duties and their content in relation to the protection 
of human rights in the context of environmental protection, the Advisory Opinion may 
contribute to climate action by inspiring the development of a flexible approach to causation 
both within the Inter-American system and in other jurisdictions, in ongoing and future rights-
based climate litigation. As Atapattu and Campbell Duruflé reflect, ‘many climate lawsuits 
currently ongoing before national and international bodies that rely on international human 
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rights law in one form, or another are likely to feel the ripple effect of this important 
development as well’.151 
3.1.3 The Landmark case of Urgenda 
A powerful example of the potential impact of the deployment of human rights arguments in 
climate litigation is represented by the recent landmark case of Urgenda.152 More than in any 
other case, Urgenda, demonstrates the potential for courts to make advancements on the 
question of causation. The Urgenda Foundation, an environmentalist NGO, and 886 
individuals, filed a case against the Netherlands in 2015. The High District Court of The Hague 
ordered the Dutch State to limit its carbon emission levels by to at least 25% by 2020, in 
comparison to its 1990 levels.153 Although this was not a human rights case, as such, the right 
to life, and the right to private and family life, enshrined in articles 2 and 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, respectively, were used to ground the claim in relation to the 
potential violations resulting from climate impacts.154 The District Court upheld the claim on 
the basis of constitutional and civil law,155 the hazardous negligence doctrine,156 and principles 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, particularly the 
precautionary principle.157  
When addressing causation, the District Court found that a sufficient causal link could be 
assumed to exist between the Dutch greenhouse gas emissions, global climate change and the 
present and future effects on the Dutch climate. The Court also found that even though ‘current 
Dutch greenhouse gas emissions’ are limited on a global scale, this does ‘not alter the fact that 
these emissions contribute to climate change’.158 The District Court’s view provides a factual 
approach to addressing causation issues. It overrides the defence argument that it is not possible 
to establish causation for climate impacts due to the global and multiple-sourced character of 
emissions. In this regard, the role of climate science was crucial in informing the District Court 
findings on causation. The District Court relied on the Fourth and Fifth reports of the IPCC to 
reach its finding that the Dutch carbon emissions reduction target was ‘below the standard 
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deemed necessary by climate science and the international climate policy’.159 This led the Court 
to the conclusion that, in order to prevent dangerous climate change, the Netherlands would 
need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 25-40% by 2020 in order to realise the 2°C 
target.160 Climate science was thus critical for the District Court to determine specifically 
whether or not the Dutch emissions reduction target was sufficient.161  
However, the decision was not favourable for the claimants on all fronts. The District Court 
was of the view that Urgenda was not eligible to rely on articles 2 and 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights as  the claimants could not be considered as direct or indirect 
victim, within the meaning of Article 34 of the European Convention.162 Article 34 establishes 
that the Court ‘may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or 
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting 
Parties of the rights set forth’ in the Europena Convention.163 The decision was appealed by the 
government in 2018. The Appeals Court upheld the District Court decision and Urgenda’s 
cross-appeal regarding its eligibility to rely on the rights protected under articles 2 and 8 of the 
European Convention, thereby overturning the initial decision on victim status; and, was against 
the state’s argument about the lack of a causal link because, it found that there was a real risk 
of the danger of climate change for which measures have to be taken now.164 By asserting that 
the only element necessary to establish causation is the existence of ‘a real risk’, the Appeals 
Court provided an approach to surpass recurrent causation barriers in climate litigation.  
The Appeal Court upheld Urgenda’s claims under the European Convention on Human Rights 
and, therefore, overturned the District Court’s arguments based on article 34 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Appeal Court found that Article 34 of the European 
Convention could not serve as a basis for denying Urgenda the possibility of relying on articles 
2 and 8 of the Convention, as Dutch law entails access to Dutch courts.165 Accordingly, the 
Appeal Court found that the state has positive obligations under both articles 2 and 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights ‘to protect the lives of citizens’.166 
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Following the District Court’s approach, the Appeal Court, relying on the IPCC findings on 
climate science to reach its decision, found that the government was acting unlawfully, in 
contravention of the duty of care under Articles 2 and 8 European Convention on Human 
Rights, ‘by failing to pursue a more ambitious reduction as of end-2020, and that the state 
should reduce emissions by at least 25% by end-2020’.167 Given that what was at stake in the 
case was the ‘right’ level of ambition of the target appropriate for the Dutch government to 
effectively contribute to global emissions reductions, the use of climate science was crucial in 
informing both the District Court and the Appeal Court’s decisions. 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in cassation appeal by the government, upheld the previous 
judgements and confirmed their reliance on climate science to reach their findings.168 The 
Supreme Court affirmed that the state’s human rights obligations under Article 2 and Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights are engaged in relation to the risks associated 
with climate change, including when such violations occur over a protracted period of time.169 
Accordingly, it found that ‘[the] European Court of Human Rights has on multiple occasions 
found that Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights  was violated with regard to 
a state's acts or omissions in relation to a natural or environmental disaster’.170 No less 
importantly, the Supreme Court decision also set a risk criteria to determine the existence of a 
state obligation under Article 2 European Convention on Human Rights , in the context of 
climate change. It was of the view that the state ‘is obliged to take appropriate steps if there is 
a real and immediate risk to persons and the state in question is aware of that risk’.171 The Court 
determined 'real and immediate risk' to mean ‘a risk that is both genuine and imminent’ and it 
clarified that ‘the term 'immediate' does not refer to imminence in the sense that the risk must 
materialise within a short period of time, but rather that the risk in question is directly 
threatening the persons involved’. The Court found then that Article 2 of the Convention also 
entails protection from risks that ‘may only materialise in the longer term’.172  
Similarly, in relation to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, on the right to 
private and family life, the Supreme Court reiterated its risk criteria to determine the existence 
of a human rights obligation under its scope. It found that the positive obligation under article 
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requires the state ‘to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect individuals against 
possible serious damage to their environment’.173 The Court specified that the positive 
obligation, like under article 2 applies in the context of longer term risk  and the state is required 
to take measures if serious environmental contamination risks individual well-being or 
enjoyment of  their homes ‘in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely’.174 
The Supreme Court, by confirming the applicability of Article 2 and 8 European Convention 
on Human Rights, affirmed that the risks ’caused by climate change are sufficiently real and 
immediate’ to bring them within the scope of those provisions of the Convention.175 In this way 
the Court recognises climate change as a threat to human rights. The Court’s decision sets a 
precedent for the deployment of human rights considerations in climate litigation. The decision 
also serves to strengthen the fairly recent recognition of the relationship between human rights 
and climate change. In doing so, it builds upon European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence 
involving the application of human rights law in cases where there have been rights harms 
related to the environment.176 The Supreme Court thus develops the application of human rights 
law in cases where rights violations are not necessarily the direct result of climate impacts, but 
the result of insufficient or inexistent climate measures by the state. Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court was of the view that obligations under articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights to take appropriate steps to counter an imminent threat may encompass both 
mitigation and adaptation measures.177 In other words, this means that the absence or 
insufficiency of such climate measures by the state may entail non-compliance with human 
rights obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
In order to assert the obligation of the Dutch State under articles 2 and 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the Supreme Court introduced the risk criteria, which can work 
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as an effective benchmark to determine state compliance with their human rights obligations in 
the context of climate change. According to the Supreme Court, those criteria are fulfilled when, 
first, there is ‘a real and immediate risk to persons’ and when, second, the state in question is 
aware of the risk, even if the risk only materialises in the longer term.178 It should be noted that 
the Supreme Court raised the threshold of the risk criteria established by the Appeal Court, 
which only required a real risk. The Supreme Court added the ‘immediateness’ criteria. 
Accordingly, the mere existence of a risk does not suffice to establish liability for human rights 
violations under articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, according to 
the Supreme Court. It is necessary that such risk actually exists and will produce its effects, 
regardless of the actual time that that risk will take to materialise. In this sense, the Supreme 
Court pertinently added that ‘the term 'immediate' does not refer to imminence in the sense that 
the risk must materialise within a short period of time, but rather that the risk in question is 
directly threatening the persons involved’.179 The focus is on the person impacted by the risks 
of climate change rather than on the point in time when that person may actually suffer the 
materialisation of a risk. The Supreme Court supported its findings through the precautionary 
principle, rejecting the government’s argument that articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights do not entail states obligations to protect against risks of climate change as 
these ‘would not be sufficiently specific’.180 The Court found that: 
The fact that this risk will only be able to materialise a few decades from now and 
that it will not impact specific persons or a specific group of persons, but large parts 
of the population does not mean – contrary to the state's assertions – that Articles 2 
and 8 ECHR offer no protection from this threat … This is consistent with the 
precautionary principle … The mere existence of a sufficiently genuine possibility 
that this risk will materialise means that suitable measures must be taken.181 
In this way, the Supreme Court held that the Dutch State holds precautionary or positive human 
rights obligations in the context of climate change. Such obligations consist of taking 
appropriate steps under articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and of 
undertaking preventive measures ‘to counter the danger, even if the materialisation of that 
danger is uncertain’.182 The Supreme Court concluded, in the human rights maximum point of 
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its judgement, that ‘…the Netherlands is bound by the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Dutch courts are obliged under … the Dutch Constitution to apply its provisions in 
accordance with the interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights. The protection of 
human rights it provides is an essential component of a democratic state under the rule of 
law.’183 
This recognition of the state’s obligations grounded in human rights law paved the way for the 
Supreme Court to assert in turn the obligation of the Dutch government to take mitigation 
measures, thereby linking both fields, human rights, and climate change. The Supreme Court 
accepted the dangers of, and the urgency of, climate change and held that the state was obliged 
to do its part in the interests of the residents of the Netherlands. The Court rooted that duty of 
the government in articles 2 and 8 and in the internationally recognised view that the 
Netherlands, as an Annex I country, under the UNFCC, was required to reduce its emissions.184 
Accordingly, it was on a human rights basis that the Supreme Court upheld the Urgenda claim 
and affirmed the previous Appeal and District Courts’ decisions of ordering the Dutch State an 
emission reduction ‘of at least 25% by 2020. Also, following the previous Courts’ reliance on 
climate science, the Supreme Court considered the 25% target to be the ‘common ground.’185 
This target is based on the ‘large degree of consensus in the international community and 
climate science that at least this reduction by the Annex I countries, including the Netherlands, 
is urgently needed’186 The Court went even further by setting the 25% target ‘as an absolute 
minimum’, again, with the assistance of human rights considerations related to the positive 
obligations under Articles 2 and 8 European Convention on Human Rights to take appropriate 
measures to prevent dangerous climate change.187  
Having resolved the state obligation to reduce its emissions, in order to establish causation, the 
Supreme Court relied, inter alia, on Article 47 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of states 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts.188 This article provides that ‘where several states are 
responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, the responsibility of each state may be 
invoked in relation to that act’.189 Accordingly, the Supreme Court took the approach, in line 
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with the ‘no harm principle’,190 that ‘partial causation’191 justifies partial responsibility: ‘each 
country is responsible for its part and can therefore be called to account in that respect’.192 In 
this vein, as the Supreme Court summarises: ‘partial fault’ also justifies partial 
responsibility’.193 The legal value of this finding is that it partly removes the burden of proof 
on the claimant to demonstrate the causal link as it relies on the fact that the state has partly 
contributed to climate change, regardless of its actual contributions to global emissions, and its 
actual effects upon individual human rights. In this way, the Supreme Court discards the 
(common) defence argument that its ‘own share in global greenhouse gas emissions is very 
small and that reducing emissions from one’s own territory makes little difference on a global 
scale’.194 This approach can facilitate other courts in relaxing causation barriers in subsequent 
claims and, at the same, as Nollkaemper and Burgers note, assist as a ‘basis for the allocation 
of responsibility for the harmful effects of climate change to multiple contributing actors’.195 
Urgenda provides significant insights for overcoming the causation challenges and will 
potentially be considered in future claims to establish liability for contributions to climate 
change.196 Non-compliance with these obligations, either due to absence or insufficiency of 
adequate mitigation and adaptation measures would trigger state liability for human rights 
harms resulting from climate impacts. Indeed, Urgenda represents an early example of the 
potential of human rights considerations - even if these are not central in a case - to prompt 
more ambitious climate action, which can be developed in future claims, including, aspects 
limitedly addressed in Urgenda, such as extraterritoriality issues. For instance, Urgenda takes 
a restrictive approach to extraterritorial challenges when establishing the causal link. This is 
especially relevant in the context of climate litigation given the transboundary nature of climate 
change. For instance, the District Court was of the view that ‘Urgenda can partially base its 
claims on the fact that the Dutch emissions also have consequences for persons outside the 
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Dutch national borders, since these claims are directed at such emissions’.197 In this way, it 
differentiates between the consequences of Dutch emissions in and outside borders and, 
accordingly, implicitly restricts its view to a territorial scope. Further, as Nollkaemper and 
Burgers observe, the Supreme Court judgement does not explicitly follow the Inter-American 
Court of Human Right’s approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction.198 The Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights  held that “jurisdiction,” … is not limited to the national territory of a state 
but contemplates circumstances in which the extraterritorial conduct of a state constitutes an 
exercise of its jurisdiction’.199 Nevertheless, although Urgenda’s impact in terms of 
contribution to global mitigation efforts may be ‘very minor’, as the Dutch State argued in its 
defence;200 its wider effect to limit states’ emissions levels, regardless how minimum these 
could be in comparison to those from other states, can be expanded through subsequent climate 
litigation. 
‘Successful’ cases, like Urgenda and the Advisory Opinion, and even ‘unsuccessful’ ones, like 
the Inuit petition play an important role in shaping the development of human rights 
performance in the context of climate change, thereby contributing to overcoming causation 
and other legal challenges in climate litigation. As such, they represent steppingstones towards 
establishing responsibility for climate-led harms to rights and the environment, not only by 
states but also potentially by corporations. The latter are probably the hardest to find liable for 
their contributions to climate change as they continue to operate in something of a ‘legal 
vacuum’. Developments on attribution science and climate litigation addressing attribution 
hurdles may also help to this end.    
3.2 Attributing Emissions to its Sources 
Causation and attribution are distinctly linked to climate science. While causation focuses on 
identifying the causal link between human activity and its effect on the climate, attribution aims 
to trace the sources of the actions contributing to the climate change effect. The multiplicity of 
sources contributing to climate change raises the question of the extent to which each source 
has contributed to climate change, and the question of the share of responsibility which must 
be apportioned between the different contributing sources. For claimants, in order to establish 
liability in rights-based climate litigation, it may be required to prove that a specific actor, either 
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a state or corporation, has contributed to climate change to a given extent causing human rights 
violations. The complexity of attribution and apportionment lies then in, first, specifying the 
actors contributing to the problem out of multiple sources over a long period of time, given the 
cumulative character of climate change; and second, determining the corresponding share 
between each of those sources during a certain timeframe. In rights-based claims, claimants 
would have to prove that climate change impacts result from the emissions generated by a 
specific emitter, which have impacted an individual or group in such a way as to cause a 
violation of rights.201 In addition, given that global emissions are produced by multiple sources, 
the added challenge is to determine the share of the total of global emissions between specific 
contributors, either states or corporations, and its link to a specific human right violation.202  
Developments in climate science are helping to overcome those attribution challenges with 
increasing accuracy.203 This has helped to elucidate where the main responsible sources of the 
problem are. As a result, claims are increasingly being directed at seeking the liability of those 
sources. For instance, Heede’s scientific study204 shows that ‘only 90 corporations caused two-
thirds of man-made global warming emissions’,205 leading to climate change effects, which in 
turn adversely impact human rights. Yet, the multiplicity of emitters contributing on different 
scales to climate change creates serious legal attribution challenges to determine the liability of 
a specific contributor. In this regard, Faure and Nollkaemper, in discussing individual, joint and 
several liability, query whether a joint and several liability rule could be applied or whether 
individual liability would apply thereby requiring victims to take a high number of lawsuits: 
[By] assuming that the damage to the victim is proportional to the emissions by 
particular states or actors, the question still arises of what the consequence will be 
when the particular contribution of each actor has been determined: is each held 
liable separately for his own emissions (with the consequence that the victim has to 
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bring a high number of lawsuits) or can a joint and several liability rule be 
applied?206 
If establishing states’ liability for contributions to climate change is a complex exercise, then 
establishing corporate liability for climate-led harms may be considered almost impossible at 
this stage, given the existing lack of consensus on the content and scope of corporate human 
rights obligations. However, the several liability rule could help to address liability obstacles: 
‘if it cannot be established who of the many tortfeasors contributed to a certain loss to a specific 
extent, all of them will be held jointly and severally liable. The effect is that the victim can 
choose to sue any of the injurers falling within the joint and several liability regimes and claim 
full compensation from any of them’.207 In fact, this is partly the reasoning used by the Supreme 
Court in Urgenda where the Court rejected the defendant’s argument relying on the multiplicity 
of sources and the minimal amount that the Dutch State’s emissions represent compared to the 
total of global emissions.208 
The criteria to establish attribution and apportionment of responsibility for rights harms 
resulting from climate change remains underdeveloped. However, recent innovative rights-
based claims targeting corporations have started to crop up on the climate litigation scene 
providing new insights to overcome these challenges. This is exemplified by the renowned 
‘Carbon Majors’ case,209 targeting corporations for climate-led impacts on human rights.  
3.2.1. The Carbon Majors Case 
In the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, which severely hit The Philippines,210 in 2015, a group of 
Filipino individuals and a group of civil society organisations led by Greenpeace South Asia 
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presented an inquiry to the Commission on Human Rights of The Philippines (the 
‘Commission’) to investigate the responsibility of 50 fossil fuel, gas and coal corporations (the 
‘Carbon Majors’) for ‘human rights violations or threats of violations resulting from the 
impacts of climate change’.211 The petition was mainly grounded on Filipino constitutional 
rights and the ‘relevant international human rights instruments’.212  It inquired about the Carbon 
Majors’ responsibility for the climate impacts to the Filipinos’ rights to life, to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health; to food; to water; to sanitation; to adequate 
housing; to self-determination; and it addressed ‘those particularly likely to be affected by 
climate change’,213 including certain environmental rights, such as the rights to health and a 
balanced and healthful ecology. 
The inquiry was accepted by the Commission based on its constitutional mandate, which 
establishes that the Commission has the power to ‘[i]nvestigate, on its own or on complaint by 
any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights’.214 However, 
the Commission is not a judicial body per se and has only declaratory power,215 therefore, its 
findings are not legally binding upon the ‘parties’ to the inquiry. Yet, some respondent 
corporations challenged the Commission’s authority to investigate the case in their response to 
its invitation to provide their views.216 The Commission, however, decided to proceed with the 
investigation ‘[w]ith or without the participation of the respondents, in respect of its 
constitutional mandate’.217  
After several years of investigation and hearings with the participation of Filipino victims of 
climate change, scientists, lawyers and experts, the Commission announced its findings in the 
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Carbon Majors inquiry, in the margins of the UNFCCC Conference of States Parties (COP25), 
in December 2019. Although, at the time of writing, the Commission has not yet released its 
final report, according to the Chair Commissioner, Roberto Cádiz, the Commission found that 
the Carbon Majors ‘could be found legally and morally liable for human rights harms to 
Filipinos resulting from climate change’.218 The Commission also found that ‘relevant criminal 
intent may exist to hold companies accountable under civil and criminal laws, in light of certain 
circumstances involving obstruction, wilful obfuscation and climate denial’.219 These 
preliminary findings suggest potential avenues that can be explored by litigants to establish 
accountability of corporations for disproportionate emissions’ contributions leading to  climate 
change, which may benefit from increasing developments in the field of climate science.220 In 
fact, the Carbon Majors case raises important questions about corporate liability for rights 
harms resulting from climate impacts to which they contribute through disproportional emitting 
activity. Given that claims alleging human rights violations associated with climate change-
may likely continue to grow in the near future, the application of the ‘joint liability but 
individual accountability’ notion may increasingly be explored in climate litigation.  
At the same time, other forms of liability may be explored such as criminal prosecution of CEOs 
of corporations historically and disproportionally contributing to climate change. For example, 
US Senator Sanders proposed in a Democratic Presidential debate to criminally prosecute fossil 
fuels executives ‘because they have lied and lied and lied when they had the evidence that their 
carbon products were destroying the planet’.221 Likewise, in scholarly work, the notion of 
ecocide has been suggested in order to prosecute the Chief Executives of corporations for their 
responsibility in their corporations’ conduct contributing to climate change.222  
Overall, despite the Commissions’ limited power, the Carbon Majors case opens the door for 
the initial scrutiny of the responsibility of corporations for rights violations resulting from 
climate impacts in the context of climate litigation. Yet, the ability of claimants to creatively 
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ground claims in the blurred zone of corporate human rights obligations, and the receptivity of 
courts to this kind of claims remains to be seen. 
3.2.2 Lliuya v RWE 
Indeed, the receptivity of courts to claims alleging rights harms caused by corporations’ 
emissions contributing to climate change has started to be tested. In Lliuya v. RWE AG,223 for 
example, a Peruvian farmer filed a claim against a German corporation, RWE, the largest 
energy corporation in Europe, before the Essen Regional Court of Germany in 2015. The claim 
sought the court’s adjudication on RWE’s responsibility for its contributions to climate change 
as well as reimbursement for damages for the impairment of the claimant’s property rights 
under German Civil Law.224 The claimant argued that the high emissions levels from the 
corporation were causing the melting of glaciers in the Andes region, where Huaraz, his home 
city, is located. Specifically, he alleged that the melting of glaciers near Huaraz are causing a 
notable increase in the water-levels of the Palcacoha glacial lake, which poses an imminent 
threat of flooding and would negatively impact his family life and property rights as well as his 
home city.225 The claimant also sought reimbursement from RWE for adaptation costs incurred 
to protect his property and home city from potential floods and costs for damages based on 
RWE’s emissions contribution per year.226 Based on emissions contributions from RWE, the 
claimant provided the amount of share attributable to it out of the total emissions227 in order to 
calculate compensation costs. 
Lliuya relied on German Civil Law, property rights legislation,228 and recent climate 
jurisprudence to support his claim. This included the renowned findings of the The Hague 
District Court judgment in Urgenda, as well as ‘joint liability’229 arguments in order to address 
causation and attribution challenges. Lliuya argued that, ‘[with] regard to the impairment 
through multiple disturbers [joint liability], the owner can take action against each one 
according to its causational contribution’,230 thereby reserving his ability to sue other polluters.  
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The Essen District Court dismissed the claim. It found it was ‘impossible to identify anything 
resembling a linear chain of causation from one particular source of emission to one particular 
damage’.231 This reflects the prevailing difficulty in overcoming causation and attribution to 
establish the link between the act generating emissions by a specific ‘major’ emitter and the 
rights harms resulting from that act. Accordingly, the Court was of the view that ‘every 
emission may be causational for the state of the climate as it presents itself today, but this 
assessment has no bearing on the question of legal attribution to individual emitters’.232 The 
claim also would not have satisfied attribution as the Essen District Court found that 
‘[irrespective] of the fact that equivalent causation is negated in the context of cumulative 
damages, the contribution of individual … emitters to climate change is so small that any single 
emitter, even a major one such as the defendant, does not substantially increase the effects of 
climate change’.233  
The decision was appealed and admitted by the High Regional Court of Hamm, which requested 
the parties to provide expert opinion in order to evidence causation and risks associated to it as 
well as the ‘defendant’s share in the contributory causation [accounting] for 0.47%’.234 At the 
time of writing, the decision is still pending. However, the admission of the case, the call to 
parties to provide additional evidence, and overturn of the Essen District Court’s judgement by 
the High Court of Hamm already represents an important achievement. The Court found that 
‘it is enough that [RWE] emissions are partially responsible for the actual, present risk [of flood 
in Huaraz]. There is no basis in the law to argue that partial causation does not exist in this 
case’.235 Certainly, given the multisource nature of climate change, causation will always be 
partial and trigger the use of attribution science in order to apportion the share of emissions 
contribution corresponding to each source. So, not only is there no reason to rule out corporate 
responsibility but, also, partial responsibility will always be the case as a premise. This, 
transferred to Lliuya, means that while RWE is not wholly responsible for emissions causing 
climate-led impacts to rights, RWE is still partially responsible for them and, as such, should 
be held accountable for its share of responsibility. Consequently, irrespective of its outcome, 
Lliuya may set a precedent in rights-based claims targeting corporations and prompt more cases 
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arguing impingement to rights by them using rights language.236 Ganguly, Setzer and Heyvaert, 
noting the proliferation of such arguments, remark on the possibility of climate change ‘no 
longer being represented before the court as a diffuse and general problem caused by myriad 
unknown and unidentifiable sources’ rather, it could be represented ‘as the consequence of a 
specific set of choices and actions, undertaken by a discrete group of well-informed actors, 
which causes particular and measurable damage’.237 
Lliuya, certainly, provides positive insights in the effort to overcome attribution challenges in 
future climate litigation as well as causation and extraterritoriality challenges. So far, the 
admission of the case by the High Court of Hamm implies opening the door for consideration 
of the possibility of establishing corporate responsibility for their emissions contributions to 
climate change leading to rights harms, regardless if they amount only to a (small) portion of 
the total amount of emissions contributions, or if the effects of climate change are felt thousands 
of kilometres distance from the emitting corporation’s jurisdiction. That is the complexity of 
climate change. It challenges traditional understandings, including those related to the 
implications of individual actions and, in consequence, the understanding of the application of 
laws that challenge unquestioned territorial and temporal notions in law and, in particular, in 
human rights law. This entails, inter alia, the reconsideration of intergenerational rights in 
human rights law, so relevant in the context of climate change, and increasingly present in 
emerging rights-based climate litigation, discussed hereby.   
3.3 Extratemporality: Climate Change, Human Rights and Future Generations 
In the context of climate change is worth to consider the temporal dimension of implicit (legal 
understandings): whilst the behaviour causing climate change is, generally, conceived as an 
action performed in the past, its effects upon rights and the environment only become 
recognisable over time, meaning in the present and in the future.238 As a result, under this 
understanding, climate change can be considered as a slow form of violence. As Nixon states: 
‘slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat 
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multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for 
sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.’239 In the case of climate change, 
future victims of climate impacts, as rights’ holders, seem to be always out of view. This is in 
part because law and, specifically, international human rights law does not recognise the rights 
of future generations, in a comparable way to present existing human beings. As Fisher argues, 
‘there might be no appropriate claimant to vindicate the rights of groups of people affected by 
climate change, particularly those of future generations. Climate change has widely dispersed 
social impacts and so does not fit easily into the individualised legal paradigm of human 
rights’.240  
Nixon provides an illuminating framework for understanding these dispersed impacts. He coins 
the phrase slow violence to distinguish between highly visible and newsworthy forms of 
violence ‘immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space…erupting in to sensational 
visibility’ and ‘violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction 
that is dispersed across time and space, an attrition violence that is typically not viewed as 
violence at all’. 241 He argues that ‘the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we 
perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions….in particular, environmental 
calamities’.242 Nixon argues that we urgently need to rethink how we see the slow violence that 
animates climate change. As he notes: ‘Stories of toxic build-up, massing greenhouses gases, 
and accelerated species loss due to ravaged habitats are all cataclysmic, but they are 
scientifically convoluted cataclysms in which casualties are postponed often for generations’.243 
Nixon’s examination of slow violence provides a useful language which can help to illuminate 
the blind-spots in human rights law, such as future generations and the environment. Human 
rights law tends to prioritize the immediate and the spectacular and fails to see the slow violence 
that characterizes climate change, environmental calamity, and the lives of future generations. 
Impacts that are dispersed widely over time and space and slow violence pose a real challenge 
for the existing human rights law framework which is largely concerned with the here and now.  
In the context of climate litigation, it is already complex to prove imminent or actual climate 
impacts on the rights of present individuals and groups; our existing tools and priorities make 
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it doubly difficult to imagine how we legally represent rights violations which will materialise 
in the future, impacting future generations rights. In a similar vein to how Nixon urges a 
reimagining of slow violence, it is necessary to challenge human rights law temporalities. Lewis 
remarks on both the necessity and the difficulty of seeing future generations within the 
international human rights framework:  
[A] number of legal, practical, and political challenges remain to be overcome 
before international human rights can be employed effectively to address climate 
change. These challenges exist when the rights holders concerned are members of 
contemporary generations but are even more problematic when attempting to 
extend the application of the law to future generations.244 
In this sense, the context of climate change has the potential to push human rights law 
boundaries, triggering its evolution in a way to capture elements a priori ignored, such as future 
generations and the as yet unrecognized, in international human rights law, right to a healthy 
environment. Tremmel defines ‘future generation’ as a generation where ‘none of its members 
is alive at the time the reference is made’.245 The idea of the rights of future generations 
exemplifies how human rights law fails to embrace the rights of future generations in the same 
way as present generations; as such, only existing human beings are considered to fall under its 
scope of protection.246 Atapattu remarks that international human rights law does not yet 
recognise a right to a healthy environment as a human right, despite the close link between 
environmental degradation and the enjoyment of rights.247 
In the context of climate change, its extra-temporal character of climate change and its effects 
trigger fundamental questions about the applicability of human rights law to future generations. 
As Browne identifies, ‘the effects of climate change are not linear and may materialise or be 
realised over different time scales and spatial scales. This raises the question of whether a 
plaintiff might sue on behalf of future generations who may not yet even be born but who may 
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suffer the consequences of climate change as a result of current activities’.248 However, it should 
be borne in mind that the challenge presented by the extra-temporal dimension of climate 
change also affects the rights of currently young generations which, along with future 
generations, will be less able than current generations to enjoy, for instance, their right to food 
due to the increasingly long and intense droughts in some areas of the planet, which may only 
be aggravated in the future.249 In this regard, Tremmel argues for an inclusive understanding of 
intergenerational justice, through the term ‘succeeding generations’: 
Unlike the term ‘future’, the term ‘succeeding’ generations includes not only 
unborn generations but also present children and adolescents. In many 
respects, it makes no difference for a theory of an intergenerationally just 
distribution of resources and life-chances whether a child was born yesterday 
or will be born tomorrow. In both cases, it has a life to live and should be 
protected against intergenerational injustice. 250 
This need to account for succeeding generations has been reflected in a number of recent claims 
brought by or on behalf of children before courts worldwide,251 enabling the rights of future 
generations as a matter of intergenerational justice. These cases have brought attention to extra-
temporal challenges to the application of human rights in the context of climate change. 
Current climate policies and human rights provisions are inadequate protection for the rights of 
future generations. For instance, the Paris Agreement makes very limited and generic references 
‘to intergenerational equity’ and it excludes a specific reference to future generations.252 
However, as Lewis has noted, the Paris Agreement does not specify, in its human rights 
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reference in the Preamble, that it applies to current generations only; accordingly, it could be  
argued that it ‘makes space for the rights of future generations’.253 Yet, as Lewis further notes, 
‘the preambular statement is vague … the language is not especially demanding –and its 
position in the Preamble leaves it without much legal force’.254 As a result, it can be inferred 
that neither human rights law nor the climate regime are equipped to protect future generations’ 
rights. It is thus necessary to rethink human rights law to embrace the respect and protection of 
the rights of future generations, a group especially vulnerable and disproportionally affected by 
climate change impacts resulting from decisions and actions taken by past and present 
generations; decisions in which they did not have a say at all. In this context, rights-based 
climate litigation may provide an avenue to develop innovative approaches to address such 
limitations in human rights law. One such innovation, as Johnston argues, is to grant future 
generations legal standing in climate change litigation. Climate litigation could, then, provide 
a means to challenge, as Johnston puts it, ‘the “intergenerational buck passing” of the current 
generation who benefits from passing on the costs and harms of their behaviour to future ones 
due to the time lag effect of climate change’.255 Recent climate litigation addressing 
intergenerational issues from a rights perspective has opened the door to this approach of 
making claims on behalf of young and future generations.  
3.3.1. Intergenerational Climate Justice in the United States: Not Quite Ready? 
Juliana et al v. the United States is one such case which revolves around the rights of future 
generations.256 When the case was filed in 2015, it was novel. This was the first time that a case 
involving children and young claimants invoking the rights of future generations was brought 
before a national court. Since then, several cases invoking the rights of future generations have 
been filed in different jurisdictions. These cases, irrespective of their outcome, have garnered 
wide public attention.257  
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In Juliana, a group of twenty-one young claimants, filed a claim against the government of the 
United States and other government agencies before the District Court of Oregon. The claimants 
sought declaratory relief, arguing that defendants have violated and are violating claimants 
‘fundamental constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property. Defendants’ acts also 
discriminate against these young citizens, who will disproportionately experience the 
destabilized climate system’.258 The claim also sought an injunctive relief order for the 
government to undertake various actions aimed at drastically reducing its emissions.259 The 
claimants argued that government actions in support of fossil fuel activities ‘have knowingly 
endangered Plaintiffs’ health and welfare by approving and promoting fossil fuel development, 
including exploration, extraction, production, transportation, importation, exportation, and 
combustion, and by subsidizing and promoting … fossil fuel exploitation… These deliberate 
actions by Defendants  [they further argued] ‘have cumulatively resulted in dangerous levels of 
atmospheric CO2, which deprive Plaintiffs of their fundamental rights to life, liberty, and 
property’.260 The claim was based, then, on the constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property 
and on due process rights under the Fifth Amendment,261 as well as the public trust doctrine.262 
The claimants claimed that they are holders of the ‘inherent, inalienable, natural, and 
fundamental rights [to] a stable climate system and an atmosphere and oceans that are free from 
dangerous levels of anthropogenic CO2’.263 By doing so, the claimants alleged that the 
government ‘dangerously interferes with a stable climate system and violates Plaintiffs’ 
constitutional rights’.264   
The defendants made several attempts to dismiss or delay the case. They, for instance, filed a 
motion to dismiss, challenging the Court’s authority to hear the claim on the basis of the 
separation of powers doctrine.265 They argued that the claimants had failed ‘to allege 
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particularized harm traceable to defendants’ acts’,266 thus, they argued the claimants lacked 
standing. However, the claimants were able to overcome some of those attempts.267 For 
instance, in response to a motion to dismiss from the industry as intervenors, Judge Aiken from 
the District Court of Oregon ordered rejection of the motion. She found that ‘the right to a 
climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society’ 
and she held that ‘a stable climate system is quite literally the foundation “of society without 
which there would be neither civilization nor progress”’.268  
In addition, in relation to the claimants’ lack of standing alleged by the defendants, Judge Aiken, 
reasoning on the imminence requirement for standing, found convincing the youth plaintiffs 
arguments that harm was ongoing and was likely to continue in the future and that this was 
sufficient to satisfy the imminence requirement: ‘By alleging injuries that are concrete, 
particularized, and actual or imminent, plaintiffs have satisfied the first prong of the standing 
test’.269 This recalls the ‘present and imminent risk’ criteria developed in Urgenda as the 
admissibility threshold in rights-based claims. In addition, Judge Aiken found that the claimants 
‘have adequately alleged harm to public trust assets’ because some of their ‘injuries relate to 
the effects of ocean acidification and rising ocean temperatures’,270 developing in this way the 
causal link between climate harms and their actual impacts on individuals’ rights.  
Judge Aiken’s reasoning provides a sign of willingness to hear, or at least, openness to hearing, 
young and future generations’ claims by the judiciary. She pointed out that ‘Federal courts too 
often have been cautious and overly deferential in the arena of environmental law, and the world 
has suffered for it.’271 This kind of view may help to overcome additional standing obstacles 
that young and future generations face in climate litigation, despite being the most vulnerable 
and disproportionally affected by climate impacts. While rights-based claims technically cannot 
be filed by members of future generations per se, as they technically do not exist yet, claims 
filed by children and youth are made ‘on behalf’ of young and future generations.  
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Subsequently, the defendants appealed the District Court’s decision. They requested to dismiss 
the case on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Thus, the request was denied and the 
District Court’s decision stayed.272 In 2020, in a divided order by the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, two of the three judges found that, while recognizing the need for ‘adoption of a 
comprehensive scheme to decrease fossil fuel emissions and combat climate change … it was 
beyond the power of the court to order, design, supervise, or implement the plaintiffs’ requested 
remedial plan’. 273 As a result, the Ninth Circuit found that ‘any effective plan would necessarily 
require … the wisdom and discretion of the executive and legislative branches’.274 Accordingly, 
it concluded that whilst the plaintiffs had made a compelling case, the issue was one for the 
political branches and not the court. The Court was unambiguous about the need for climate 
action. The Court recognised the weak record of governmental climate action and noted: ‘it will 
be increasingly difficult in light of that record for the political branches to deny that climate 
change is occurring, that the government has had a role in causing it, and that our elected 
officials have a moral responsibility to seek solutions’. 275  The Court also recognised the 
political value of the plaintiffs’ case which could ‘well goad the political branches into action’. 
276 But the Court, nevertheless, found the claim nonjusticiable: We reluctantly conclude…that 
the plaintiffs’ case must be made to the political branches or to the electorate at large...That the 
other branches may have abdicated their responsibility to remediate the problem does not confer 
on Article III courts, no matter how well-intentioned, the ability to step into their shoes’.277 
With this decision the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision taken by the District Court and 
‘preserved’ the separation of powers doctrine, despite acknowledging the need for climate 
action and the potential impact of the claim in generating climate action within the United 
States. Contrary to this view, Judge Staton, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed with the 
decision to dismiss on the grounds of the questions of justiciability, holding that the ‘mere fact 
that this suit cannot alone halt climate change does not mean that it presents no claim suitable 
for judicial resolution’.278 He did not hold back both on his ire at governmental inaction and the 
decision to dismiss, arguing that the ‘government accepts as fact that the United States has 
reached a tipping point crying out for a concerted response - yet presses ahead toward 
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calamity... Seeking to quash this suit, the government bluntly insists that it has the absolute and 
unreviewable power to destroy the Nation’.279 
This view, in addition to the previous District Court’s findings, only confirm the increasing 
receptivity of judges to rights-based claims, including those brought by children or youth on 
the basis of ongoing and future rights harms, even if this implies pushing to its limits the 
sacredness of the separation of powers. Considering the significant role that the United States 
plays as a contributor to climate change through its emissions,280 the potential impact of these 
types of claim, which are cropping up in different courts,281 is not insignificant. Despite the 
reversal at the Ninth Circuit Court, the case may trigger further climate litigation, especially of 
claims involving future generations’ rights. In addition, the youth claimants continue to push 
ahead with their claims in this case. Following the Ninth Circuit decision, the claimants filed a 
petition for rehearing en banc their claim,282 the outcome of which is, at the time of writing, 
still pending. 
3.3.2 Intergenerational Climate Justice in Colombia: Rethinking Time and Environment 
In Colombia, in 2018, in the Future Generations v. Ministry of the Environment and Others 
case,283 children and youth filed an injunction claim to protect fundamental rights, a tutela or 
legal guardianship, in the Superior Tribunal of Bogota. The claimants alleged that the grievous 
deforestation in the Colombian Amazonia, the source of 89% of Colombia’s total emissions,284 
is causing global warming,285 which violates their constitutional right to enjoy a healthy 
environment.286 With the use of constitutional rights arguments, the claimants alleged that the 
violation of their right to enjoy a healthy environment threatens ‘their rights to life, health, food, 
water as members of the future generation who will face the effects of climate change in our 
country’.287 The Tutela was denied by the Tribunal as it found that acción popular, a collective 
rights-based injunction was the most ‘idoneous and efficient’ means to obtain the protection 
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claimed.288 On appeal, the Supreme Court, instead, revoked the previous decision and granted 
the legal guardianship to the youth claimants.  
This innovative judgement develops the linkages between the need for a healthy environment, 
the realization of fundamental rights and the rights of future generations. The Supreme Court 
upheld the interdependence of both rights and rights in relation to the environment, arguing that 
‘the fundamental rights of life, health, the minimum subsistence, freedom, and human dignity 
are substantially linked and determined by the environment and the ecosystem’.289 The Court 
then linked this interdependence of rights to intergenerational climate justice: ‘Without a 
healthy environment, subjects of law and sentient beings in general will not be able to survive, 
much less protect those rights, for our children or for future generations. Neither can the 
existence of the family, society or the state itself be guaranteed’.290 
In noting this dependency of subjects of law and sentient beings on a healthy environment and 
in understanding ‘sentient beings’, as comprising all other living beings, the Supreme Court 
took a novel step towards the recognition of the importance of ‘sentient’ beings, otherwise 
neglected as legal subjects. The Court, thus, moves away from the traditionally anthropocentric 
notion of human rights law in which human beings occupy a central and overarching place in 
relation to the elements of the environment; in which the environment and its components fulfil 
a utilitarian function only.  
Whilst the Court remains unavoidably anthropocentric in essence provides insights to rethink 
the human rights’ relational approach to the environment and its elements, which can gradually 
evolve in a way to consider human beings as part of the environment, an environment, whose 
components could also be subjects of rights. This does not mean that the rights of the 
environment should mirror the rights of humans. As Stone highlights, ‘to say that the 
environment should have rights is not to say that it should have every right we can imagine, or 
even the same body of rights as human beings have. Nor is it to say that everything in the 
environment should have the same rights as every other thing in the environment’.291 The Tutela 
case shows, however, that courts are starting to accept what, in the words of Stone, was the 
‘unthinkable’, by recognising sentient beings, other than humans, as interdependent on a 
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healthy environment. Such an approach is, thus far, at least, uncommon and time can only tell 
if other courts and actors will follow suit.  
The Colombian Supreme Court acknowledged the inextricable connection between the 
deforestation of the Amazon and the resulting ‘short, medium, and long term imminent and 
serious damage’292 to the rights of present and future generations. It found that: 
The increasing deterioration of the environment is a serious attack on current and 
future life and on other fundamental rights; it gradually depletes life and all its 
related rights. The inability to exercise the fundamental rights to water, to breathe 
pure air, and to enjoy a healthy environment is making Colombians sick. 293   
The Court observed that this was an exceptional proceeding but the invocative connection it 
made between fundamental rights and the environment facilitated the Court’s decision: ‘…in 
this case, the exceptional proceeding of the Tutela is sufficiently demonstrated to resolve in 
depth the problems raised, because the jurisprudential assumptions for this purpose are met, 
given the connectedness of the environment with fundamental rights.294 By connecting the 
harms to the environment with harms to rights, both of present and future generations, the 
Supreme Court adopts a temporal logic which projects human rights to cover the rights of as 
yet inexistent humans. In this way, as in the case of the environment, it develops the traditional 
application of human rights.  
Reflecting on our obsession with the present and short-termism of human rights, Humphreys 
notes: ‘We seem addicted to a present that we are unable to conceive of as our past, while the 
future seems to recede further and further out of reach’.295 Humphreys argues that we need to 
rethink time. The need to rethink time also applies to human rights law. It is necessary to rethink 
the temporal application of human rights law, to include future rights holders now. As such, the 
Colombian Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that the protection of fundamental rights 
involves not only protecting the existing individual but also the ‘other’ including the unborn, 
who will also need to have the ability of enjoyment of the rights that human beings in the present 
have., represents an evolution towards a wider understanding of the temporalities of human 
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rights law, in light of the protracted temporality of climate change. Accordingly, as Setzer and 
Benjamin have noted ‘the decision applied the same constitutional provisions used for the 
protection of the environment for current generations, but this time to protect future generations, 
thereby substantially expanding the limits of such rights’.296 
It is thus in light of these developments of traditional human rights notions, including the 
explicit acknowledgement of the environment and future generations as ‘subject’ entities falling 
under the scope of human rights protections, that the Supreme Court concludes that ‘in order to 
protect this ecosystem vital for our global future, just as the Constitutional Court declared the 
Atrato river, the Colombian Amazon is recognized as a “subject of rights,” entitled to 
protection, conservation, maintenance and restoration led by the State and the territorial 
agencies’.297 Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the claimants petition and ordered the 
Colombian government to prepare, within five months, ‘an “intergenerational pact for the life 
of the Colombian Amazon’. It ordered the government ‘to adopt measures aimed at reducing 
deforestation to zero and greenhouse gas emissions, and …, directed towards climate change 
adaptation’.298 However, the ability to enforce the decision is a different story, and this remains 
to be seen. According to Dejusticia, the environmental non-governmental organisations that 
supported the young claimants’ Tutela petition, one year after the decision, deforestation in 
Colombia continues at a high level, with only minimal responses from the Colombian 
government.299  
Nevertheless, the recognition of a relationship between human beings, the environment, and 
future generations, as developed in Tutela, is significant step towards overcoming the 
challenges of the extra-temporal dimension of human rights, particularly in the context of 
climate change. In order to overcome legal technicalities of standing, present young generations 
can act ‘as surrogates for future generations’.300 For the environment, the designation of an 
authority, for instance, an Ombudsman for the environment or an indigenous group traditionally 
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linked to an ecosystem, to act as ‘guardians’ of the environment or its components, can 
overcome the problem of achieving standing before courts.301  
This does not dispel the very real challenges. As Lewis, reflects, ‘challenges exist when the 
rights holders concerned are members of contemporary generations, but are even more 
problematic when attempting to extend the application of the law to future generations’.302 
Tutela, however, sets an important precedent in climate jurisprudence, which will likely trigger 
similar claims seeking recognition of rights for other components of the environment, whose 
conservation ‘is a national and global obligation’,303 for the good of present and future 
generations, and all sentient beings. In the case of the Amazon, the obligation to protect is 
pressing; it is ‘the main environmental axis of the planet…the “lung of the world...”’.304 
3.4 Extraterritoriality: Pushing the Borders of Human Rights 
Clearly, the temporalities of climate change pose a challenge to the temporal dimensions of 
human rights law – as we have seen, climate change demands human rights law to take a leap 
in to the future. The geographic scope of climate change poses yet an additional challenge. 
Climate change is oblivious to borders and territorial limits. Its impacts, whilst uneven, are 
transnational and global. International human rights law, however, whilst universal in 
aspiration, has prescribed territorial jurisdictional limits. Simply put, the applicability of human 
rights law outside the jurisdiction of a given state is complex and is far from settled, even in the 
context of the common and ‘universal’ concern of climate change.  
Whilst human rights treaty bodies and courts have to some extent recognised the extraterritorial 
application of human rights, in certain circumstances, that application remains ‘controversial, 
because it is usually assumed that the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights 
have territorial application’.305 Article 2(1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
for example, can be interpreted narrowly as applying only ‘within [a State] territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction’.306 So, while the word and, from a grammatical point of view, can be 
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interpreted restrictively, as Milanovic points out, ‘the object and purpose of a treaty are 
considerations that must be taken into account when interpreting it’, as such, Milanovic argues 
that an interpretation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ‘which favours universality 
and human dignity is within the limits of textual vagueness or ambiguity by definition 
preferable to an interpretation which runs against the grain of the treaty’.307 Yet, although it is 
technically possible to interpret human rights provisions in a more or less restrictive way, there 
seems to be a ‘general consensus …that civil and political rights operate territorially.308 The 
widely debated Banković v Belgium309 case before the European Court of Human Rights 
provides a ‘classical’ example of narrow territorial interpretation of Civil and Political Rights. 
310 Thereby, the Court developed the ‘effective control’ criteria, whereby ‘an obligation arises 
where a State is in effective control of a particular territory in a sense of exercising some sort 
of public power…(i.e. acts of State agents abroad)’.311 In the context of climate crisis, a narrow 
interpretation of human rights obligations is problematic because climate change, at difference 
of a ‘classical’ ‘crisis, which is generally circumscribed to a given geographical area where the 
crisis arises or develops; the context of climate change is borderless. The actions leading to 
climate change as well as the victims who feel its effects are disperse. 
On the other hand, Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights provides that the Parties ‘[undertake] to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum 
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant’.312 The provision does not make reference to territory or 
jurisdiction. General Comment 24 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
finds, however, that ‘extraterritorial obligations of States under the Covenant follow from the 
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fact that the obligations of the Covenant are expressed without any restriction linked to territory 
or jurisdiction’.313  
Yet, the extraterritorial application of human rights continues being problematic and contested 
and it is not clear how this can be overcome in the climate change context. In his report on the 
issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and 
sustainable environment, the former UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the 
Environment, has noted the complexity of the application of human rights given the geography 
of climate change: 
Apart from questions of causation and responsibility, the nature of 
climate change also requires us to consider how human rights norms 
apply to a global environmental threat. Most human rights bodies that 
have examined the application of human rights norms to environmental 
issues have examined harm whose causes and effects are felt within one 
country. Climate change obviously does not fit within this pattern.314   
He notes further, however, that attempting ‘to describe the extraterritorial human rights 
obligations of every state in relation to climate change would be of limited usefulness’.315   
Indeed, in principle, international human rights law operates territorially, even though there is 
some level of recognition of its extraterritorial application by various human rights Committees 
and Courts. The Special Rapporteur concluded that the extraterritorial approach is not a useful 
one in the climate change context due to the ‘practical obstacles’ of making the jurisdictional 
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3.4.1 Recognising Nature in a Climate Changing World: the Colombia Advisory Opinion 
In the Inter-American system, the Inter-American Court takes ‘a relatively liberal approach to 
the question of state responsibility for extraterritorial human rights violations’.316 This is 
exemplified by the new approach the Inter-American Court has taken in its recent Advisory 
Opinion to Colombia.317 Contrary to the restrictive approach of the Inter-American 
Commission in the Inuit petition, which, like in the Athabaskan Peoples case, addresses 
extraterritoriality issues by assuming that emissions ‘by the United States and Canada, are in 
breach of individual human rights’;318 the Inter-American Court, in the Advisory Opinion, 
instead, develops a preventive approach, based on the state duty to prevent transboundary 
damage. As such, the Inter-American Court shifts the focus from the reception place of the 
resulting impacts of climate change, where the victims of climate impacts are, to the place of 
origin of the activities leading to climate change, where the emitting activities take place for 
the purposes of determining jurisdiction. In this sense, the Inter-American Court was of the 
view that the state from which environmental harms emanate has extra-territorial human rights 
obligations under the Convention, if the case for causation can be made:  
States have the obligation to avoid transboundary environmental damage that can 
affect the human rights of individuals outside their territory. For the purposes of the 
American Convention, when transboundary damage occurs that effects treaty-based 
rights, it is understood that the persons whose rights have been violated are under 
the jurisdiction of the State of origin, if there is a causal link between the act that 
originated in its territory and the infringement of the human rights of persons 
outside its territory.319 
This reasoning in the Inter-American Court Advisory Opinion may likely help to clarify 
questions of jurisdiction in future climate claims, at least, within the Inter-American system. 
Yet, a possible side-effect of the ‘legal presumption of jurisdiction’,320 due to its conditional 
aspect based on establishing causation, is that it may trigger additional hurdles to prove the 
causal link between a conduct within a state and the harm to rights outside of it. As Atapattu 
and Campbell-Duruflé note, in the light of ‘the uncertainty inherent in climate science, the 
 
316 Gondek, at 381. 
317 See Advisory Opinion (n 135). 
318 Quirico (n 70) 193. 
319 Advisory Opinion (n 135) para. 101. 




presumption of jurisdiction may well be difficult to apply to cases of transboundary climate 
change harm’.321 Nevertheless, this approach developed by the Inter-American Court can 
potentially help to resolve standing and admissibility obstacles, as in the Inuit and Athabaskan 
Peoples petitions, and, in turn, increase the odds of a successful outcome.  
However, aside from this development by the Inter-American Court, extraterritoriality remains 
as one of the most difficult challenges for claimants to overcome in holding a state responsible 
for extraterritorial climate-related impacts on human rights. As Quirico identifies, ‘from the 
angles of external State action, there is a limited possibility of envisaging extraterritorial 
extension of jurisdiction in order to hold a State responsible for human rights breaches’.322 This 
limitation is particularly problematic in climate cases on mitigation because, contrary to 
adaptation claims, ‘the causal link between governmental action (or inaction) and climate 
change impacts on citizens that implicate their rights is generally easier to establish than in 
cases involving failure to mitigate’.323 In Urgenda, for instance, whereas the District Court 
tackled challenges of extraterritoriality and extratemporality by accepting the claimants 
standing ‘on behalf of individuals and future generations outside the Netherlands’,324 the Court 
of Appeal accepted standing only ‘on behalf of current Dutch nationals [as this] was undisputed 
between the parties’.325 And, consequentially, this restricted approach to extraterritoriality was 
also adopted by the Supreme Court. It held that ‘the parties do not dispute that Urgenda has 
standing to pursue its claim to the extent it is acting on behalf of the current generation of Dutch 
nationals against the emission of greenhouse gases in Dutch territory.326 In this way, as 
Nollkaemper and Burgers note in comparing the Dutch Supreme Court decision to the Inter-
Amercican Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion, the Supreme Court ‘neither rejected nor 
supported the conclusion of the IACHR relating to jurisdiction’.327 
On the other hand, in rights-based adaptation cases, extraterritoriality challenges ‘do not arise, 
given that petitioners would be taking action against their own governments to force greater 
adaptation efforts in order to safeguard their rights’.328 This is exemplified by the Leghari 
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case,329 whereby the Lahore High Court upheld the claim of a Pakistani farmer against its 
government, for failing to implement climate adaptation measures. Accordingly, it ordered 
several government agencies, inter alia, to designate ‘climate change focal persons’ to carry 
out the Framework for Implementation of Climate Change Policy (2014-2030), and create a 
Climate Change Commission to oversee the development of the national climate action plan.330 
Indeed, the ambitious approach of the Lahore High Court was probably facilitated by the 
domestic character of adaptation claims, although it recognized the extraterritorial dimension 
in the context of climate change, whereby ‘the identity of the polluter is not clearly ascertainable 
and by and large falls outside the national jurisdiction’.331  
Yet, irrespective of whether climate cases involve mitigation or adaptation claims, the 
extraterritorial application of human rights law remains problematic. This is particularly 
important in order to address the climate impacts suffered by the most vulnerable states and 
communities, such as, small island states.  
It is certainly useful to ground the obligation on states doing more in human rights law. 
However, relying on the assumption that human rights law will persuade states to act and 
cooperate in good faith, is something at least questionable. Indeed, the human rights approach 
to state cooperation side-lines the dominant role of transnational corporations both in the 
international legal order and in causing climate change. As Grear and Weston argue, ‘in light 
of … widespread human and environmental abuse at the hands of TNCs and other corporate 
actors, the need of individuals, groups and states to be able to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction 
to hold globally powerful corporate human rights violators to account is now 
incontrovertible’.332 Given that transnational corporations are responsible for most of the global 
emissions contributing to climate change, some form of accountability is urgent.333 However, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, their intricate legal nature with multiple branches 
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established in different countries poses additional problems to the extraterritorial application of 
human rights, and makes it especially cumbersome to establish liability for climate-related 
impacts. Grear and Weston note that, in international human rights law, there is ‘an almost 
complete absence of any effective way of holding corporations directly accountable for human 
rights abuses, or of preventing such abuses or even of ensuring redress for the victims of such 
abuses’.334 In this context, climate litigation emerges as a legal avenue to address complex 
jurisdictional issues presented by transnational corporate activity in cases involving 
extraterritorial impact to rights.  
3.4.2 Inquiry on the Human Rights Responsibility of the Largest Emitters: The Carbon 
Majors Case 
The Carbon Majors inquiry335 submitted to the Commission on Human Rights of 
The Philippines had to address first jurisdictional issues in order to initiate its investigation on 
the responsibility of corporations with large contributions to global emissions, for rights 
violations or threats resulting from climate impacts. Some corporations challenged the 
Commission’s authority to admit the petition on a jurisdictional basis, arguing that they were 
not headquartered in the Philippines.336 For instance, Shell, one of the Carbon Majors, relied 
on the well-established ‘effective control’ approach to jurisdiction to challenge the 
Commission’s authority to carry out the investigation.337 It was of the view that ‘the 
‘extraterritorial application of human rights obligations is limited to exceptional circumstances, 
such as for example, where the state exercises “effective control” over the territory of 
another’.338 The corporation invited to present their views also challenged the Commission’s 
jurisdiction on the basis that ‘any attempt by the Commission to apply the Philippines’ human 
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rights extraterritorially to actions of foreign corporations on the territory of another state 
without legal basis will amount to an incursion of the sovereignty and independence of that 
other State.’339  
Likewise, Cemex, alleged that ‘the jurisdiction of a state is limited only to the confines of its 
physical boundaries’ and, accordingly, the Commission has no jurisdiction.340 Nevertheless, the 
Commission was firm in accepting the petition, in accordance with its ‘general mandate to 
uphold the human rights of all Filipinos and, towards this end, to investigate and monitor all 
matters concerning the human rights of the Filipino people’.341 The Carbon Majors responses 
to the Commission, accordingly, failed to consider the fact that ‘states frequently exercise 
adjudicatory and legislative jurisdiction over persons or events outside their territory, as long 
as there is a clear connecting nexus between that state and the person or conduct that it seeks to 
regulate’.342 Contrary to, for instance, Repsol’s view alleging that the Commission did not have 
jurisdiction because it is ‘not doing/transacting, and has never done/transacted, business in the 
Philippines’,343 there is a nexus between the Philippines and the Carbon Majors’ conduct in 
generating emissions, leading to climate change. This nexus is based on the impacts that 
corporate activity resulting in climate change effects had over the rights of the people of the 
Philippines. The Commission, therefore, had jurisdiction to accept the Carbon Majors petition 
filed by Filipino citizens. Savaresi, Cismas and Hartmann point out to the general acceptance 
of the application of the protective principle of jurisdiction, though they note the lack of 
consensus on how this principle might apply. Noting that the principle authorises states ‘to 
protect themselves by regulating and adjudicating over conduct carried out abroad that may 
damage their essential interests. They observed that it ‘can only be justified by the need to 
protect ‘essential’ or ‘vital interests’ of the state, but there is little consensus on how these 
should be defined.’344 Given what was at stake in the Carbon Majors case, that is, the 
fundamental rights of the people of the Philippines, which represent ‘vital interests’ of the 
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Philippines, the Commission’s jurisdiction to accept the Carbon Majors petition was 
indisputable.345 
The Commission thus was oriented to determine the responsibility of corporations for rights 
violations resulting from climate impacts by asserting its jurisdiction, within its mandate, to 
uphold the Carbon Majors petition.346 A similar approach is taken elsewhere. For example, 
General Comment 24 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, states, in 
accordance with the principles of prevention and ‘effective control’ that the ‘extraterritorial 
obligation to protect requires States parties to take steps to prevent and redress infringements 
of Covenant rights that occur outside their territories due to the activities of business entities 
over which they can exercise control.347  
The Commission, in the Carbon Majors case made a notable development by admitting the 
petition to investigate the responsibility of multinational corporations, regardless whether  they 
were or not headquartered in The Philippines or where they conduct their operations. As 
Savaresi, Cismas and Hartman reflect, the Commission ‘achieved an important result, by 
demonstrating that national human rights institutions may look at the responsibilities of 
corporations, even when these are not headquartered in the territory of the state where the 
investigation takes place, as long as the exercise of their powers can be justified under one of 
the principles of jurisdiction’.348 This interpretation of jurisdiction in the field of human rights 
in the context of climate change may trigger an increasingly active role of national human rights 
institutions to clarify question of human rights associated with climate change impacts. Within 
their national legal frameworks and scope, such national human rights institutions can 
potentially explore avenues to determine (corporate) responsibility for climate-led impacts to 
human rights in parallel with the judiciary, for instance, through investigation or monitoring 
mechanisms.349    
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Overall, extraterritoriality remains one of the most challenging barriers to be surmounted by 
claimants in rights-based climate litigation. Traditionally, courts have followed a restrictive 
approach when dealing with the extraterritorial application of human rights. The European 
Court of Human Rights has taken a particularly stringent approach to the issue. As Shelton 
notes, the European Court ‘has several times indicated that jurisdiction in international law is 
‘primarily territorial’.350 The Inter-American system of human rights was, not all that long ago, 
not so different. The Inter-American Commission, for instance, took a cautious approach when 
confronted with the first rights-based climate claim in the Inuit petition. However, recent 
developments indicate that extraterritoriality hurdles are no longer insurmountable and could 
be gradually overcome. The Inter-American Court’s Advisory Opinion provides an innovative 
avenue to addressing extraterritoriality issues based on the place of origin of actions leading to 
human rights violations instead of the general view focused on the place where rights violations 
are felt. Similar avenues in that direction may be developed in order to meaningfully addressing 
corporate activity disproportionally contributing to climate change.351 In this vein, the Carbon 
Majors case provides an opportunity to explore how human rights bodies can overcome the 
question of the extraterritorial application of human rights in the context of climate change in 
relation not only to state, but also corporations, given their crucial emissions contributions to 
climate change. Therefore, as Shelton foresees, ‘international human rights bodies may face 
innovative claims and efforts to expand jurisdiction well beyond what is conferred by the 
relevant legal instruments’.352 
 
4. Rights-Based Climate Litigation: Opportunities and Challenges  
Recent climate litigation has been characterized by the use of innovative strategies that include 
the resort to constitutional rights and human rights arguments, either on their own or in 
combination with other litigation ‘tools’ such as the public trust doctrine, the precautionary 
principle or civil law.353 Moreover, the increasing severity and frequency of climate-related 
events worldwide, in conjunction with alarming projections from climate science, has meant a 
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growing reliance on science in climate claims. On the one hand, claimants are more willing to 
push the borders of traditional limitations in climate litigation, such as the separation of powers 
doctrine, standing hurdles or jurisdictional issues. On the other hand, courts appear to be more 
receptive to complex claims that challenge the application of human rights law in the context 
of climate change and, accordingly, are open to relaxing standing barriers.  From a general 
perspective, the deployment of rights-based arguments in climate litigation facilitates the 
legitimate demand for climate justice from claimants, but also, purposefully, or not, brings 
‘public and political attention to the detrimental human consequences of climate change’.354 
Framing climate claims through rights language translates into law what was previously 
confined to the climate news or scientific articles. The existential threat of climate change to 
ecosystems and communities worldwide, whether to the Inuit or Athabaskan Peoples in the 
Arctic or peoples in small island states in the Pacific Ocean, has become tangible as a result. 
Most importantly, rights-based climate litigation helps the public and, particularly, 
governments to realise that climate change is not only Arctic peoples’ or small island states’ 
problem, but a global one that threatens humanity existentially and the environment as a whole 
and, as such, requires urgent action. As Knox notes, ‘applying human rights rhetoric to climate 
change may draw attention to its effects on particular communities, convince those not yet 
directly affected that it threatens environmental disaster on an unprecedented scale, and make 
individuals and states more willing to make the hard choices needed to combat it’.355 
However, the persuasiveness of rights-based climate litigation is still limited considering that 
most parts of the world are not (yet) active in climate litigation and that, litigation activity is 
concentrated in the Western world. This might be explained by the fact that large corporations 
are mainly headquartered in so-called developed states and they represent the biggest group of 
claimants.356 In contrast, only a small portion of climate litigation worldwide can be considered 
rights based. According to the Climate Litigation Database, at the time of writing, only 47 cases 
are categorised as human rights claims.357 These facts indicate that most climate litigation 
activity is not oriented to enhancing governments’ climate mitigation or adaptation efforts, 
protecting the rights of the most vulnerable to climate impacts, or establishing state or corporate 
liability for climate-related rights violations. However, despite the limited number of rights-
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based climate claims, compared either with claims filed by corporations or non-rights-based 
claims in general, this type of claim is growing steadily. In 2016, for example, there were only 
24 cases registered in the Climate Change Litigation database.358 This is likely in part due to 
the influence of ‘successful’ outcomes like Urgenda and innovative strategies, such as those 
used in Juliana,359 the potential of rights-based climate litigation should not be dismissed.  
Rights-based claims originating in the Third World still represent a minority of cases within the 
(already) narrow universe of rights-based climate litigation. The development of climate 
litigation in the Global South provides an opportunity to develop rights-based climate litigation 
strategies from the perspective of those most vulnerable communities in the context of climate 
change. Setzer and Benjamin highlight that claims in the Global South are not focused on 
developing new legislation.360 They rather focus on addressing ‘poor enforcement of existing 
planning and/or environmental legislation, possibly acknowledging the capacity constraints 
involved in passing new legislation on climate change in some jurisdictions’, as well as ‘on 
efforts to protect important native ecosystems’.361 Significantly, rights-based climate litigation 
from the Global South also provides an opportunity to incorporate realities previously ignored 
by human rights law. Particularly, the relational approach of human rights law to ‘abstract’ 
notions like the environment and future generations can be envisaged in rights-based claims, in 
general and, in particular, in claims originating in the Global South. For instance, in the Tutela 
case,362 the declaration of legal personhood to a vital ecosystem for the world, like the Amazon 
region represents an important step in rethinking the relational approach of human rights to the 
environment.363 
Nevertheless, despite this seemingly auspicious emergence of rights-based climate litigation, 
its limitations should not be overlooked. First, while rights-based climate litigation emerges as 
an avenue through which technical issues posed by the complex nature of climate change can 
potentially be overcome, it is also a challenge for courts - traditionally conservative institutions.  
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Depending on the national or regional legal culture, courts can be more or less accommodating 
to the legal challenges presented by climate change. Even in the limited range of rights-based 
climate case law so far, it is clear that there is still a reluctant attitude from courts to hear 
unconventional stories of climate-related human rights violations or threats. As Fisher, Scotford 
and Barritt point out, given the varied courts and tribunals, in which these cases are heard, we 
are yet to see an overarching response to climate change cases. They observe, further, that we 
are still at the early and disruptive state of climate litigation and courts are still trying to make 
‘legal sense of climate change: 
…climate change often presents a disruptive challenge to courts and tribunals in 
recognizing cases or litigants within their jurisdiction and legal traditions. It is not 
a case of whether courts should say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to hearing climate change cases, 
but how they can make legal sense of climate change as a problem when relevant 
disputes appear before them. This problem does not go away once climate change 
is legally recognized by courts.364 
‘Successful’ cases like Urgenda or Leghari should thus be greeted cautiously. While those 
courts’ receptivity in those claims provide a positive outlook for subsequent claims inspired in 
those cases, it is too early to posit them as part of a pattern of success. National factors such as 
the legal culture or the particular vulnerability of certain states to climate impacts might 
influence the judicial approach to claims. For instance, the position of the Netherlands in terms 
of vulnerability to climate impacts may have been taken into account by the Supreme Court in 
Urgenda. It ‘specifically singled out the risk of a sharp rise in sea level, which may make the 
low-lying Netherlands partly uninhabitable’.365 Likewise, in addition to its particularly 
vulnerable position to climate change,366 Pakistan has an ‘established track record of judicial 
activism in public interest environmental cases’.367 The specificities of states and their legal 
cultures may, therefore, be an important factor in the receptivity of courts in hearing these often 
technically complex claims. 
Second, the enforcement of judgements represents another challenge after litigation has been 
concluded, even in ‘successful’ cases, in which courts have made far-reaching decisions. As 
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Boyd notes, the enforceability of constitutional rights ‘vary markedly between countries.’368 
Regardless of the outcome, if enforceability is unlikely, then it is necessary to consider the 
impact of climate litigation as an avenue to foster climate action. For instance, in the Tutela 
case, the Colombian Supreme Court ordered the government to formulate an intergeneration 
pact for the life of the Colombian Amazon, within five months of the decision. In addition, the 
decision required the adoption of measures aimed at ending deforestation and greenhouse gas 
emissions.369 Despite this essentially positive outcome, the decision leaves unanswered 
questions as to how the government could be compelled to implement the decision, in the short 
period of time decided by the court. Lamprea and García remark, in this respect:  
How to credibly implement the Court’s orders in such a short period of time is a nagging 
question…crafting a policy plan for the effective protection of the vast Amazonian basin 
in only five months is an exceedingly ambitious goal, not to mention the objective of 
achieving zero deforestation and zero emissions of greenhouse gases in the next few 
years.370 
Arguably, such ambitious targets would be difficult for any government to achieve. As such, 
when assessing the competent court in which to file a case, claimants should also consider the 
enforcement capacity of that court as it varies across judicial systems. If the enforcement 
capacity within a judicial regime is weak, ambitious decisions may risk becoming paper tigers, 
without actual impact in global climate action.   
Third, as discussed in the previous chapter, there is a lack of legal mechanisms to hold 
corporations accountable for climate-related human rights violations and threats, despite their 
significant emissions contributing to climate change. The emergence of cases filed against 
corporations claiming their responsibility for past and current conduct contributing to climate 
change may prompt the development of legal mechanisms to establish corporate accountability 
for human rights harms resulting from climate impacts. Particularly, as well as the common 
challenges presented in climate litigation, rights-based claims targeting corporations help to 
address extraterritoriality obstacles given their complex relationship and their multiple branches 
in different jurisdictions across the world. Cases like the Carbon Majors may represent a step 
towards establishing corporate accountability for human rights harms through the use of 
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strategic litigation against corporations [which] ‘is on the increase’.371 This type of litigation 
also helps to raise public awareness about the role of corporations in the current climate crisis 
and the need for mechanisms to establish corporate accountability for climate change impacts 
upon rights and the environment worldwide.  
Fourth, the ‘rights-turn’372 in climate litigation provides not only opportunities to address 
challenges presented in the context of climate litigation, amongst them, causation, attribution, 
extratemporality and extraterritoriality, but it also helps to build bridges between previously 
unrelated fields such as human rights and climate science, including within the same or multiple 
claims. Notably, the deployment of human rights considerations in conjunction with climate 
science-based arguments reflects the ability of human rights language to break down silos 
between often disassociated fields in order to inform judges’ decisions. As Averill notes, 
climate change is often ‘viewed as primarily a matter of science. Human rights framing can 
help people to focus on the human stories about how climate change will impact people and 
communities. Emphasizing such human stories may help to move the discussion beyond the 
scientific debates that often mask important underlying values disputes’.373 Accordingly, the 
use of human rights language in climate litigation as a legal framework for climate stories may 
also facilitate accessibility and understanding of the urgent calls from climate science to reduce 
global emissions.374 
Fifth, the deployment of human rights arguments in climate litigation also helps to raise public 
awareness on the real impacts of climate change upon individuals and the environment all 
around the planet. However, it should be noted that claimants who reach the courts will not 
likely represent those most vulnerable to climate impacts within societies. Often, the most 
affected victims of climate impacts may not be willing or able to spend their efforts and money 
in costly and lengthy lawsuits,375 whose potential results may not directly reach them, at least 
in the short term.   
Sixth, rights-based climate litigation brings to the attention of judges and public opinion 
‘climate stories’ of rights harms affecting disproportionally the rights of present and future 
 
371Savaresi and Auz (n 12)7. 
372 Peel and Osofsky (n 3). 
373 Averill (n 9)142. 
374 See, for example, the IPCC 1.5ºC Report. 




generations.376 Innovative future generations’ claims like Juliana, certainly, represent one of 
the clearest examples of the benefits of the human rights ‘turn’ in climate litigation. As Lewis 
notes, the benefit of the ‘human rights-based approach is that it focuses attention on those who 
are most affected by climate change, giving them a voice and equipping them with a language 
to help in articulating their claims.377 In this sense, future ‘rights holders’ must be accounted 
for as they clearly will bear the burden of climate impacts,378 which is a consequence of ‘action 
taken (or not taken by current generations’.379 In light of this, the claims of future generations 
have the potential not only to prompt climate action from governments but also, more 
fundamentally, to expand temporal notions of human rights law.380  Similar to environmental 
law, human rights law has ‘a lopsided temporality, framed around a “present future” outlook in 
which the priority is governing contemporary activities that pose future risks such as climate 
change’.381 Certainly, the long-term value of current rights-based claims brought by children 
and youth has the potential to generate rethinking of human rights temporalities in a way to 
encompass the protection of the rights of future generations. Those claims portray the 
undeniable current and future realities of human rights violations resulting from climate change. 
Specifically, these realities, due to the cumulative nature of climate impacts, will continue to 
affect the young and future generations even if emissions could be completely and immediately 
stopped. Climate litigation involving young and future generations rights thus provides the 
opportunity to showcase otherwise ignored realities from one of the most vulnerable and 
disproportionally affected groups by climate change.  
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Presently, the ‘international community does not adequately recognize the links between human 
rights and climate change and failures in protecting the rights of current generations are 
common’.382 The relatively rapid proliferation of this type of claim involving future generations 
includes a number of cases taken in the Global South. In the longer term, this may help to 
capture the realities experienced in the Global South, which are often overlooked in human 
rights law.  
Although catalysing a rethinking of human rights law – by challenging the temporality of 
human rights, for example - may not have been the intention of the Colombian Supreme Court, 
its judgement, that case does facilitate room to rethink the relational approach of human rights 
law to the environment. In this newly conceived relationship, human rights law would recognize 
its central subject, the human, as part of the environment, instead of as a sort of superior entity 
under which the environment serves in a subordinate and instrumental capacity. The Tutela case 
thus symbolizes an early step in that direction, where human rights law was rethought in a way 
to reconsider the basic human rights and environment nexus. Stone, reflecting presciently on 
the need to extend rights thinking beyond the status quo, observed: 
We are inclined to suppose the rightlessness of rightless ‘things’ to be a decree of 
Nature, not a legal convention acting in support of some status quo ... The fact is, 
that each time there is a movement to confer rights onto some new ‘entity’, the 
proposal is bound to sound odd or frightening or laughable. This is partly because 
until the rightless thing receives its rights, we cannot see it as anything but a thing 
for the use of ‘us’-those who are holding rights at the time.383 There is something 
of a seamless web involved: there will be resistance to giving the thing ‘rights’ until 
it can be seen and valued for itself; yet it is hard to see it and value it for itself until 
we can bring ourselves to give it ‘rights’.384 
The environment and future generations are examples of ‘rightless things’. With time, 
developments in climate litigation may catalyse rethinking, maybe even reform, of human rights 
law, to integrate notions originally neglected. These reforms may entail reconsidering the 
relational approach of human rights to the environment and future generations or bringing the 
rights of future generations under the scope of its protection. Although it is still in an embryonic 
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stage, rights-based climate litigation can gradually prove that climate change has the potential 
to catalyse the rethinking of fundamental human rights law notions. In fact, ongoing and future 
claims grounded in human rights arguments will likely further consolidate such ‘trends and 
emphasize the extent of the nascent “rights turn”.385  
 
5. Conclusion 
It could be said that it is in climate litigation that the previously disassociated areas of human 
rights and climate change are increasingly interacting with each other and developing ‘stronger 
linkages’.386 Rights-based climate cases can help to test the ability of human right to assist 
claimants in overcoming the challenges of causation, attribution, extra-temporality and 
extraterritoriality. Irrespective of the outcomes of cases, the emergence of rights-based climate 
litigation demonstrates that human rights will likely play an increasingly important role in 
climate action, both inside and outside the courtrooms to the extent of potentially expanding 
basic human rights notions. 
The use of human rights law in climate litigation as an avenue to generate climate action is still 
very limited. However, the deployment of human rights considerations in climate litigation 
emerges as a promising litigation strategy, either applied on its own or in combination with 
other strategies. Framing climate claims with human rights arguments can effectively help to 
illustrate and inform public opinion in general on the actual or potential impacts of climate 
change upon the rights of individuals and communities worldwide and their surrounding 
environment. Most importantly, the application of human rights considerations in climate 
litigation shows that the context of climate change has the potential to catalyse fundamental 
rethinking and even reforms of basic human rights notions and their relational approach with, 
for example, future generations and the environment. This may trigger the gradual evolution of 
human rights law towards a more integrated notion that embraces the protection of the 
environment and the rights of future generations under its scope. 
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The ongoing global climate emergency is putting all forms of life on Earth under serious threat. 
Storms, droughts, floods, heat waves, droughts, hurricanes, glaciers melting, sea level rise, 
wildfires among other increasingly frequent and severe climate events adversely impact 
ecosystems and the human rights of individuals and communities across the planet. Yet, despite 
the numerous warnings from science to limit carbon emissions in order to hold global 
temperature increase to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels, as per the most ambitious target of the 
Paris Agreement, efforts in that direction have been limited. The commitments of governments 
at both national and multilateral level have failed to meet the level of urgency and ambition 
required to tackle climate change. As has been shown in this thesis, there is an unprecedented 
climate emergency, however, it appears that the ‘alarm bells’ are being ignored or, at the very 
least, they are not being responded to through the level of action required to limit the impacts 
of a changing climate. This governmental inaction has led to bottom-up responses from 
individuals and civil society; their responses are often grounded in human rights arguments and 
they seek better responses from state and non-state actors to the climate crisis. One area where 
we can see such bottom-up responses is climate litigation.  
This thesis has argued that the climate crisis can act as catalyst of human rights rethinking and 
expansion in such a way as to gradually correct intrinsic (mis)understandings of the 
environment or natural world that are built into international human rights law, as a result of its 
Western inception reflecting neoliberal economic objectives; objectives which led to this 
climate crisis in the first place. In that sense and informed by Third World Approaches to 
International Law theories, this thesis has been premised on the understanding that international 
law and, specifically, international human rights law, echo a neoliberal global ‘agenda’ that 
promotes and legitimises neocolonial dynamics of economic dominance over the so-called 
Third World, and which facilitates the exploitation of nature in the name of economic growth 
at-any-cost.  
As a consequence of this understanding, this thesis has been premised on the argument that the 
natural world has been misrepresented in international law, specifically, in the two legal 
frameworks that are the subject of thesis, namely the international legal regime on climate 




of departure that climate change is in essence an economic problem resulting, to a great extent, 
from the capitalist orientation of international law, which is also mirrored in international 
human rights law, and has facilitated neocolonial relations with the Third World including the 
thorough exploitation of nature. The natural world or environment, I have claimed, in this thesis, 
is portrayed in international law, also in international human rights law, as a ‘storage of raw 
materials,’1 at the service of human needs.  
In this context, corporations, as the main agents of capitalism, have been empowered through a 
favourable international regulatory framework that facilitates their economic growth objectives 
at the cost of environmental exploitation and human suffering, particularly in the Third World. 
Representing about one-third of the sources of global emissions, corporations are considered, 
in this thesis, as having had a crucial role in leading the Earth into this new epoch of the 
Anthropocene and, more specifically, the Capitalocene. They are, now and historically, the 
largest contributors to climate change. 
This thesis has sought to demonstrate that the uniqueness of climate change – a global problem, 
that threatens the habitability of the Earth and its living species, including the human species – 
amounts to a ‘Grotian Moment.’ In Anghie’s words, a Grotian moment entails ‘one in which 
the entire character of the international system changed irrevocably. As a consequence, the old 
system of international law and relations appeared inadequate, to many, to deal with these 
unprecedented challenges.’2 In this vein, this thesis has argued that, indeed, the uniqueness of 
the context of climate change will trigger rethinking and, ultimately, correction of international 
human rights law’s original (mis)understandings in its relational approach to nature.  As a result, 
in light of the climate crisis and through structural reforms that incorporate an ecocentric 
dimension to international human rights law, international human rights law could make a more 
substantial contribution to the protection of human rights in the long-term. 
From this perspective, this thesis has, first, sought to understand the dynamics of power and 
dominance that wealthy states exert over the ‘so-called’ Third World, which reverberate 
colonial forms of subjugation and promote environmental exploitation. To that end, chapter one 
examined the making of the international law on climate change under the auspices of the 
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UNFCCC. In this process, it has tracked the significant legal and policy developments that 
emerged from the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, through to 
the entry in to force of the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change right 
up to the most recent international treaty on climate change in the form of the Paris Agreement. 
Chapter one attempted to draw awareness to what the main concerns of states have been in light 
of their own experiences of climate change. It considered state responses to the climate crisis 
bearing in mind throughout the view of dominant states, which have defined the course of global 
climate action. In doing so, chapter one acknowledged the paradox of climate change, whereby 
those who contribute the least to the problem –- such as, small island states and the most 
vulnerable within societies –- suffer first and worst the disproportional effects of climate 
change, whereas the largest emitting states, which contribute most significantly to the problem, 
while and which do feel the impacts of the crisis albeit to different degrees, are least willing to 
undertake meaningful commitments contributing to global climate action. These dynamics of 
power and dominance have blatantly been exhibited throughout climate negotiations and they 
have been reflected in the outcomes of the hose negotiations. In this respect, the Kyoto Protocol 
and its ‘market-friendly’ mechanisms which legitimise neocolonial forms of dominance and 
environmental exploitation is particularly noteworthy. Overall, chapter one contextualized the 
emergence of human rights considerations in the multilateral climate change debates and 
assessed their peripheral role throughout. They remained largely absent until the breakthrough 
in the Paris Agreement, when human rights were given explicit recognition in the preamble, 
this marked a ‘new’ stage in the relationship between human rights and climate change. 
In the light of the appearance of human rights in the international climate change negotiations 
and, finally, in an international climate change treaty – the Paris Agreement, chapter two aimed 
at demonstrating and discussing how human rights are affected by climate change. As such this 
chapter focused on identifying both the linkages between human rights and climate change and 
how a human rights approach to climate change can benefit understanding of the human 
dimension of the problem. In this vein, chapter two contended that climate change harms and 
puts at risk a number of human rights, in particular, the right to life, health, adequate housing 
and food, water, and the collective rights of indigenous peoples, the rights to self-determination, 
the participatory rights of individuals and communities and the right to a healthy environment 
as a whole. In addition, the chapter argued that climate mitigation and adaptation measures, 
such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries - REDD and REDD+ 




human rights. Chapter two also identified the key role of the right to a healthy environment, as 
an early avenue to incorporate environmental considerations into international human rights 
law, even if the right to a health environment remains a very anthropocentric approach to the 
environment, prioritizing, as it does, the human vis-à-vis the environment. In this sense, chapter 
two pointed to the significant presence of the right to a healthy environment in constitutions or 
national climate legislation around the world. This signifies an early yet important step towards 
incorporating and ultimately correcting the human rights’ relational approach to the natural 
world.  
This thesis sought to examine the crucial role of corporations in the climate crisis, Corporations 
are the largest contributors to climate change, and they are responsible for at least two-thirds of 
global carbon emissions leading to climate change. Chapter three assessed, therefore, the 
existing international regulatory framework under which corporations operate. Chapter three 
examined the main ‘soft-law’ instruments that guide corporate human rights behavior, also in 
the context of climate change. In that sense, chapter three found that there is a lack of stringent 
norms that legally bind corporations and that regulate their human rights and environmentally 
sensitive behaviour. Rather, chapter three found that corporations have traditionally enjoyed a 
favourable and voluntarism-based legal framework that legitimizes both the exploitation of 
nature and the human rights harms which result from corporate activity, particularly in the Third 
World. As a result, chapter three concluded that, unless far more stringent and legally binding 
regulations, to control corporate activity impacting human rights and the environment are 
introduced, little can be done to limit the impacts of climate change upon human rights and the 
environment.  
Consequentially, given that governments have fallen short both on regulating corporate activity 
and on taking radical steps to limit climate change impacts, individuals and civil society 
movements have attempted to fill the gap. In particular, there has been a proliferation in climate 
litigation. Youth activists, civil society activists and others have been filing climate claims 
before courts worldwide. Chapter four sought to examine this emerging climate litigation trend. 
It examined how climate claims can be grounded in human rights arguments and, thus, brought 
to consideration of judiciaries worldwide. Either as a main argument or as peripheral 
consideration, human rights legal arguments are increasingly being deployed in the context of 
climate litigation. Therefore, by using rights-based climate claims as a case study, chapter four 




way as to identify early signs of the potential for human rights to expand its horizons with 
respect to the relational approach to the environment. In doing so, chapter four sought to assess 
how human rights are being applied in the climate litigation arena in order to overcome complex 
challenges of causation, attribution, and the extratemporal and the extraterritorial dimension of 
human rights law. Thereby, chapter four has found that human rights deployment in the context 
of climate litigation has the potential to build avenues to progressively surmount those legal 
challenges, and, just as importantly, to trigger rethinking of the boundaries of human rights law 
and its (mis)understandings with respect to the nature.  
One can thus consider the disappointing outcome of the Inuit case before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights at the beginning of this century and compare it with current 
rights-based climate litigation outcomes, such as the Urgenda case in the Netherlands, or indeed 
in same human rights regional system, the Tutela case, and we can see evidence of the growing 
receptivity of various judicial bodies to claims connecting climate change impacts with human 
rights. Chapter four concluded that, whilst at an embryonic stage, the context of climate change 
is already triggering - or even forcing- human rights rethinking in such a way to prompt 
reconsideration or expansion, indeed evolution, of the human rights relational approach to the 
environment. This suggests a move towards the recognition of the rights of nature as 
exemplified by the Tutela case, and the rights of future generations, as exemplified in Juliana. 
There has also been a move towards recognising the responsibility of corporations for their 
disproportional emissions contributions leading to climate change, as exemplified in the case 
of Carbon Majors. All these unusual legal claims, at least earlier this century, would have 
probably led to a simple ‘no chance’ response from judges in the ‘climate as usual’ conditions. 
The changing judicial attitude is arguably a worrying reflection of the worrying reality, in which 
business as usual is no longer viable. 
Altogether these findings have led me to conclude that, indeed, climate change has the potential 
to act as a catalyst for the rethinking of human rights law and for the gradual correction, in the 
longer term, of human rights law, leading ultimately to the expansion of its relational approach 
to the environment. Should this expansion materialise in positive international human rights 
law in such a way that human rights law would value the environment or natural world 
intrinsically rather than for its instrumental value in satisfying human needs, it will likely be 
because of developments beyond the various judicial bodies. The decisions discussed in this 




human rights from its innate neoliberal roots, which resulted from their Western origins. This 
would, in turn, help to truly, at least in a more meaningful way than currently exists, universalize 
human rights.  
As an overall consequence, this thesis argues that, indeed, the ongoing climate crisis amounts 
to a ‘Grotian moment’ in international law. Whether climate change will allow time for this 
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